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ABSTRACT

CHRISTIAN SUPERSESSIONISM AND THE DILEMMA OF DIALOGUE IN JOS NIGERIA:
EXPLORING PANIKKAR’S DIALOGICAL DIALOGUE AS A PARADIGM FOR
INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE

By
Martin Akowe Ahiaba
December 2016

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Marinus Iwuchukwu, PhD
The Middle-belt and Northern Nigeria are notoriously known as the epicenter for ethnic
and religious warfare. The hostility between the two dominant religions—Islam and
Christianity—has a beginning that pre-dates the British colonial occupation in 1903. Islamic
opposition to British cultural imperialism and religious superiority continues in its outright
rejection of Christian supersessionism and the formation of fundamentalist sects. Though not
denying the importance of addressing the economic, ethnic, and political context of the problem
of violence, this work focuses on exclusivist Christology and its hermeneutical use in framing
the dialogue between Christians and Muslims in Jos Plateau.
We analyze the nature of absolute claims emanating from Christian supersessionism and
evaluate how these have served as triggers to violence, provoked by the slightest religious
misunderstanding. Such an exclusive Christological definition lends to religious extremism, and
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it raises serious ethical and theological questions for Christianity as a religion that preaches love
and hospitality for neighbors, especially the stranger. In this sense, Christian supersessionism
poses grave ethical danger to the virtue of hospitality in that it reduces the horizon of Christian
compassion, making it accessible only to members of the Christian faith community.
By applying Raimon Panikkar’s non-dualistic method and his post-colonial critique of
Western theological imperatives, this works seeks to liberate exclusivist Christology from its
totalizing tendencies. It is our intention to develop an alternative dialogical pneumatology of
charity and hospitality that is necessary for the interreligious encounter and mutual coexistence
between Christians and Muslims. This investigation shows that Panikkar’s cosmotheandric
vision of reality which promotes “individuality, irreducibility and reciprocity,” remains the sine
qua non for interreligious peace in a pluralistic setting. Cosmotheandrism offers a deep
complementarity of perspectives, insights, and approaches. In sum, cosmotheandrism within the
context of interreligious dialogues argues that there is no “one religion” that can be imposed on
the “many,” and there are no “many” that can be reduced to the “one.” Thus, we contend that
Panikkar’s concept of dialogical dialogue, which draws from the cosmotheandric vision, remains
an effective method for formulating both the theoretical and hermeneutical principles required
for addressing Christian exclusivism.
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CHAPTER ONE
HISTORICAL CONTEXT, RESEARCH QUESTION AND
METHODOLOGY OF STUDY
1.1. Introduction
The Middle Belt Region of Nigeria includes the city of Jos, which is the capital city of
Plateau State. In the modern era, Jos has unfortunately also become the epicenter of ethnic and
religious violence in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria. Between the years 2000 and 2009, an
estimated 4,000 people have been killed in Jos as well as in its surrounding villages and cities.1
This area forms a part of Northern Nigeria, one of the most diverse regions of Nigeria, ethnically
and linguistically, with over 300 languages.2
Ethnicity, as manifested in the indigene/settlers’ phenomenon, has been identified among
other factors as the immediate cause of conflict and violence in Jos.3 Scholars have identified
religion as the most prevailing factor serving as a catalyst for the violence. The indigenous ethnic
groups in and around Jos were once largely Traditionalists;4 however, during the colonial era the
indigenous peoples overwhelmingly converted to Christianity. Contemporaneously, there was a
gradual settling of Muslim Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups in the city. Over time, this mixture of
religious and ethnic presence became a source of concern to the former Traditionalist indigenous
groups.
1

J. A. Krause, Deadly Cycle: Ethno-religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria. Working Paper
(Geneva: Switzerland, 2010).
2
Umar Habila Dadem Danfulani, “Religious Conflict on the Jos Plateau, the Interplay between Christianity and Traditional
Religion During the Early Missionary Period,” Swedish Missiological Themes 89, no. 1 (2001): 3.
3
See S.G. Best, Conflict and Peace Building in Plateau State, Nigeria (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd,
2007); Human Rights Watch (2006); Sam G. Egwu, Ethnicity and Citizenship in Urban Nigeria: the Jos Case, 19602000. Unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, University of Jos, 2004.
4
By “Traditionalist,” I mean the adherents of African traditional religions; this term is preferred as more
subtle than the term “pagans.”
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This chapter surveys the historical background of British colonial rule and the consequent
ideological uses of religion—Islam and Christianity—to consolidate political power in Jos, as
well as in the entire Northern Nigeria area.5 Our focus will be the role of religion in the interplay
between the outsiders—i.e., the British colonial authority—and the Hausa/Fulani, identified as
the insiders: namely, the ethnic groups within the current geopolitical space of Jos, Plateau. The
introduction of the outsider-incited conflicts and disputes ultimately led to a power struggle
between the ethnic minorities of the Middle Belt6 region and the dominant Hausa/Fulani, who
became viewed as simply representatives of colonial authorities.
On the one hand, within the general perspective of the history of Islam in Northern
Nigeria, 7 it is assumed that the British ideological use of religion and politics was gainfully
employed by the Sokoto hegemony to continue the political and religious domination of minority
ethnic groups. This perspective led to the narrative that Islam benefited from the British colonial
apparatus. On the other hand, Mohammed S. Umar argues that the colonial policies of the
“appropriation and containment” of Islam had an adverse effect on its external growth and
internal harmony,8 and that this repression of Islam’s advance towards the Middle Belt, and some
cities in Southern Nigeria, proved advantageous to the evangelistic agenda of the Christian
missionaries.

5
We subscribe to Iwuchukwu’s geographical definition of northern Nigeria as meaning “territories of
northern and middle belt Nigeria under one large geopolitical area until the federal system of 1967.” Marinus
Iwuchukwu, and Brian Stilner, eds. Can Muslims and Christians Resolve Their Religious and Social Conflicts:
Cases from Africa and the United States (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2013), 3.
6
This geographical area covers the Tiv, Igala, Idoma and Bassa, under the formal Benue-Plateau region.
See Moses Ochunu, “Colonialism within Colonialism: Hausa-Caliphate Imaginary and the British Colonial
Administration of Nigerian Middle Belt,” African Studies Quarterly 10, no. 1 & 2 (Fall 2008).
7
See Iwuchukwu’s description of Northern Nigeria, footnote 5 above.
8
See Muhammad S. Umar, Islam and Colonialism: Intellectual Responses of Muslims of Northern Nigeria
to British Colonial Rule (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2006).
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On both the Christian and Muslim sides, “...religious leaders sought to supplant the other
religious group...” 9 In some instances, there have been deliberate attempts by Christians and
Muslims to gain and establish political control and religious superiority through proselytization.
Yet, from the Christian perspective, the narrative that Islam benefited more from the British
colonial authority is still dominant as if the British designed the indirect rule system especially
for the Islamic context of Northern Nigeria. On the contrary, the late Ali Muzrui asserts that the
British indirect rule policy, when applied to a Christian setting in Uganda, worked more in favor
of Christianity than in its application to Muslim-dominated Northern Nigeria. Mazrui argues,
In its application in Africa, Indirect rule favored Islam in those areas which were
already Islamized before the British came, but favored Christianity in areas where
traditional African religion still prevailed. This Indirect rule favored Islam in
Northern Nigeria (which owed its Islam to pre-colonial times), but favored
Christianity in Buganda and Southern Sudan where the prevailing mores and
beliefs were indigenous.10
However, the question about British support for Christian missions and the implication of
such for interreligious dialogue have not yet been investigated. Adiele Afigbo commented on the
detrimental effect of British double-dealing with Christians and Muslims and the implications for
religious dialogue:
“[T]here was also a positive way in which the British promoted the growth of
some of the evil consequences of cultural pluralism in Nigeria...the British also
caused untold havoc through the application of the policy of divide and rule, and
using different cultural criteria at different times to divide the peoples...they made
a clear distinction between Muslim Nigerian and the so-called animist
Nigerians...the Muslims were preferred to the animist...The [Muslims] in northern
Nigeria were considered more civilized by virtue of their monotheism than the
animist found mostly in the southern Nigeria.”11
9

Robert A Dowd, Christianity, Islam, and Liberal Democracies: Lessons from Sub-Saharan African
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 160.
10
Ali A. Mazrui, Resurgent Islam and the Politics of Identity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Scholars
Publishers, 2014), 23.
11
Toyin Falola, ed. Nigeria History, Politics and Affairs: The Collected Essays of Adiele Afigbo (Trenton,
NJ: Africa World Press, Inc, 2005), 410.
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This dissertation probes the extent of the claim of Christian superiority over Muslims in
Jos Plateau. More specifically, it investigates whether the collaboration of the British colonial
authorities with the Christian mission in the Jos Plateau supported a Christian sense of
superiority. It examines how this sense of superiority and entitlement laid the foundation of the
“rhetoric of supremacy”12 and exclusion of Muslims in Jos Plateau. In conclusion, I argue that
the continuation of such a “rhetoric of supremacy” of Christians in Jos Plateau State remains the
source of the ethnic-religious crisis.
This work therefore, probes absolute claims stemming from Christian supersessionism. It
addresses Muslims’ perception of Christian superiority as an extension of the British colonial
agenda. Today in Jos, these attitudes lie beneath and have been the trigger to spiraling conflicts
and violence provoked by even the slightest religious misunderstandings between Christians and
Muslims. The religious situation of violence calls for an epistemic reawakening and reevaluation
of the narratives, methods, and hermeneutics used in dialogue.13
Applying Raimon Panikkar’s14 dialogical dialogue, this project seeks first and foremost
to critique the basic position of Christianity: namely, the exclusive Christological claims that lies
at the heart of the evangelical approach to mission and dialogue with Islam. By so doing, we
intend to formulate an alternative dialogical principle 15 for mutual coexistence between
Christianity and Islam in Jos, Northern Nigeria.

12

This is borrowed from Chela Sandoval, Methodology of the Oppressed (Minnesota: University of
Minnesota Press, 2000).
13
In his work, Akinade proposes a Pneumatological approach to the study of Islam. Akintunde E. Akinade,
Christian Responses to Islam in Northern Nigeria: A Contextual Studies of its Ambivalent Encounters (NY:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 72.
14
Through the course of his theological career, Panikkar has, for various reasons, changed his first name
from Raimondo to Raymond and finally to Raimon. The footnotes and bibliographical references in this work will
use the surname, Panikkar.
15
Borrowed from neo-Kantian philosophers Herman Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, Eugen
Rosenstock, Ferdinand Ebner and Gabriel Marcel who used the term dialogical principle to describe a relationship

4

The concept of dialogical dialogue is at the heart of Panikkar’s cosmotheandric principle.
This vision of reality is the summation of Panikkar’s philosophical and theological thinking.
Panikkar’s cosmotheandrism has enormous implications for relational thinking between the
cosmos, God, and Humans in such a way that the principles of “individuality, irreducibility and
reciprocity,” are tightly maintained and integrated. Thus, in applying the Greek concept of
perikhoresis16 to the cosmotheandric vision of reality, Panikkar submits that “[t]here is no God
without man and world. There is no man without God and world. There is no World without God
and Man.”17 Cosmotheandrism and its accompanying principle of “individuality, irreducibility,
and reciprocity” make Panikkar’s theology of multiple belongings a possibility. This theology
forms the basis for his trans-spiritual and interreligious experience. Panikkar summarizes his
faith journey thus, “I ‘left’ as a Christian, I ‘found’ myself a Hindu and I ‘returned’ a Buddhist,
without ceasing to be a Christian.”18 The mutual fecundity evident in Panikkar’s theology of
multiple belonging testifies that dialogical dialogue ensures respect for the “individuality,
irreducibility, and reciprocity”19 of the other religions.
This project attempts to instantiate Panikkar’s dialogical dialogue into the polyvalent
religious atmosphere of Jos Plateau, Nigeria. I argue that the rhetoric enshrined in the current
dialectical hermeneutics underlying the methods for interreligious dialogue employed by
Christians in Jos encourages antagonism, hatred, and mistrust on the one hand, and, on the other,
terrorism, militancy, fundamentalism, and systematic exclusivism. These exclusivist religious
between “I” and “Thou” that is, the relation of co-authors in communication. See Ivana Markovà, Dialogicality and
Social Representation: The Dynamics of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 79. See also Per
Linell, Approaching Dialogue (Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2001), 263.
16
“Perichoresis or circumincessio, the dynamic inner circularity of the Trinity.” See Panikkar, The Trinity
and the Religious Experience of Man: Icon—Person—Mystery (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1973), 60.
17
Panikkar, The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness, Scott Eastham, Ed,
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 76.
18
Panikkar, The Intrareligious Dialogue (New York, Paulist Press, 1978), 2.
19
Panikkar, The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness, 76.
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categories are anti-peace and life-endangering. Thus, using Panikkar’s dialogical dialogue, we
can propose ‘an-Other’ model of interreligious dialogue that minimizes Christianity’s “rhetoric
of supremacy” 20 and exclusion and can strive for a dialogical pluralism 21 by promoting
difference and relationality. In addition to the need for dialogical principles that embrace
difference and promote relationality, this work argues that the acknowledgment and acceptance
of religious pluralism de facto and de jure in Jos remains the way forward towards peaceful coexistence among these religions.
Against this background of ethnic and political exclusivism built upon the
citizenship/indigenes problem, this research is to examine how the exclusivist Christology that
was inherited from missionaries in colonial times relates to Christian-Muslim dialogue in Jos
Plateau. This will mean, first, that the issue of colonial power and Christianity’s hermeneutic of
exclusion remains at the focus of this research. Second, it becomes necessary to investigate the
root of Christian supersessionism: its Christological presuppositions and foundations. Thus, the
search for a theological method other than the dialectics of classical Christology has led to the
instantiation of Panikkar’s pluralistic theology of religions.
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first chapter offers the introductory
part of the work. It gives a detailed review of the history of religious violence and conflict in
Northern Nigeria. This historical review sets the stage for the research question, the thesis of the
dissertation, and its operational methodology. This section demonstrates one fact: namely, that

20
Borrowed from Chela Sandoval, Methodology of the Oppressed (Minnesota: University of Minnesota
Press, 2000).
21
This phrase is used in this work to differentiate Panikkar’s pluralism from that of Hick and Dupuis.
Dialogical pluralism moves the discourse beyond Dupuis’ Inclusive pluralism and Alan Race’s trilogy-exclusivism,
inclusivism and pluralism. See Michael Barnes, Religions in Conversation: Christian Identity and Christian
Pluralism (London: SPCK, 1989), 172 ff.
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the phenomenon of religious violence is not new to Northern Nigeria. Indeed, it has deep-rooted
political and ethnic connections dating back to pre-colonial times. Since Northern Nigeria is
predominantly Islamic, there is a tendency to blame the Muslims for either reacting or overreacting to every instance of religious violence. For the Christian minority in northern Nigeria,
the atmosphere is unsafe for both practicing religious freedom—a constitutional right—and
conducting day-to-day business ventures. Thus, the Middle-belt city of Jos has come to be
perceived as a safe haven for Christians to achieve religious freedom and peace.
In order to make sense of the ethnic, political, and religious factors that precipitated the
2001 religious war in Jos, the second chapter, titled “Hermeneutics of Exclusion: Jos as Christian
City and Muslim Response,” attempts to demonstrate how the ethnic “indigenous versus settlers”
dynamics play into the larger theological framework that has given birth to Christian
supersessionism. This chapter furthers the debate on conceptual issues and theoretical
frameworks, exploring the relationship between pluralism, politics, and ethnicity, on the one
hand, and Christological supersessionism and Islamic fundamentalism on the other.
The third chapter proposes Panikkar’s dialogical pluralism as a desideratum that is
needed today in overcoming Christological supersessionism. Panikkar’s critique of the totalizing
tendencies inherent in traditional Christology provides the lens through which we evaluate the
lacuna in theological inclusivism and the excesses of exclusivism. Reading Panikkar alongside
and against the proponent of theological inclusivism/exclusivism allows for a new prospect for
thinking alterity. More important, this chapter examines Panikkar’s claim that Christophany
creates a better hermeneutical ground for the mystical “I—I” experiencing of the other religions
possible than does Christology.

7

The fourth chapter, titled “Raimon Panikkar’s Theology of Dialogical Dialogue,” focuses
deeply on Panikkar’s pneumatological and mystical experience and its contribution to a
pluralistic theology of dialogue. This pneumatology is conditioned by the mystical experience
drawn from his cosmotheandric vision of reality. As a result of the relationality and
interrelatedness that exist within Panikkar’s cosmotheandric trilogy, this chapter provides a
careful analyses of Panikkar’s dialogical pluralism, which aims at finding a hermeneutics of
hospitality that will serve as a way of exploring, understanding, and living with the “other.”
Finally, Chapter 5, “Theoretical Framework for Christian Dialogical Theology in Jos,”
explores further the implications of Panikkar’s relational pneumatology for the development of
an authentic Christian dialogue in post-crisis Jos. By proposing a hermeneutic of charity and
hospitality as the basis for interreligious dialogue, the chapter concludes by advocating for the
acceptance of religious pluralism de jure as the sine qua non for conflict resolution and peace
building in Jos, Nigeria.
1.2. Northern Nigerian Background of Religion and Conflicts
The history of Islamic conflicts and violence in Northern Nigeria is traceable to four
famous medieval civilizations in the West African sub-region: Ghana, Mali, Songhai, and the
Kanem Bornu empires. The successive nature of these Sahelian states was characterized by the
rise and fall of kingdoms and empires. This period lasted from approximately 800CE to
1600CE.22 Consequently, this epoch recorded conflict and violence on two fronts: internally,
there were struggles and resistance among vassal states and between conglomerated vassal states
against their lords; and externally, between established empires and external Arab and European

22

See Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L. Pouwels, The History of Islam in Africa (Ohio: Ohio University
Press, 2000); and Peter Clark, West Africa and Islam (London: Edward Arnold, 1982). See also Walter Rodney,
How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers Ltd, 1972). 31ff.
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forces. It was a period of great upheavals, comprising political unrest, failed ethnic negotiations
and aggression, territorial hostility, fratricide, and domestic slavery. Domestic slavery evidently
existed as the hub of subsistence economic enterprise in the pre-colonial era.23 The point here is
that the presence and dynamics of ethnic conflict and violence in the West African terrain predates the Sokoto Caliphate.
The Islamic faith, culture, and civilization were introduced to West Africa through trade
networks in gold, copper, species, and other mineral resources. Notable among events in the
history of Islam in sub-Saharan African around the eleventh century was the activity of the
Berber communities, whose members acted mainly as travel guides to the Arab merchants.24
According

to

Iwuchukwu,

“...[t]here

had

been

ongoing

economic

and

political

cooperation/negotiations between different city states in the Sokoto Caliphate and Kanem-Bornu
Empire with Muslim merchants and politicians from Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Chad, Mali,
Niger, etc., since the eleventh century.” Scholars of history refer to this era as the peak of the
African commerce and opening of the trans-Sahara trade route to northern Africa, Europe, and
Asia.
The Fulani jihad of 1804 and the consolidation of the Sokoto Caliphate25 have a complex
history. From a purely religious perspective, the jihad was reckoned as the activities of some
Islamist reformation groups with a purist theological agenda; others, from a sociological point of

See Paul Lovejoy, “Slavery in the Context of Ideology,” in The Ideology of Slavery in Africa, ed. Paul
Lovejoy (Beverley Hills: Sage, 1991), 11.
24
Iwuchukwu, Can Muslim and Christians, 6.
25
“Sokoto Caliphate is considered one of Nigeria’s last great empires. It stretches from Dori, present day
Burkina Faso, east to Adamawa in present day Cameroon and south to the town of Ilorin in Nigeria. The Sokoto
Caliphate emerged from the amalgamation of over 30 emirates in 1812 through a series of jihads that began in 1803
and were led by a Fulani called Usman don Fodio...The Sokoto Caliphate lasted until 1903, when the British and
French defeated it.” Toyin Falola and Ann Genova, eds., The Historical Dictionary of Nigeria (Maryland:
Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2009), 332; Kabiru Suleiman Chafe, State and Economy in the Sokoto Caliphate: Policies
and Practices in the Metropolitan Districts 1803-1904 (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1999).
23
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view, relate the jihad to racial uprising and ethnic cleansing; and from an economic perspective,
the jihad was viewed as an organized mass movement against oppressive feudal lords. 26
However, the position of early leaders of the movement supports the view that “in origin it was
also an important intellectual movement involving the minds of the leaders, a conception of the
ideal society, and a philosophy of revolution.”27 A balanced view will support tracing the jihad
movement to the reformation ideology of the itinerant preacher Usman dan Fodio, which turned
into a revolution that swept all of the Hausa states and beyond.28
It is important to underscore the historical presence of Islam in the frontiers of West
African city-states and in some Hausa states, such as Gobir and Zaria, prior to the jihad in 1804
and the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate.29 Thus, a consideration of this history in context
will balance the extreme positions championed by scholars like A. Burnes and M. Delafose who
have opined that “...the introduction of Islam neither profoundly affected the social and religious
life of the Hausa land, as Burns says, nor left it totally undisturbed as Delafose suggests.”30
On the whole, and from the onset, the imposition of British rule was an unwelcome
encounter, as evidenced in the stern reply of the Sultan Attahiru I of Sokoto to Colonel Lugard’s
initial advance: “I do not consent that any one of you should ever dwell with us. Between us and
you there are no dealings except as between Muslims and unbelievers.”31 As clearly enunciated

Marilyn Robinson Waldman, “The Fulani Jihad: A Reassessment,” in Journal of African History, VI, 3
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in the anonymous poem on Christians, Waka Nasara, the Islamic caliphate identified the British
as Christians.
10) Even if I have to leave alone, I will not say,
For, by Allah, I will not obey the Christians.
11) Between two alternatives one must be chosen:
Either hijra, or following the Christians.
12) Even the emirs have left their towns
So—if not hijra—what is there for a commoner?
Other than to become Christian.
14) Fear of death, and the love of life, we too have.
But to refuse the predestined is to follow the Christians.
15) If you say it is difficult to leave,
The totality of lahan (injury, blemish) is with those who follow
The Christians,
16) If you think you have powers and refuse hijra,
What power reaches the power of the Christian?
17) If they give a gift, don’t accept it.
It is poison they will give you; toxic is the gift of the Christians.
18) They admonished us to stop oppression:
But they are themselves oppressors, these Christians.
They have dark fitna and machination,
To spoil the religion of Islam—the Christians!32
The relationship between Muslims in northern Nigeria and the British was marred by
attempted invasions, bitter battles, and finally the conquest of 1903. Of note here is that the
British conquest of Northern Nigeria was gradual; starting with the defeat of Nupe and Ilorin, the
two forces matched on Kotongora in 1900 and advanced on Adamawa in 1901, leveled Bauchiin
1902 and finally Kano; and Sokoto fell under the mighty military strength of the British in 1903
at the battle of Burmi. 33 The Sokoto Caliphate was defeated and thus became a vassal state
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alongside other tributary states it once ruled.34Muslims interpreted the defeat and consequent
surrender of the Caliphate to the British along religious lines.
The British conquest marked the end of the Caliphate. Lord Lugard in his inaugural
speech of March 21, 1903, at the installation of the new emir of Sokoto Muhammad Attahiru II
pointed out the new reality of the conquered Sokoto Caliphate in unequivocal terms.
The old treaties are dead, you have killed them. Now these are the words which I,
the High Commissioner, have to say for the future. The Fulani in old times under
Dan Fodio conquered this country. They took the right to rule over it, to levy
taxes, to depose kings and to create kings. They in turn have by defeat lost their
rule which have come into the hands of the British. All these things which I have
said the Fulani by conquest took the right to do now pass to the British.35
The fall of the Sokoto Caliphate was a great relief for minority ethnic groups in this
region, especially for non-Muslims. Hassan Matthew Kukah alludes to the oppressive nature of
the Caliphate toward non Hausa/Fulani ethnic groups.36 Prior to the religio-political constitution
of the Hausa/Fulani ethnicities, references were made to the existence of the non-Muslim
Hausa—Maguzuwa—group. The Maguzuwa Hausa, through the amana agreement with the
Caliphate, maintained their cultural identity and did not commit to the cultural and political
collaboration of their fellow Hausas with the Fulani ethnicity. 37 The Maguzuwa are still found in
some parts of Kano, Katsina, and Jigawa States.

34

Muhammad S. Umar, Islam And Colonialism: Intellectual Responses of Muslims of Northern Nigeria to
British Colonial Rule, 1.
35
A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, The Principles of Native Administrations in Nigeria: Selected Documents 19001947 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 43, qtd. in Peter K. Tibenderana, “The Irony of Indirect Rule in
Sokoto Emirate, Nigeria, 1903-1944,” African Studies Review 31, no. 1 (April 1988): 67-92.
36
Matthew Hassan Kukah and Kathleen McGarvey, “Christian-Moslem Dialogue in Nigeria: Social,
Political, and Theological Dimensions,” in ed. Akintunde E. Akinade, Fractured Spectrum: Perspective on
Christian-Moslem Encounters in Nigeria, p. 14 (New York: Peter Lang, 2013). See also Mary Smith, Baba of Karo:
A Woman of the Muslim Hausa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).
37
For the population of the Maguzawa in Kastina emirate between 1903-1958, See Michael J. Watts, Silent
Violence: Food, Famine, and Peasantry in Northern Nigeria (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2013),
52; Frank A. Salomone, “Becoming Hausa: Ethnic Identity Change its Implication for the Study of Ethnic Pluralism
and Stratifications,” African: Journal of African International Institute 45, no.4 (January 1, 1975): 410-424; Moses

12

The existence of autonomous ethnic groups besides the Maguzawa in the far North and in
the Middle Belt demonstrated the complexities of the colonial rule. 38 The British subjugation of
the Sokoto Caliphate was totally new for both the conquered and the conqueror. The British
occupation of the Sokoto Caliphate was the first of its kind, as it signaled the collapse of an
Islamic empire not only to a foreign Western culture but to a conflicting religion—Christianity.
Consequently, the British invasion posed a major challenge to the psyche of Muslims and their
attitude toward Western ideologies and civilizations.
In this new dispensation, the Sultan of Sokoto—leader of Muslims (Sarkin Musulmi) was
subject to a secular authority and to receiving orders from the superior British colonial officer,
whose judgment on political matters and aspects of religious jurisprudence was final and binding
to all. “[P]rior to the imposition of colonial rule, the Sarkin Musulmi was the political head of the
Sokoto Caliphate, the religious leader of the community, and the supreme judge of the Islamic
law Shari’a.” 39 His duties included the appointments and depositions of emirs and the
enforcement of the Shari’a. Strange enough was the fact that under this new order, the British
colonial authority assumed the administrative role of the sultan of Sokoto—Sarki Musilmu.40
This situation left the entire Muslim ulama without an authentic jurisprudence and leader; for
them, it was akin to utter destruction and total annihilation. “[W]ith the advent of British rule, the
people of Sokoto (Sakkwatawa) expected the Sultan to continue to play the role of the final
arbiter and to safeguard the tenets of Islam. Unfortunately for them, the Native Courts
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Proclamation of 1906 and its successor, the Native Courts Ordinance of 1914, stripped the Sultan
of judicial power.”41
The political and religious subjugation of the Sokoto Caliphate by the British colonial
authorities begins the first phase of Christian structural and political supersessionism under the
guise of colonialism and civilization. Under these circumstances, and amidst news of robust
growth recorded by Christian missionaries in the Southern and Middle Belt region, the vexation
of Muslims in Northern Nigeria was directed towards the problem of identity and survival under
the British policy of “appropriation, containment and surveillance of Islam.” 42 Although, the
British had colonized both Southern and Northern Nigeria, their strategies in both of these
protectorates were not religiously neutral. It is fair to say that each of the colonized entities
responded differently to the strategies of the British colonial power: the Muslims in Northern
Nigeria to the challenges of indirect rule and the Southern traditionalist to the foreignness of the
Christian mission.43
Apart from early efforts by the Portuguese missionaries in the fourteenth century, the first
African Church in West Africa was established in 1792 for returnee slaves in Sierra Leone. 44 By
the 1800s, there were early missionary contacts along the coastal regions of the western and
eastern part of Nigeria;45 and between the 1890s and the early 1900s, further attempts were made
towards the northern and middle belt towns of “...Baro, Bida, Lafiyaji, Lokoja, Minna, Zarai,
41
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Kaduna, Jigawa, Kebbi, Kastina, Sokoto, Kano, Nguru, Benue, Shandam, Damshin, Muri, Ibi,
Dekina, Wase, Bauchi, Kukawa in Bornu and Zinder about 150 miles into the Sahara Desert.”46
The point to be made here is that upon their arrival in 1903, the British encountered an
established Sokoto Caliphate with a socio-economic, political, and religious culture that had
endured for a century. A balanced contextual approach to the history of Islam in Northern
Nigeria must acknowledge this fact.
Therefore, a thorough understanding is required for an integral history of the Sokoto
Caliphate; a selective survey of episodes will not suffice. A balanced perspective on the history
of the Sokoto Caliphate will correct existing pattern of distortions abounding in the Western
literature. Irrespective of their volumes, styles, and category, Western literature classifies the
entire reign of Sokoto Caliphate in two separate but disconnected events: namely, the origins of
the revolt of Usman dan Fodio and the arrival of the British colonial authorities as liberators. The
former is presented as an uncivilized epoch of weakling and cruel Hausa-Fulani aristocrats and
fanatical Muslims, and the latter era is dominated by civilized Christianity.47 Muqtedar Khan
develops the claim that
European successes were interpreted as a result of Christianity’s superiority and
Muslim defeats were seen as a result of the inferiority of Islam…Thus,
Christianity did gain from colonial conquest, even though much of the rationale
for European imperialism was political and economic. Contemporary historians
and social scientists, who often share a secular worldview, sometimes deemphasize the role and activities of missionaries in the former colony. But in the
Muslim psyche, the threat of Christianity was foremost and remains to this
today.48
46
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Another concern emanating from the British distortion of the history of the Caliphate
came from the first Lugardian discourse which propounds “the doctrine of hierarchy of races
[and which] accounts for Fulani dominance by conflating race and religion to make sense of
Muslim Fulani’s position as a conquering and ruling race over the pagan tribes.”49 The British,
under the illusion of the one Fulani tribe 50 against the ethnic minorities, stratified society by
giving preference to the “Christian-British at the top, the Muslim Fulani in the middle, and pagan
tribes at the bottom.”51 The subsequent application of this schema by Christian converts from
ethnic minorities in the Middle-belt area unleashed the greatest opposition from the Hausa/Fulani
Muslims, who understood this move as a continuation of Western domination.
Nigeria52 is a country in West Africa with an estimated population, as of 2012, of 182.8
million. 53 It is large, consisting of a conglomeration of ethnic nations and states within one
geographical mass. It has strong regional and other divisions, including religious and social
49
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segmentations. Its cultural diversity is long-standing, shaping inter-communal harmonious
relations, as well as generating frequent inter-tribal conflicts and wars.
In Northern Nigeria,54 various hypotheses have been advanced as factors contributing to
the ethno-religious crisis. Some scholars viewed the crisis as an outcome of economic
inequalities, resource control, and poverty accruing from retarded development, coupled with
indigene-settlers’ issues. 55 Others have traced it to failed policies and politics leading to
uncontrolled power tussle. 56 Yet, Kukah and Falola linked the crisis to the tendencies of the
northern elite to create a politics of Islamization deriving from the Islamic principle of nonseparation of politics and religion.57 From the religious and theological perspective, Iwuchukwu
suggests that the rising trend of violence relates to the fundamentalism associated with the
version of Islam inherited and practiced by the Usman dan Fodio and his progenitors.58
Similarly, Grace Okoye argues that the events brewing in Northern Nigeria formed the
latent stage of future ethno-religious genocides, such as those in Bosnia—involving extremist
Muslims intent on cleansing the north of Christians and other non-Muslims through the extremist
ideology of imposing Shariah law. 59 Furthermore, the International Crisis Group traces the
complexity of the ethno-religious crisis in Northern Nigeria to “including a volatile mix of

54

See footnote 1 above.
See Osaghea, 1995; Harnischfeger, 2004; and Ostien, 2009 in Grace O. Okoye, Proclivity to Genocide:
Northern Nigeria Ethno-religious Conflicts (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2014).
56
Ifeoma Mary Okwo, “Causes and Impact of Ethno-religious Crisis and National Development,”
International Journal of Research in Arts and Social Sciences, 4 (2012): 223-232.
57
Matthew Hassan Kukah and Toyin Falola, Religious and Self-Assertion: Islam and Politics in Nigeria,
Making of Modern Africa series (Hereford, UK: Avebury, 1996).
58
Iwuchukwu, “Revisiting the Perennial Religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria, 1990-2010: Broadening
the Focus of Muslim-Christian Dialogue” in Can Muslims and Christians Resolve their Religious and Social
Conflicts, 9.
59
Grace O. Okoye, Proclivity to Genocide, xviii.
55

17

historical grievances, political manipulation and ethnic and religious rivalries.”60 Finally, Moses
Ochonu submits that the problem faced by Northern Nigeria today degenerated out of British
...articulation, bureaucratization, and consequences of a Caliphate-centered
colonial administrative imagining: This was the colonial governing ideology
funded on a belief in the superiority and administrative utility of significations,
practices, symbols, systems of rule, and methods of socioeconomics and political
organization associated with Hausa-Fulani, Muslim identity derived from the
modes of belonging forged by the Sokoto Caliphate.61
With this historical reality as starting point, this dissertation probes the nature and extent
of British superiority by examining its methodological and epistemological presuppositions,
which developed from the British imposition of colonization, civilization, and the creed of superordination and sub-ordination of cultures.
This stance of cultural super-ordination viewed within the context of conquest further
reduces Islam in the Sokoto Caliphate to a religious inferior and a political non-entity. The same
trend of Christian supersessionism is observable among former liberated “African
traditionalists”62 in Jos, Plateau, now converts to Christianity. Most notable are the evangelical
and Pentecostal Christians who found it almost impossible to forgo the narrative of an inherited
superiority over Islam. This makes the situation today alarming and dangerous.
Furthermore, the quarrelsome division of Nigerian history into simple geographical poles
of “north” and “south” is problematic because it creates a narrative of Muslims in the north
polarized against Christians in the south. This is a classical definition of the “divide and rule”
policy. This way of reading the history of religion in Northern Nigeria gives rise to two
fundamental misconceptions that are detrimental to interreligious dialogue. The first is the
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characterization of Northern Nigeria as Islamic but highly favored by the colonial authorities.63
This view has been refuted by Islamic scholars who opine that such a misreading of history
undermines the monumental struggles of Islam against colonial authorities and their religion—
Christianity.64 The second misconception centers on the prevalent idea that Islam prevents the
spread of Christianity in northern Nigeria. 65 The above misconceptions portray Islam as a
beneficiary of the dividends of colonialism.
The Sokoto Caliphate, unlike previous kingdoms, was characteristically an Islamic
polity.66 The Caliphate continued its reign and exercised the dynamics of power within and along
ethnic homogenous lines within the West African sub-region. In this connection, the British
conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate altered the dynamics of power, from homogenous to
heterogonous mixtures of ethnicities and rival religious traditions. As Heussler bluntly puts it,
“British authority over Northern Nigeria came from conquest and was absolute.” 67 For the
majority of Muslims, the shift from a homogenous Islamic state to a diverse Christian political
entity was sudden and unpleasant.
Thus, in the event leading to the colonization of Northern Nigeria, no prior negotiations
occurred between the Sokoto Caliphate and the British, such as happened in Uganda—a proChristian colony. The relation between the British colonial authority and the king of Buganda
(Kabaka) of Uganda was normalized by a treaty, not by conquest, in 1900.68 Incidentally, it is
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interesting to note that Fredrick Lugard was the colonial administrator of Uganda from 18901900. Lugard was the administrator during the Muslim revolution of 1889-9069 and the Christian
counterrevolution (1889),70 the Protestant seizure of power (1892), and finally the consolidation
of the revolutionary changes by the British takeover and loss of Buganda’s sovereignty
(1894/1900). 71 Lugard had visibly joined forces with the Protestant Christians to retain the
Victorian plain as an extension of the Christian British Crown. Thus, the British treaty of 1900
with the Buganda King (Kabaka) was understood as a tradeoff for Christian evangelization,
education, and civilization. Consequently, “the British regarded the civilization of Buganda as
superior to anything else available in Uganda; and the acceptance of Christianity and literacy
enhanced that superiority.... The Buganda, for their part, became enthusiastic ‘subimperialists.’”72
With the Uganda historical development in mind, one wonders if religion played a key
role in the sudden shift in diplomacy by the British towards the Sokoto Caliphate. The offer of a
political treaty by the British to the Sokoto Caliphate would have made the meeting of these
empires more sincere and smoother. The result of maintaining such diplomatic relations benefits
both the colonizers and the colonized. However, the British colonial authority had an
unfavorable view about Islam as a religion and the Sokoto Caliphate as a kingdom. The British
seem to have been looking for an excuse to exclude Northern Nigeria and Islam from the entire
Niger-area while they penetrated and plundered its resources. Islam in the Sokoto Caliphate
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offered a non-conflict oppositional model 73 to the British imperialistic agenda. According to
Mohammed Umar, the British grand colonial strategy was targeted primarily at demonizing
Islam, 74 depicting it as a religion of the uncivilized and later discrediting the monumental
achievements of the Sokoto Caliphate, especially its contributions to the abolishment of slavery.
Umar further described this move as “the first Lugardian discourses to ideologically justify
British conquest of Northern Nigeria as a termination of miseries perpetuated by the ineffectual
rule of the Fulani.”75
In Peter Tibenderana’s view, the British indirect rule system in the entire Northern
Nigeria functioned as an ideology. For all intents and purposes, indirect rule was not geared
towards a collaborative share of power between the colonial authorities and the native
authorities.76 Simply put, indirect rule was fashioned to blind the native authorities to the realities
of British looting of their resources. As Abu-Lughod argues,
The target [of the colonialist] was the same everywhere: to obtain cheap exports.
But to achieve this capital, the center…could organize production on the spot, and
there exploit both the cheap labor and the natural resources, by wasting or stealing
them, i.e., by paying a price which did not enable alternative activities to replace
them when they were exhausted. Moreover, through direct domination and brutal
political coercion, incidental expenses could be limited by maintaining the local
social classes as conveyor belts.77
This passage speaks about the duplicity of the British intention: namely, the pretext to an
internal land grab, and profit maximization accrued from the production of free labor for the
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plantations and factories in the new world.78 Although, slavery was officially abolished in Britain
in 1807 and 1834, the historian David Eltis argues for its continuation beyond these dates:
The flow of British resources into slave trade did not cease in 1807. After this
date, British subjects owned, managed, and manned slavery adventures; they
purchased newly imported Africans in the Americas; they supplied ships,
equipments and insurance, and most important of all, trade goods and credit to
foreign slave traders.79
In the same vein, Marika Sherwood posits that
The British Emancipation Act of 1834 was equally half-hearted. It ended slavery
only in the Caribbean, not the rest of the British Empire. Slavery only became
illegal in India in 1848, on the Gold Coast in 1874, and in Nigeria in 1901 [and
finally again on the Gold Coast in 1928]. In the late nineteenth century, colonial
soldiers and police in Africa were often slaves themselves. Even after it was
officially prohibited, slavery continued under other names as indentured service
or forced labor.80
Above all, the British stance toward Islam relates to Erik Eriksson’s concept of a
pseudospecies by the implicit declaration that “we are the chosen people made in the image of
God.”81 This declaration is pivotal to the British-Christian self-identity and assumption of power
in Northern Nigeria. Erikson remarks, “...To have steady value at all, [they] absolutize them; to
have style [they] must believe [themselves] to be the crown of the universe. To each extent, then,
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that each tribe, or nation, culture or religion will invent a historical and moral rationale for its
exclusively God-ordained uniqueness, to that extent... [this absolute claim is] a pseudospecies.”82
Erikson introduces the term “pseudospecies” to describe the dehumanization and ethnic
discrimination resulting from the ideological use of ethnicity and religion. To put it differently,
pseudospecies “claim natural and historical superiority defined by selective values and divine
design.” 83 The root of British Christian supersessionism stems from this understanding,
especially as employed by Christian converts in the Middle Belt to justify Christianity’s
superiority over Islam.
The question whether the British colonial system functioned as an extension of the
Christian crusades lingers in scholarly circles. Altogether absent from the literature are specifics
of how British religious and political colonization of the Sokoto Caliphate contributed to
Christian supersessionism. Nonetheless, within the general context of the colonization of African
societies, abundant documentary evidence affirms this connection. In David Christy’s words,
Let England…make a united effort to extend the benefits of Christian civilization,
not only around the coast, but into the heart of this hitherto benighted portion of
the earth, and the most cheering result might be anticipated. Let accumulated
wealth pour her exhaustless treasures in the lap of the Colonization Society,
enabling it to send out to Africa multitude of civilized and enlightened men, to
diffuse intelligence and freedom along the shores of its rivers, and over its
mountains and plains. Let England with her commerce, her wealth, her public
spirit, her Christianity, exert her powerful influences in extending her commerce,
her enterprise and her civilization among the native of this extensive continent.84
Prior to the British capture of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1903, attempts were made to
establish a Christian state-polis representing an extension of European Christianity in the coastal
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areas. The 1787 experiment of a European Christian settlement in Sierra Leone offers a unique
opportunity to critique the strategies and motivation of Christianity in putting a check on the
advancement of Islam through rigorous evangelical revival.85 Consequent to the religio-political
pact entered by the British Crown and the Christian Missionary Society (CMS) in London, the
British Colonial authority in Sierra Leone, “did not will the presence of Islam, much less control
its growth.”86
The Muslims of the Sokoto Caliphate were aware of the failed British attempt to establish
Christian settlements in Sierra Leone and the unfriendly attitude of the Church Missionary
Society (CMS) towards Muslims. The Sultan of Sokoto and the Emirs of Kano voiced their
discontent and offered visible resistance to the initial advance of the British colonial authority,
which they viewed as an extension of Christianity.87
For Muslims, a distinction between the British polity and Christianity seemed
superfluous. Muslims were aware of the free pass and logistical support the British colonial
authority gave to Christian missionaries in the south. This led to the belief that their defeat at the
hands of the British signaled the beginning of the reign of Christianity, regardless of the
broadmindedness of the British colonial authorities toward Islamic religious practices. Arising
from this was the phobia behind Islamic counteraction to Christian supersessionism—a
perspective that is missing in scholars’ response to British colonialism.
This present research builds on earlier works by Islamic scholars and argues that
“...although the British did not prohibit Islamic religious practices, they pursued containment
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policies towards Islamic Law....”88 Most Muslims perceived the proscription of certain aspects of
the Shariah by the British colonial authority as evidence of Christian supersessionism.
The subordination of Islamic laws under British colonial policy constitutes, for some
Muslims, a hidden agenda for the entire colonization project of Christian Europe: that of robbing
Islam of its identity and inner cohesion, and leaving it vulnerable to external Western attack.
Another important factor in Muslim discourses on colonialism is the view that “Christians,’ and
the Europeans were both in race and religion...inseparable.”89 Accordingly, Fredrik Barth in the
nineteenth century, wrote of “Christian government” as a synonym for colonial rule. 90 Walter
Rodney’s phraseology of “Livingstone, Stanley, and Karl Peters,” as well, indicates the intrinsic
connection between explorers, colonizers, and missionaries.91
Nevertheless, the hierarchical racial structures observable during the colonial era favored
the Christian-British at the zenith, followed by the tutored Muslim Fulani in the middle position,
and the pagans at the lowest.92 This opinion is similar to William Carey’s four-fold stratification
of the world’s civilizations, religions, cultures, and societies. Carey, through the prism of
Christian superiority, gives priority to Christians, followed by Jews, then Muslims and pagans.93
In addition, a replica of this worldview is recorded in the Encyclopedia Britannica, 1797.
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When the different system of religions that have prevailed in the world are
comparatively viewed with respect to their influence on the welfare of Society,
we find reason to prefer the polytheism of the Greeks and Romans to the ruder,
wilder, religious ideas and ceremonies that have prevailed among savages;
Mahometanism, perhaps in some respect to the polytheism of the Greeks and
Romans; Judaism however to Mahometanism; and Christianity to all of them.94
There are theological implications to such a worldview, one of which was the
development of the theology of the heathen. This theology aided the European invasion of Africa
and the consequent enthronement of Christianity as the divine solution to slavery and savagery.
The Sokoto Caliphate did not have a common interest with Western slavers and Western slave
bearing countries like Portugal and Spain, who with the blessing of the Catholic Church in the
person of Bishop Bartolome de las Casas, authorized the wholesale transportation of African
slaves in perpetuity to the new world.95 Buxton’s argument was authoritative in this regard.
Whatever methods may be attempted for ameliorating the condition of untutored
man, this alone can penetrate to the root of the evil, can teach him to love and to
befriend his neighbor, and cause him to act as a candidate for higher and holier
state of being.... This mighty lever (i.e. Christianity) when properly applied, can
alone overturn the iniquitous systems which prevails throughout the continent. Let
the missionaries and school-masters, the plough and the spade, go together, and
agriculture opened; confidence between man and man will be inspired whilst
civilization will advance as the natural effect, and Christianity will operate as the
proximate cause of this happy change.96
The dual plan of the British to first put a halt to the spread of Islam, especially its radical
form in the Sudan region, and to slow the advancement of the French toward West Africa
focused a spot light on and renewed interest in the Sokoto Caliphate. Any alliance between
France and the Sokoto Caliphate would spell doom for the British national interest along the
West African coast. Even with their military strength, the British needed further justification for
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the invasion of the Caliphate. The British furnished an argument on moral and humanitarian
grounds to invade Sokoto Caliphate as it continued slavery after the abolition edict of 1807. The
British linked slavery to the barbaric and cruel nature of the Islamic regime towards non-Muslim
and non-Hausa minorities. In this way, colonization was legitimized as the tool for liberation.
Walter Rodney describes this duplicity:
Curiously, Europeans often derived a moral justification for imperialism and
colonialism.... The British were the chief spokesmen for the view that the desire
to colonize was largely based on their good intension in wanting to put a stop to
the slave trade. True enough, the British in the nineteenth century were as
opposed to slave trading as they were once in favor of it...The British took a
special self-righteous delight in putting an end to Arab slave trading, and
deposing rulers on the grounds that they were slave traders...the common factor
underlying the overthrow of African rulers in East, West, Central, North and
South Africa was that they stood in the ways of Europe’s imperial needs.97
Ironically, as we see here, the moral ground for British takeover of the Sokoto Caliphate
was slavery. Like other European countries, British participation in the slave abolition exercise
was influenced by the progressive outcome of the industrial revolution. The production of largescale manufacturing machines replaced manpower labor produced by slaves. In this sense, the
machines are less cost-effective than slave labor. Even with its firmness, the British renewed
interest in the abolition of slavery still left unresolved the initial commitment to abolition. Eric
William’s “Capitalism and Slavery” makes this point even better: namely, that the British
abolition exercise hinged on economics and not humanitarian considerations.98
No doubt, the Enlightenment created the path for freedom and autonomy. But the
question remains—whether or not Enlightenment thinkers were themselves forerunners of
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slavery,99 and moreover, whether or not the philosophy of the Enlightenment is foundational to
the Christian theology of missions that pronounces Africans to be heathens. In any case, the
entire reign of the Sokoto Caliphate was characterized as cruel and its peoples uncivilized, with
both in urgent need of the liberation offered by the British civilization and religion. Here began
the British theological narrative of savagery, captivity, and emancipation.100Even more reasons
arise to connect Enlightenment culture and Christianity in the events that led to the systematic
and methodical transfer of Africans to the New World.101
Far more problematic is the Western historical interpretation meant to legitimate
colonialism, which looks away from the grotesque massacre and brutality that occurred during
the transportation of Africans to the New World. For whatever purposes it may have been
conceived to serve, the slave trade was the worst evil that plagued the African continent. That era
in history constitutes the highest point of a society’s bondage to self and to external forces. In the
estimation of Henry Gemery and Jan Hogendorn, “the economic cost of the trade [i.e., to West
Africa] exceeded its gains on an overall basis,” and “the overseas slave trade had a detrimental
economic impact even without considering its social cost.”102 Yet, slavery continued unabated
with no possible solution at hand. The European countries of “...Portugal, Spain, France,
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Holland, and England were deeply involved in it. The very idea of emancipation was widely
viewed as a threat to the social order.”103
The slave industrial unit was an enormous investment that profited both church and state.
Thus, even though Europe may have intended to stop slavery, it lacked the moral will because of
vested interest and economic gains. In consequence, “between 1662 and 1807 (when Great
Britain made it illegal for British citizens to engage in the slave trade), approximately 3.5 million
Africans crossed the Atlantic in British ships,”104 as owned legitimate property, not as persons—
but as slaves with denied humanity.
Contrary to the dominant narrative in British historiography105 that portrays the abolition
exercise as solely the product of European civilization, scholars like Darity refute the claim that
the abolition of slavery was a pristinely British resolution.106 Furthermore, both Lovejoy and
Fisher argue for including the contribution of Islam to the abolition exercise. A good example of
this contribution is the Islamic objections on religious grounds to the enslavement of Muslims
and the Islamic principle of the manumission of slaves. Lovejoy continues his argument:
...Hence the abolition of the slave trade across the Atlantic and the struggle to
emancipate slaves must be seen as more than products of the European
emancipation and concerns for the “right of man” as articulated in the French
revolution and the Christian-based reformed movements in Britain. Such a partial
perspective overlooks the discussions within West Africa over the legitimacy of
enslavement and therefore ignores the efforts of Islamic government to develop
their own slave policies.107
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Today, part of the problem facing interreligious dialogue in Nigeria is the conscious and
deliberate disregard of historical accuracy on the part of some scholars in their search to address
historical grievances between Christians and Muslims. A selective approach to the history of
North Nigeria as written by British colonial historians has flooded academia, leaving existing
research biased and one-sided in its sympathy for Christianity, and ignoring the connection
between the Christian religion, empire, power, and knowledge.108
This approach to the history of Northern Nigeria does no justice to the entire political
lifespan of the Sokoto Caliphate, from its “seizure of power, consolidation of power, and use of
power.”109 To this point, what is known about the Sokoto Caliphate is an abridged history of
Usman dan Fodio’s “seizure of state powers” by means of a violent jihad. The Sokoto
Caliphate’s principle of manumission of Muslim slaves was the most notable example of the
Caliphate cooperation with the British towards the emancipation and later abolition of slavery.
The near absence of underscoring such accomplishments in Western literature is nonetheless
intriguing.
A retrieval of this Islamic principle demonstrates how the Sokoto Caliphate cooperated
with the British in the negotiations that eventually led to the abolition exercise. Furthermore, we
propose that the rapid advancement and successes recorded by the Sokoto Caliphate were not
won by the sword alone, but also by the practice of the principle of the manumission of slaves
who chose to embrace Islam.110 Current literature on the root cause(s) of the ethno-religious
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crisis in Northern Nigeria displays little appreciation for the role the Sokoto Caliphate played in
the abolition of slavery. Mostly, these documents contain negative characterizations of the
Sokoto Caliphate, along with a genuine effort to exonerate the British colonial authorities of any
accountability to historical specificity.111
Scholars, especially of Western or Christian extraction, have succeeded in producing
texts that have methodologically and systematically excluded the broader context of Islamic
literature. More often than not, the perspectives of Islam and the voices of Muslim have received
lesser or no representation. In other words, such works are not genuinely representative112 of the
social context of Islam under British colonialism. The incoherency of these literatures, mostly
Western in orientation and evangelical in approach, shows the degree of British intentionality113
in mis-representing Islam to Muslims and Christians alike.114
Therefore, employing an ideology 115 becomes necessary in turning a distortion into a
grand narrative about Islam and the Sokoto Caliphate. According to Edward Said, these
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distortions amount to some level of caricature: “the caricature of Islam and Muslims has emerged
out of a history of political turmoil and religious conflict. In some cases, these negative images
have been endangered by political conquest and aggrandizement.”116 The continuation of this
“caricature” is sustained by a narrative that reduces the entire century-long reign of the Sokoto
Caliphate to a mediocre political appendage to the larger British colonial history.
Furthermore, Akinade warns of a “hackneyed and stereotypical portrayal of Islam that
has blighted the deep devotion and diversity....”117 As a result of this stereotyping,118 Christians
have become more estranged from and suspicious of Muslims, depicting Islam as a beneficiary
of the British colonial system. For example Jeanmaria Fenrich, writes that, “...It is important to
note that the Islamicization of the masses did not come by the ways of these jihad; that feat was
achieved by the colonial upheaval. Islam was the first beneficiary of colonialism; it progressed
more in fifty years of European administration than it did in ten centuries of history.”119 Such a
statement seems to suggest the presence of the Sokoto Caliphate at the Berlin Conference of
1885 to negotiate a possible hand-over to the British in the 1900s. Even as Akinade observes that
“...in contemporary times, Christians are striving to go beyond the normative stereotype about
Islam,”120 scholars like William F. S. Milles still defend colonial rule as “not merely preserv[ing]
the role of Islam in Nigeria, [but] also indirectly strengthen[ing] it.”121
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The Muslim intellectual response to this position, as advanced by Muhammad S.
Umar,122 presents a different take and an insider’s perspective. Umar pointed out that the British
appropriation, containment, and surveillance 123 over Islam was disingenuous with regard to
Islamic culture. Thus, the assumption that the north benefited politically through the structures of
indirect rule already in place, prior to the British takeover, does not address questions about the
fundamental religious motif of the British Empire, which was to put a stop to Islamic advances in
West Africa and to implant Christianity. The continuation of the myth 124 of alleged British
support for Islam has pitched Christians against Muslims, consequently creating a fundamental
mistrust that is detrimental to interreligious dialogue.
Christian responses to Islam in Northern Nigeria on the basis of an alleged British
support face the herculean task of reading and interpreting Islam in light of its century of
existence within the Sokoto Caliphate prior to the British conquest of 1903. The first myth
arising from such a reading of the history of Islam in Northern Nigeria laid the foundation for a
growing trend to undermine the immense impact of Islam in the century span of Sokoto
Caliphate. This has led to a trend that collapses the entire history of Islam in northern Nigeria
into the straightjacket of British political ideology, and presenting it as a rising phenomenon that
is simultaneous with Christianity among the Southern and Middle Belt ethnic minorities. This
shift nonetheless constitutes a basic flaw in the hermeneutics of interreligious dialogue and
contextual studies.
For the most part, subscribing to the storyline contained in British historiography further
distorts view of Sokoto Caliphate. In this context, it is understood as resulting from the extremist
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and radical Islamic “...reformist and ultraconservative brand of Islam,” practiced by Usman dan
Fodio with the quest for “worldly kingdom,” 125 and the oppression of the non-Hausa/Fulani
minorities through institutional oligarchies and aristocrats.126
A further characterization of the Sokoto Caliphate as a perpetrator of slavery by means of
jihad has led scholars like Lissi Rasmussento argue that “the most important consequence of the
jihads was the creation of the Sokoto Caliphate, the largest political unit in nineteenth century
West Africa, a confederation of states (emirates) held together by common aims and religious
allegiance to the Amir al-Mumini [Commander of the Believers]...Stress was laid upon the
uniqueness and exclusiveness of Islam and its opposition to any form of accommodation with
African traditional beliefs.”127
Such a perspective has led scholars like Iwuchukwu to the conclusion that “it is therefore
logical to consider the success of dan Fodio as symptomatic of the religious intolerance and
bigotry which are at the heart of Muslim-Muslim and Muslim-Christian conflicts in northern
Nigeria until date.”128 Besides, the European literature is silent about the various mediations and
confrontations between the Sokoto Caliphate and the British Empire on religio-political themes,
in which the issue of slavery was topmost.129 There are actually sound reasons to suppose that a
history of the Sokoto Caliphate, placed in the trajectory of its struggles and opposition to British
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colonialism and the slave trade will yield a different result, leading to the positive outcome
needed as a prerequisite for interreligious dialogue.130
Likewise, a history of the jihad in context will first and foremost address the Sokoto
Caliphate’s policy on the manumission of slaves. As Fisher notes, “one of the major causes of
the jihad which began in Hausaland in 1804 was the increasing enslavement of free Muslims.”131
Lovejoy’s findings also support the claim that slavery, not religious bigotry nor Puritan
fanaticism, was among the primary factors that orchestrated the Sokoto jihad. Lovejoy writes,
In the annals of the caliphate, slaves first demonstrated opposition to their servile
status during the jihad that brought the caliphate into existence. By claiming
allegiance to the cause of Muslim revolution, slaves could seize the opportunity to
assert their independence. Consequently, slaves played a major role in the initial
uprising in the Hausa states between 1804-1808…. This prolonged period of
expansion and consolidation lasted after the first phase of the jihad was over with
the conquest of the first Hausa states of Gobir, Kastina, Kano and Zaria in 1808.
Here the appeal of the jihad to slaves is examined in four phases: first the initial
four-year rising in Hausaland; second, the campaign among Gurma in 1809-10,
which led to the creation of Liptako; third, the revolt in Oyo between 1817 to the
early 1830s, which led to the consolidation of the emirate of Ilorin among the
northern Yoruba and fourth, the civil wars among the Nupe from the 1820s to
1857, which ultimately resulted in the creation of five emirates including Bida.132
Lovejoy further traces the beginning and the consolidation of dan Fodio’s jihad of 1804
to the vehement opposition to the massive enslavement and deportation of Muslims slaves
through the transatlantic to the Christian world. As a result of his commitment to the abolition of
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slavery, Usman dan Fodio was referred to as the “Muslim Wilberforce” of the Sokoto
Caliphate.133
The truth is that dan Fodio was thoroughly disgusted with the bustle of irreligiosity at the
Gobir court house, and the hub of this controversy was the status of Muslim slaves. The Sultan
of Gobir had restricted the grant of protection for fleeing Muslim slaves only to those who had a
genuine claim to Muslim parentage. The consequence of this denial of protection to Muslim
slave converts raises juridical concern with respect to the prescription of the Holy Quran on the
rights and privileges of freed citizens.
From the onset of the jihad in 1804, dan Fodio had complained about the slave policy of
the Gobir kingdom: “...The Sultan of Gobir attacked the Sheikh’s people; they fled, for they were
afraid. The Gobir army followed them and captured some and slew others, seizing children and
women, and selling them in our midst.”134 Thus, dan Fodio picked an ideological fight with the
Sultan of Gobir based on the argument that in Islam, faith in Allah is thicker than blood relations.
This slogan became the jihadist philosophy and rule of life that aided the politico-cultural
revolution and changed the entire tapestry of the West African region.
According to statistics, by the 1890s, the Sokoto Caliphate had the largest population of
slaves in the world; two million of its estimated ten million inhabitants were slaves.135 As a result
of the staggering numbers of slave inhabitants, many scholars, especially from the British
chronicle, have uncritically referenced the Caliphate as a citadel of slave-raiders. These scholars
have failed to consider the Caliphate’s slave manumission policy as the possible source of this
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growth. Consequently, we submit that, any history of the Sokoto Caliphate without a note on its
slavery policy is incomplete and misleading.
By the same token, a reading of the jihad as a tool for liberation, granted first to Muslim
slaves and then converts, provides another reason for the massive enlistment recorded by the
jihadist. This contradicts the popular view “...that a good number of Usman dan Fodio’s Fulani
tribesmen who joined ranks with him in pursuit of the jihad were...supporting their kinsman, as
his victory brought economic and political gains...”136 Situating the jihad in the context of the
liberation provides a clearer perspective as to why enlistment in the jihad become the most
expedient alternative to trans-Sahara or transatlantic slavery.137 Certainly, this is not to deny that
the politico-religious liberation agenda of the jihadist had some proselytizing consequences.
In addition, most slaves at the time of the trans-Atlantic trade would rather have become
Muslims, even if nominally, to gain upward social status rather than to live in bondage in the
plantation of the colonial Americas. In this sense, the humanitarian approach of Islam towards
slaves was a major factor in its growth; for the jihad was not won by the sword alone. It was
successful to the extent it offered relief, security, and freedom to slaves, especially non-Muslims,
whose primary purpose for joining Islam was to obtain commercial immunity against slavery.
The Islamic principle of manumission of slaves differentiates between Arabic slavery and the
European transatlantic experience that offered a one-way trip with no possibility of freedom or
return. As an illustration, the adoption of Arabic names and the use of tribal/facial marks were
characteristic among ethnic minority groups to build a sense of belonging and to enable freed
slaves to reunite with their ethnic clan after release.
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Another evidence of a non-Western resolution to the abolition of the slave trade was
Caliph Muhammad’s attempt to prevent selling Muslims into slavery. 138 The Sokoto Caliphate
raised concern over the statistics of Muslim slaves shipped from the West African coast to the
New World. The staggering numbers of Muslim slaves en-route from the Oyo Empire to the
Christian world came to the attention of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1812. Caliph Muhammad Bello,
son and successor of dan Fodio, had accused the Yoruba of violating the Caliphate’s prohibition
against selling slaves to Christians. “The people of this land would get captured slaves from our
land here and they would sell them to the Christian...I have mentioned this so that you should not
purchase a Muslim slave if someone captures such a slave and brings them to you.”139 As a result
of this controversy, Muhammad sought a diplomatic resolution with the British representative
Captain Hugh Clapperton in the 1820s. This concord, even though not ratified, became the
memorandum of understanding between the Sokoto Caliphate and the British, centering on the
prohibition of the sale of Muslim slaves to the British-Christian Empire.140
The coming of the British signaled multiple interests in sub-Saharan African, primarily to
balance the territorial expansion of France and bring to a halt Islamic advancement. 141 Current
scholarship on the history of Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria has yet to decipher the
amount of damage caused by the British colonial policy of “divide and rule” 142 to Muslim and
Christian dialogue. By pitching a Muslim north against a Christian south, this policy has
succeeded in perpetuating the narrative that the Muslim north of Nigeria benefited from colonial
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rule. This tale has become offensive to Muslims on many grounds, thereby constituting a major
hindrance to interreligious dialogue.
One of the shortfalls of the British colonial authority was its policy of ethnic
balkanization that set up the dominant Hausa-Fulani tribe as both foreign and the most
sophisticated among the rulers of the ethnic minorities of the Middle Belt region.143 The British
colonial authority created a clash of ethnicities through re-configuration of the ethnic groups, its
ideological use of Islam, establishment of an indirect-rule policy in northern Nigeria, and the
imposition of such without differentiation among Middle-Belt minorities.
In sum, we offer a contextual reading of the British indirect rule policy in northern
Nigeria within the general framework of the British divide-and-rule strategy. We argue that this
policy led to a narrative based on “divide and rule” between the Islamic north and the Christian
south. The implications of such a policy in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria were twofold; first,
the British continued indirect rule through the direct rule of the Hausa-Fulani Muslim hegemony
over other ethnic minorities; and second, a free pass was given to Christian missions to operate
within the Middle Belt. This background guides us in exploring the internecine conflict over
religion and land, especially among the ethnic minorities in Plateau State, where the Christian
majority sought dominance over the minority Muslim Hausa-Fulani, who once had political
dominance with the support of the British indirect rule policy.
For whatever reason, in the Middle Belt, the British did not implement the kind of
indirect rule it employed in the Hausa-Fulani region. Rather, the British left the affairs of the
governance of the Middle Belt in the hands of the amateur Hausa-Fulani Muslim diplomats. The
Middle Belt resisted the direct-rule of the Hausa-Fulani minority from its onset. However, the
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problem took a different twist some years later with the arrival of the Christian missionaries and
their appended rhetoric of supremacy and Christian supersessionism over Islam. This, we argue
is the starting place of the ethnic-religious crisis that has engulfed the entire region.
In this regard, we agree with Thaddeus Byimui Umaru “that the historical dynamics of
the spread of Islam and Christianity as well as the politics of the colonial administration in the
region, prepared the breeding ground for ongoing violent conflicts.”144 It is fair enough to say
that British contact with Nigeria benefited both the north and south, each in its own way—the
former with political structures and the latter with educational institutions. As such, any genuine
effort towards interreligious dialogue must first and foremost acknowledge these dynamics. For a
stark reality remains, namely, that both the southern and northern protectorates of Nigeria fell
under the military might of the British and subsequently were colonized, and that each region
responded differently to British colonial rule.
Thus, from the perspective of the West, the acceptance of indirect rule by a defunct
Sokoto Caliphate signaled cooperation rather than resistance.145 In contrast, for the Muslims, the
acceptance of indirect rule was more of an accommodation and a preference for the lesser evil.146
As matter of fact, the British appropriation of Islamic structures through indirect rule in northern
Nigeria was inevitable for both the colonizer and the colonized. Besides, from the perspective of

144

Thaddeus Byimui Umaru, Christian-Muslim Dialogue in Northern Nigeria: A Socio-Political and
Theological Consideration (USA: Xlibis, LLC, 2013), 31.
145
See Frederick D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Edinburgh and London, 1922);
Margery Perham, Lugard: The Years of Authority 1898-1945, 2 Vols. (London, 1956-1960), ii, 1-280 and 375-638;
C. N Ubah, “Colonial Administration and the Spread of Islam in Northern Nigeria,” The Muslim World, 81/2 (1991),
133-48; Andrew E. Barnes, “Religious Insults: Christian Critique of Islam and the Government in Colonial Northern
Nigeria,” Journal of Religions in Africa, 34/1-2 (2004), 62-81. “For scholars who questioned the integrity of
Lugard’s indirect rule, see, Hubert Deschamps, “Et Maintenant, Lord Lugar?” Africa: Journal of the International
Africa Institute, 33/4 (1963), 293-306; and responding, Michael Crowder, “Indirect Rule: French and British Style,”
Africa: Journal of the International Africa Institute, 34/3 (1964), 197-205; For the difference between the West
African and East African British experimentation of the indirect rule policy, see Felicitas Becker, “Islam and
Imperialism in Africa,” in David Modetal, Islam and European Empires, 112-131.
146
Umar, Islam and Colonialism, 161.

40

logistics, the British colonial authority lacked the manpower to administer the Sokoto Caliphate
because of its geographical vastness.147
The British application of indirect rule in Northern Nigeria is not a new phenomenon in
its relations with the indigenes of the British Crown Colonies.148 Indirect rule was thought of as
the most convenient and effective method to obtain the unalloyed support of the people in
accepting their new colonial status. Conceivably, the same logic holds for the British ideological
use of Christian missions to occupy southern Nigerian territory where they faced the defiance of
the African traditional religions. 149 In this sense, the strategic use of indirect rule in northern
Nigeria is analogous to the ideological use of Christian missionary activities in southern Nigeria.
This assertion makes the entire paraphernalia of colonialism in Nigeria rest on the two mutual
interdependent events of Muslim indirect rule and Christian missions.
In the long run, both principles achieved the desired result, that of quelling the people’s
resistance and eliciting their acceptance of the British colonial rule. Ultimately, indirect rule did
not thrive in Southern Nigeria, not only because places like the southeast lacked centralized
traditional rulers or figure-heads but also for the simple reason that it was never enforced by the
British, who considered the use of Christian missions most efficient and less cost-effective.150
Likewise, in Northern Nigeria, the abysmal failure to implement Western education can no
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longer be attributed to sheer resistance offered by emirs. The anomaly lies rather in the lack of
British enforcement of such policies—whether indirect rule in the South or Western education in
the North.
In this connection, one of the major challenges faced by scholars of interreligious
dialogue in Northern Nigeria is an established reluctance to perceive the British strategy of
indirect rule in Northern Nigeria and Christian missions in Southern Nigeria as both agents of
colonialism. Yet, “historians of colonized or formerly colonized societies have typically viewed
foreign missions as an expression of the exigencies of colonial rule, a theologically and
politically undifferentiated agency of the British colonial system.” 151 Consequently, an isolated
critique of the British indirect rule policy in Northern Nigeria that is separated from the general
picture of British missionary enterprise in the South is disingenuous under scholarly scrutiny.
The British divide-and-rule policy in categorizing the North as Islamic terrain for indirect
rule and the South as the domain of Christian missions made these two entities oppositional and
confrontational. To this end, Frank Salomonne remarks,
“...to bolster their own power, British administration created the official wisdom,
that emirs were opposed not only to Christian missionaries, but also western
education...the fact that missionaries in general actively opposed the facade of
indirect rule did not find them many supporters in Northern Nigeria
Administration...the inherent logic of indirect rule demanded that missionaries be
opposed even when they were the only visible vehicle for education...In sum,
even in ‘progressive’ emirates, the north was woefully behind the Southern part of
Nigeria in every field of modern education.”152
In the mind of most Muslims, the concept of either direct or indirect rule from a nonMuslim entity over the Muslim community constitutes an anomaly. As Crowder pointed out,
“...For Muslim societies...the imposition of white [Christian] rule meant submission to the
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infidel, which is intolerable to any good Muslim.” 153 Yet, for those Muslims who absorbed
British rule, the only option left was the practice of spiritual hijra. This spiritual disposition
entails cooperating suspiciously with British policy, and at the same time, offering pockets of
resistance to the imposition of European rule, culture and religion. 154 For the most part,
Christianity functioned not only as a religion but also as an arm of the British Empire with a
hidden agenda to contain Islamic growth.
The concept of indirect rule, though devised to serve the grassroots population, became
the paradox of its own creation: namely, it produced a vast uneducated Hausa-Fulani population
as compared to the southern regions where Christian missionaries operated. In general, one
wonders whether the Northern Nigerian populace understood the interplay between British
indirect rule, on the one hand, and the plundering of resources for the New World, on the other.
The question remains if truly “British authority over Northern Nigeria came from conquest and
was absolute,”155 how could the emirs reject the British tool of civilization: namely, Western
education?
Furthermore, scholars have raised questions about the nature of the power that was
conferred on the traditional rulers under indirect rule. As noted, Fredrick Lugard’s famous
speech reiterates the British colonial powers’ ability “to depose and create kings.” There were
indeed evidences of such depositions of emirs who showed the slightest inclination to oppose
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colonial rule.156 It is clear, according to Umar, “that any emir disloyal to the British could not
remain in office.”157 Similarly, Tukur further observes that
while some emirs more or less readily worked with the British and while some
others found it absolutely impossible to work with them and had to be removed, a
majority of emirs adopted what the British themselves called passive resistance, a
tactic whose usual form was to be very civil and cordial towards the British, to
express verbal approval of most of what they proposed but at the same time find
one excuse or another for being unable to help in the execution of those
proposals.158
Ubah, for one, raises doubt as to whether emirs would have constituted any hindrance to
missionary education had the British colonial authority willed it.159 The question remains: Why
this unwillingness by the British colonial authority to enforce western education in Northern
Nigeria, especially following Lugard’s own narrative that the “Hausa-Fulani’s exposure to Islam
and its principles constituted a civilizational substitute for British Modernity, a tolerable
alternative instrumental to conveying the blessing for British rule and enlightenment to Northern
Nigerian's benighted ‘natives.’”160 What gain had the British colonial authority in not educating
the probable agents of social change that would have accelerated the pace of the colonial project?
The answer is not farfetched. British intelligence gathering on the capability of the Sokoto
Caliphate as an autocephalous political entity began prior to the conquest in 1903. The fear of
educating the emirs, mallams, and entire ulama as agents of social change was not unconnected
to the known consequences of liberating the masses and their subsequent inclination to revolt161
against colonial rule.162
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Given the centrality of British religio-political dominance over the Sokoto Caliphate and
its adjoining regions, this work will relate the findings from the general context of the Caliphate
to the specific religio-ethnic crisis in Jos Plateau. The focus will be on three areas: first, the
persistent attempts by the Sokoto Caliphate to gain control of the Jos Plateau region by annexing
Jos to the Bauchi emirate; second, the implications of the British policy of colonization by the
proxy use of Hausa/Falani aristocrats and the resistance from the indigenous groups; and finally,
the role of missionaries as both agent of colonialism and social change.
1.3. Research Questions
The incessant conflict between Christians and Muslims in the colonial and post-colonial
city of Jos, Plateau, is a challenge to the practice of an authentic—de jure and de facto—
religious pluralism. Competition among religions in the public domain has led to the delineation
of ethnicity and designation of political power. From a Christian perspective, there has not been
a commensurate de jure response 163 from Christian theologians that effectively addresses the
soteriological concern of other religions.
In this light, this study investigates the problem of Christian-Muslim dialogue in Jos,
Plateau, and in a fundamental way, raises the question of whether supersessionism or
exclusivism constitutes the appropriate theological response to religious pluralism. In Jos, like in
other parts of Nigeria, the whole issue of a suitable response to religious pluralism is a burning
question. 164 Accordingly, a nonchalant attitude towards religious pluralism remains topmost
among the leading factors that ferment internecine conflict in Jos, Plateau. While it is true that
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perceived aggression and hostility among ethnic groups have led to the loss of lives and property,
it is also a fact that the casualties of this deadly violence are mostly Christians and Muslims.
The objective of this research is to determine the factors underlying the deadly conflict
and bloody vendetta between Muslims and Christians in Jos, Plateau. The research questions
deals with two issues: first, we briefly identify the main questions to be investigated.
Subsequently, we shall formulate specific questions based on a descriptive analysis of the
guiding questions of the research.
In addition, this study asks whether Christianity has embraced the fuller meaning and
implications concerning the de jure right of existence of the other religions. From a broader
perspective, Iwuchukwu’s quest for the de jure right of non-Christian religions can be a starting
point of the status quaestionis. 165 Foremost is this question: What role does Christian
supersessionism—the idea of being the chosen people—play in the conflict of Jos, Plateau? Do
Christians share an understanding that God has chosen them alone as a people? Does Christian
exclusivism necessarily lead to supersessionism? And is such supersessionism liable for de jure
or de facto discrimination against members of the Islamic faith? The focus remains on the
instantiation of Panikkar’s Trinitarian theology for the future of interreligious dialogue among
Muslims and Christians in Jos, Plateau.
While evidence of the relationship between ethnicity, religion, and violence has been
established in many literatures, there is scanty substantiation regarding the role of Christian
supersessionism as the start to conflict and violence. Until now, the outcomes of prior studies
have been biased, mixed, and contradictory, as evidenced by the works of Umar Habila
165
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Danfulani,166 Simoen O. IIesanmi,167 and Kalu U. Ogbu.168 Still, not enough is known about the
negative impact of the evangelical hermeneutics of Christian missionaries, especially the Sudan
United Mission (SUD). The point often overlooked was that despite the social contributions and
charitable works of SUD, no study has ever looked at the potential harmful effects of its long
history of proselytism, especially on the campuses of higher institutions, and how such
aggressive evangelistic outreach ignited the counter response of Islamic fundamentalists. Under
those circumstances, we pose the questions: (a) How much of the roots of Islamic
fundamentalism in Jos, Plateau, are traceable to the exacerbating influence of Christian
proselytism? (b) Is Islamic fundamentalism more of a reaction to Christian supersessionism or to
Western domination?
The preceding discussion about Christian supersessionism in Jos, Plateau, raises some
historical questions about the kind of Christianity that was implanted in the Jos area. Yusuf
Turaki maintains that knowledge about the historical antecedents involving the meeting of
Christianity, Islam, and the Traditional religion is not only crucial but also a genuine prerequisite
to interreligious dialogue.
It is not possible for us as Nigerians to have a proper grasp of the nature of
religious and communal clashes, riots, conflicts and violence in Nigeria today,
without understanding our primordial, religious, cultural and colonial past, what we
were before the arrival of Islam, the colonial masters and Christian missions, and
what we became during and after the Islamic, colonial and Christian, and postcolonial eras?169
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Turaki’s point of view draws attention to the activities of the British wing of the Sudan
United Mission (SUD). Apart from its hidden ties with the British colonial authorities, the
Christocentric exclusivism of SUD, as was strictly mandated by the 1910 Edinburgh World
Missionary Conference, has come under scrutiny. 170 Against the backdrop of this broader
perspective, the following questions can be deduced: (a) Did the British colonial administration
consciously or unconsciously favor Christians over Muslims in the administration and allocation
of social services and educational infrastructures in Jos? (b) Did the Christian Missionaries’
hermeneutic of mission constitute the basic knowledge of and feelings and attitudes towards
Muslims? (c) How did the British colonial presence aid the occurrences of Christian conversion?
These questions relate to the influence of colonial support on the formation of Christian identity
among the dominant ethnic group in Jos.
1.4. Definition of Terms
This study concerns itself with the role of Christian supersessionism in the larger
framework of religious dialogue in Jos, Plateau. The focus of this theological research shares a
significant theoretical framework with the social sciences. Thus, defining and, in some cases,
delineating some of the key terms used in this dissertation is imperative.
Supersessionism
The term “supersessionism”
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It was originally coined to describe the ambiguous Jewish and Christian interreligious relations
marred by absolute exclusivist claims about the nature of the chosen people of God. 172 Matthew
Levering’s definition of supersessionism is useful: “...what happens when Christian theologies
leave no theological space for Judaism or Jewish theologies leave no theological space for
Christianity—due to the Christian proclamation that Jesus of Nazareth is the son of God
incarnate who fulfils God’s covenant with Israel and reconfigures Israel around himself.”173
Furthermore, in its classical usage, the doctrine of supersessionism “maintains that
because the Jews refused to receive Jesus as Messiah, they were cursed by God, are no longer in
covenant with God, and that the Church alone is the ‘true Israel’ or the ‘spiritual Israel.’” 174 In
this study, supersessionism is used synonymously with both replacement and fulfillment
theologies.175
Although a similar claim of supersessionism is put forward by Islam, alleging that it
supplants Christianity and Judaism as the finality of revelation, 176 the use of supersessionism is
restricted in this study to instances where Christianity offers “no theological space” for Islam or
Islamic theologies in Jos, Plateau. In the context of the debate of interreligious dialogue, the use
of supersessionism further denotes illustrations of both Christological exclusivism and some
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mild forms of Christological inclusivist thinking. Conversely, the use of the terms
“nonsupersessionism” or “nonsupersessionist” is applied to designate pluralistic alternatives to
exclusivist and inclusivist thinking.

Religious diversity/plurality-pluralism
Unlike the concept of religious diversity, which is as old as the concept of religion itself,
the term “religious pluralism” is a neologism. It is complex in nature, multifaceted in approach,
and diverse in practice. It is difficult to give a detailed account of its various nuances and
paradigms. As a result, in some of the literature, “religious pluralism” and “religious plurality”
are used interchangeably. This study uses the fourfold distinction offered by Diana Eck of the
Pluralism Project of the Harvard University.
First, pluralism is not diversity alone, but the energetic engagement with diversity.
Diversity can and has meant the creation of religious ghettoes with little traffic
between or among them. Today, religious diversity is a given, but pluralism is not
a given; it is an achievement. Mere diversity without real encounter and
relationship will yield increasing tensions in our societies.
Second, pluralism is not just tolerance, but the active seeking of
understanding across lines of difference. Tolerance is a necessary public virtue,
but it does not require Christians and Muslims, Hindus, Jews, and ardent
secularists to know anything about one another. Tolerance is too thin a foundation
for a world of religious difference and proximity. It does nothing to remove our
ignorance of one another, and leaves in place the stereotype, the half-truth, the
fears that underlie old patterns of division and violence. In the world in which we
live today, our ignorance of one another will be increasingly costly.
Third, pluralism is not relativism, but the encounter of commitments. The
new paradigm of pluralism does not require us to leave our identities and our
commitments behind, for pluralism is the encounter of commitments. It means
holding our deepest differences, even our religious differences, not in isolation,
but in relationship to one another.
Fourth, pluralism is based on dialogue. The language of pluralism is that
of dialogue and encounter, give and take, criticism and self-criticism. Dialogue
means both speaking and listening, and that process reveals both common
understandings and real differences. Dialogue does not mean everyone at the
50

“table” will agree with one another. Pluralism involves the commitment to being
at the table—with one’s commitments.177

De jure and De facto religious pluralism
We understand religious plurality as an actual reality—the de facto reality of the
existence of other religions besides Christianity; and the acceptance of this reality as a given
principle from God constitutes de jure pluralism. The questions posed by de jure pluralism have
led scholars178 to re-define the theological significance of the other religions.
Christological triumphalism
According to Douglas John Hall, this term entails “the profession of Christ's sovereignty,
whether it is called kingship or monarchy or lordship or whatever else, [which] invites the
religious tendency to turn the whole character of Jesus Christ's person and work into one of
blatant triumph.”179 The use of the term “Christological triumphalism” denotes the outcome of
the colonial and post-colonial application of the Christian Scriptures by missionaries and their
successors in a bid to create a superior identity for Christians with the mandate to civilize and
Christianize the subjugated religiously inferior.
Christological exclusivism
Tom Greggs identifies three forms of exclusivism: (a) Christological exclusivism, (b)
revelatory exclusivism and (c) eschatological or soteriological exclusivism, which denies
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salvation to the non-Christians. 180 Greggs argues that exclusivism forms (a) and (b) do not
necessarily lead to form (c), but in the context of this study, all forms of exclusivism discussed
above will be used synonymously. Thus, we conceive Christological exclusivism as theological
positions that claim the possibility of salvation through Jesus Christ alone.
Christological inclusivism
In this study we do not conceive Christological inclusivism as the opposite of
Christological exclusivism. Rather it shares in the conviction of the universal salvation offered
by Jesus Christ but also finds, to a certain degree, the vestige of the saving Christ in a variety of
religious contexts. Alister McGrath had this to say about the fluidity of the term inclusivism:
“Inclusivism…argues that although Christianity represents the normative revelation of God,
salvation is nonetheless possible for those who belong to other religious traditions. This class of
approach includes parallelism, a form of inclusivism which recognizes the obvious differences
between the religions and argues that each religion is to be seen as valid, in that it achieves its
own specific goals.”181
Pseudospecies declaration
This term is derived from Eric Erikson’s concept of pseudo-speciation. It is applied in
this study to illustrate the use of religion and ethnicity by the dominant ethnicities in Jos, Plateau,
in their relationship with ethnic minorities.
In Erikson’s (1968) view, man survived as a specie by dividing into pseudospecies by way of the distinctions introduced by language barriers and the
tendency to reject outside groups as “barbarians” excluded from humanity....
However, in so doing, he differentiates himself into groups, thus running the risk
of rejecting as inhuman, animal, or bestial the groups which do not share the same
basic identity. Pseudo-speciation, by causing the sense of human specificity of
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every man to be lost, is one of the greatest dangers threatening humanity. The
collective identity of the horde, tribe, class, nation or religious community may
lead to only regarding as truly human those who share the same identity. Now, the
search for a pure identity is both a sign of alienation and a condition of historical
evolution, through the necessary confrontation with confusions of identity...182
1.5. Thesis
This research centers on group conflict in Jos, Middle-belt, Nigeria. It is premised upon
the trio dynamics of (a) the inherited British colonial super-ordination, (b) religion and ethnicity
and (c), religious identity and the politics of power-holding and resource control. British indirect
rule, as orchestrated by the Hausa/Fulani hegemony over ethnic minorities in the Middle-belt
region, is the genesis of the ethnic and religious crisis. Relations between “indigene” or “host”
and “settler” communities in Nigeria have been historically complex, vexed, and tense;183 and
most times they have resulted in fatalities. The problem, simply put, is that the three dominant
Christian ethnic groups of Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere (BAA) constitute a “we” or “inner”
group sustained by the “pseudospecies declaration, we are the chosen people.”184 By implication,
the Jassawa Muslim minority are the un-chosen.185 This strong group identity, based on ethnic
and religious dominance and attached to “territorial imperatives,”186 has invariably undermined
182
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the Jassawa ethnic group, turning them into what Volkan vigorously refers to as “suitable targets
of externalization.”187
The importance attached to land and the issue of gaining territorial control is part of the
reason for which people fight in Jos. More important and complicating is the fact that these
crises are centered in religion and intergroup competition among religions. One school of
thought on the origin of the name “Jos” traces its foundation story to 1904 as a German
missionary territory. According to this school, J, O, and S are an acronym for “Jesus our Savior
(JOS).”188 Explicitly, this school or tradition identified Jos as a Christian city. Consequently, Jos
became a scrambled space that generated inter-group conflict between Christianity and Islam,
with the latter presenting also a well-defined claim and identity in Jos. A recipe for inter-group
conflict would emerge from these separate identities. The symbolic claim of Christians
emanating from the “Jesus Our Savior (JOS)” narrative becomes the basis for its exclusivism and
supersessionism.
There are several consequences to the violent and tragic encounter between the BAA and
the Jassawa. The need to establish a well-founded religious identity as a means toward political
relevance often pitted one group against another. In this melee, both ethnic groups remain
stranded without a sustained conflict resolution method. The core pursuit of this study is to find a
possible answer through the conceptual frameworks laid out by the Chicago Sociology189 and
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Raimon Panikkar’s methods for conflict resolution. Together these will provide the basis for our
analysis of the series of internecine conflicts that led to the 2001 religious crisis that engulfed
Christian indigenes and Moslem settlers in Jos, Nigeria.
By liberating exclusivist Christology from its totalizing tendencies, we intend to use
Panikkar to develop an alternative dialogical pneumatology of the charity and hospitality
necessary for an interreligious encounter and coexistence between Christianity and Islam in Jos,
Nigeria. The application of exclusivist Christology as a foundation for interreligious dialogue is
held suspect. Hence, this study attempts to instantiate Panikkar’s dialogical dialogue190 into the
interreligious world of Northern Nigeria. Panikkar’s dialogical dialogue will be useful in
formulating theoretical-hermeneutical principles for rejecting Christian supersessionism as an
approach to interreligious dialogue. This study further investigates the nature of absolute claims
emanating from BAA and evaluates how these claims serve as triggers to violence, which is
provoked by the slightest religious misunderstanding between Christianity and Islam in Jos,
Nigeria.
One cannot deny the existence of supersessionism in Islam. The problem has been that
most of the literature on the 2001 Jos crisis seems to downplay, if not neglect entirely, the extent
to which religious supersessionism has functioned as a trigger to violence. This lacuna has left
vast room for further research. There is a lack of genuine theological attempts by both Christians
and Muslims to engage in a thorough self-critique of doctrinal presuppositions that hinder mutual
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dialogue.191 Therefore, from a Christian perspective, our attention will be drawn to the role of
Christian supersessionism and how it serves as trigger to the immediate cause of the Jos riots.
This study on the first level will carry out a theological investigation into Christian
supersessionism, tracing its foundations to the Christian myth propelled by BAA about the origin
of Jos—properly understood as the city of “Jesus Our Savior.” In addition, the selfunderstanding of Christianity as a religion sui iurui and with iure divino status to public
existence and action is on trial.192 The narrative of Jos as the city of “Jesus Our Savior” accounts
for the vehement opposition by BAA to the appointment of Hausa political figures to State and
Federal government positions.193 Such a definition, even though backed by political correctness,
depicts religious extremism. In other words, it raises serious ethical and theological questions for
Christianity as a religion that preaches love and hospitality for neighbors, especially the stranger.
In this sense, Christian supersessionism poses a grave ethical danger to the virtue of hospitality
in that it reduces the horizon of Christian compassion, limiting its beneficiaries to members of
Christian faith communities only.
This study proposes that the tragic encounter between BAA and Jassawa that led to the
death of about 5,000 inhabitants of Jos is not unconnected with the Christian deterministic claim
of ethnic and religious superiority over the Muslims. To put it differently, the role of Christian
supersessionism is identified as one of the contributing factors that triggered the conflicts and
violence in Jos. Hence, there is a need to propose a non-supersessionist theology that challenges
the dominant exclusive theology that is hostile to religious pluralism.
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No other theological framework has furthered the advancement of non-supersessionist
theology as well as Panikkar’s theology of interreligious dialogue. His critique of the worldview
built on exclusive theology is relatively important because it draws attention in this research to
the dangers of the totalizing effect of exclusive theology.194
Panikkar’s non-supersessionist model, as outlined in his dialogical pluralism,195 provides
the thesis to be proven: namely, that the dialogue of equity is in jeopardy in Jos, Northern
Nigeria, owing to the absolute supremacy claims of Christianity over Islam. The Christian
paternalistic attitude that is evident in the exclusivist model of “we are the chosen people,
therefore, we own the land, and the truth that leads to salvation,” is at the core of its ethnic
bigotry and religious supersessionism.
1.6. Theological Methods
The method used in this dissertation is qualitative research. It is based on descriptive,
analytic examination and cross-examination of the subject matter that is both reflexive and
active. This work studies the role of religion in colonial and post-colonial Jos, Plateau, in
Middle-Belt Nigeria. For this reason, through the hermeneutical lens of post-colonial discourse,
this dissertation situates theology within the confines of the cultural struggles of both Christians
and Muslims in Jos as they have responded to the aftermath of colonialism.
Thus, theological methods that ignore the colonial and post-colonial realities of this
context function at best as epistemological tools at the disposal of what Mignolo describes as
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“...coloniality of power which controls the conceptualization of knowledge.” 196 Owing to the
complex nature of the phenomenon of interreligious conflict in Jos, an eclectic 197 approach that
transgresses the limit and borders of euro-centrism will be employed to harness the different
theological presuppositions used in this study.
Furthermore, an understanding of the existing problems of traditional theology is a sine
qua non for an effective engagement in transgressive theology. In the words of Boodoo, “Can
one speak of transgressive theology, one that implies and encourages transgression, or is it
theology itself that needs to be transgressed? The former holds out hope that theology is capable
of transgressing boundaries and can engage and generate transgression as a constitutive part of
its endeavor.”198 In his extensive research on the Roman Catholic theological methods, Francis S.
Fiorenza affirms the necessity of a balance between philosophy, culture, community, and
theology. To maintain this balance, the issue about methods is paramount and must be taken
seriously.199 For the relevance of theology to the human community depends heavily on how it is
packaged and how it is been unpacked. Thus, for Fiorenza “...theology relates to a community: a
community of discourse and of faith.”200 A Nigerian-Igbo proverb, nku di na mba na eghere mba
nri (the firewood within a given locale is sufficient for cooking), drives this point home
beautifully: namely, that the philosophical and theological ingredients available by nature and
culture in a particular locale are sufficient for God-talk. We agree with Fiorenza that method in
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theology, or theological method, belongs to the realm of nature and is therefore culturally
bonded. This means that claims to “substitutional universalism” 201 overlook the God-given
resources bestowed on nature and culture. This tendency toward “substitutional universalism,”
that is, “claiming as universal what is in reality a specifically Eurocentric viewpoint,” 202 has been
the stumbling block of magisterium theological methodology.
The next section on methodology is divided into two major parts on (i) dialogue,
contextual, and incarnational methods, and (ii) liberational and hermeneutical methods.
1.6.1. Dialogue, contextual and incarnational methods
The search for appropriate methodology and concise hermeneutics remains one of the
fundamental tasks of the theology of interreligious dialogue as a sub-sect of African theology.
The socio-political and cultural changes evolving in the context in which theology is been done
in Africa call for a reevaluation of the methods already employed and the sharpening of its
hermeneutics. The logic is that if there is to be any genuine dialogue between Christianity and
other religions, African theologians must be convinced of the reliability and validity of the
methods and hermeneutics employed in the dialogue.
The enigmatic and perennial question about the relationship of Christ and culture within
African theological studies has been nagging at scholars over the years. Scholars of various faith
backgrounds and different religious affiliations during the course of history have attempted to
strike a balance between the summons of faith in Christ and the respective human response in
culture. In spite of the recorded scholarly progress, the problems of hermeneutics and methods
remain perennially in the study of African theology. In light of the above, therefore, the search
for proper hermeneutics and appropriate methodology for retrieving, investigating, and
201
202

Ibid, 69.
Ibid.

59

articulating the concerns of the African people and the theological responses given to these
concerns have now become the prolegomena to the study of African theology.
African philosophers and theologians, as well as sociologists and anthropologists, do not
agree on the methods of inquiry required for an integrated approach to the social sciences.
Kwame Bediako, in his work Theology and Identity, testifies to this fact.203 While scholars like
Bolaji Idowu (Methodist), John Mbiti (Anglican), and Mulago Cikala Musharhamina (Catholic)
argue for an inclusive methodology that builds on the genuineness of the pre-Christian African
heritage and its usefulness for the reconstruction of African theology, others, like Byang Kato
(Evangelist), from an exclusivist standpoint are vehemently opposed to any kind of continuity
between African Traditional Religion (ATR) and Christianity.204
However, from a pluralistic African feminist perspective, Ifi Amadiume critiques
methodological presuppositions that come from both the African Traditional Religion (ATR) and
African Christian theologians. According to Amadiume, scholars of the aforementioned religions
enthroned a male supreme God alongside the Judeo-Christian God to the de-valuation of female
deities. Amadiume believes that this trend of thought shows an inherent weakness in the work of
Christian theologians, namely, “patriarchal greed, totalitarian patriarchy, gender oppression, and
centrism.”205
Similarly, non-Christian African scholars, like Okot p’Bitek and Ali Mazrui, offer a
similar critique against the universalistic claims evident in the hermeneutics of modern African
scholars. p’Bitek, for instance, has accused some African scholars as “Hellenizers of ATR,”
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because, “they dress up African deities with Hellenistic robes and parade them before the
Western world.”206 p’Bitek draws further attention to the predicament of African scholars.
What did African scholars find so beautiful or useful in Greek metaphysics that
they chose it to be the vehicle for expressing African Religious Concepts? It
would appear that African scholars were attracted to this tool not because of its
usefulness or efficiency. They were reacting against intellectual arrogance and...
“in order to establish her intellectual equality with the West, African has to master
Western versions of intellectual skills. Africa has to be as Greek as the next
person.” And, while the West is busy demolishing the Hellenistic mould in which
Christian faith had been imprisoned, African scholars are busy collecting the same
rusty, thrown-away pieces and putting them on African deities.
Likewise, in the epilogue to p’Bitek’s work, Ali Mazrui, retired late Professor of Political
Science, seriously queries the intent of studies that are geared towards a universal hermeneutics
if they do not take the local context seriously:
Why should there be a constant search to fit African conceptions of God into
notions like omnipotence and omnipresence and omniscience? Why should there
be a constant exploration for one super-god in Africa societies, as if one was
trying to discover an inner monotheism in traditional African belief systems?
Why should African students of religion be so keen to demonstrate that the
Christian God had already been understood and apprehended by Africans before
the missionaries came?207
As a result, current theological methodologies and hermeneutics proposed for a dialogical
encounter between Christianity and Islam in Jos as advanced by leading African scholars and
religious leaders demand critical scrutiny. The staggering statistics of violence resulting from
interreligious riots and wars between the Christians and Muslims in Jos indicate failed dialogue.
In this study, we will argue that the incessant failure in dialogue witnessed in Northern Nigeria is
the result of applying the wrong dialogical methods and hermeneutics, most of which are heavily
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based on the framework and ideology of the western paradigm of God-Talk which by all
standards have grossly become redundant and thus inadequate.
Furthermore, judging from the context of the theology of inculturation, these imported
western dialogical principles lack vigorous pastoral relevance and contextual application.
Consequently, for African theology to be relevant today, African theologians must wean
themselves from the palliatives provided by Western hermeneutics and methodologies.
If theology is to be relevant today, the issue of inculturation should not be taken as an
option. It is urgent and necessary, a hic et nunc for the Church in Africa. In the words of
Chupungo, “The necessity for inculturation in the theology today especially in mission countries
cannot be over stressed. It is absolutely necessary if the church is to be positioned to offer to all
people the mystery of salvation and life brought by God.” Theology without inculturation, says J.
M Walligo, “paralyses all efforts to make Christ appear in all his splendor to the people of each
culture.”208 Teresa Okure also states that “our understanding of the mystery of incarnation serves
as a solid foundation for comprehending inculturation—for inculturation rests on incarnation
seen not as a mystery and event in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, but as a process to be carried
on in history till the end of time.”209 Patrick Chibuko corroborates Okure’s position when he
shows that:
the word took flesh and dwelt among us. In the incarnation, Jesus is seen as the
model and archetype of inculturation. His birth, life and death took place in a
particular context and culture. He learnt the language and customs, then in and
through these he expressed the truth and love of God for the entire humanity.
Authentic inculturation needs to be distinguished by noble simplicity, radical
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transformation, enduring values depth in meaning and having an embracive
wholeness.210
The views of Okure and Chibuko present Christ’s incarnation as model for the Nigerian
Church. Consequently, authentic inculturation builds on the principle of incarnation whereby the
Son of God became Jewish in all things but sin, sharing their faith, culture, and tradition. This
ecclesiological dimension of inculturation makes it incumbent on the Church to identify itself
historically and culturally with its people and become not only a “Church in” but a “Church of”
a particular place—a local church.
Similarly, Uzukwu opines that “our analysis of the merging of certain elements in the
traditional Igbo experience and practice of priesthood, and leadership with the received Western
Christianity’s practice of ministry shows the urgency…of the theology of inculturation.” 211
Accordingly, Uzukwu defined inculturation theology for the Igbo
as that theology which works towards the encounter of Igbo structural history and
the heart of the proclamation of the gospel; because this theology must be
Christian, it becomes an incarnation of the Christian message into the Igbo culture
so that the Christian way becomes a principle that animates, directs and unifies
Igbo life, transforming and remaking it so as to bring about a new creation.212
This definition of Uzukwu has a direct bearing on the sitz in leben of the Igbo cultural
community and, therefore, evokes a fundamental review of its ecclesiastical structures. Uzukwu
continues this clarion call for structural adjustments and the balancing of ecclesiastical powers
and sharing of charisms within the local Church.213
From the ecclesiastical dimension, since the Second Vatican council, the Church has
issued documents and pronouncements highlighting positively the question of gospel and culture.
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The establishment of the Pontifical Council for Culture by John Paul II in 1993 is its
culmination. Commenting on this council for culture, the Pope declares: “oftentimes when one
talks about African Culture, minds are filled with dress, dance, color, art work—modes of the
past. But culture is dynamic and living and not past oriented. It embraces the socio-economic and
political organization of a people within a given environment; it has a depth—level where people
struggle to express and reflect on the mystery of its contact with the universe. At this level, the
question of life and death, of God and the spirits under guiding the universe are posed.”214
Subsequently, in 1994, the African Synod considered inculturation an urgent priority in
the life of particular churches for rooting the Gospel in Africa. The Synod acknowledged the
“‘difficult’ and ‘delicate task’ of inculturation, especially as it may affect people’s fidelity to the
Gospel and the Apostolic Tradition amidst the constant evolution of culture.” 215 Sadly, the
contributions of the African Bishops’ leading-up to the wonderful proposals of the Synod
received very little attention from scholars.
With the African Synod come and gone, Uzukwu reminds the African Church leaders that
if the goals of the synod as they were clearly articulated in the Lineamenta (Proclamation,
Inculturation, Dialogue, Justice and Peace and Social media) were to be achieved, the Church
has to develop a listening ear to issues and challenges raised by contextualization. Thus, for the
African churches to be autonomous, self-reliant, and in communion with one another and with
Rome, it has to take seriously the resources and tools offered by the African traditions and
culture.
Drawing from the examples of African patristics, especially from the elaborate treatment
of the ecclesiology of Cyprian of Carthage, Uzukwu argues for an African Church that maintains
214
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universal communion but also reserves the right to be different and autonomous in both
discipline and rite. The metaphor of the Church with large listening ears works well within an
ecclesiological framework where the pastoral theological concerns of the local churches are not
suppressed or subsumed under a desire for universal conformity to dogma.216
In order to give a theological boost to the issue of inculturation, Aylward Shorter draws
attention to the Christological connection between Jesus Christ and the logic of his Incarnation,
and the implication of such on the content of the Christian message. Relying on the concept of
the logos spermatikos of Justin Martyr, which was referenced also by the Second Vatican
Council’s Ad Gentes (#22), Shorter argues for the incarnation as the starting point for
inculturation. In the conciliar document, there seems to be confusion among the terms
“adaptation,” “inculturation,” and “incarnation.” These were used interchangeably in some
instances. This was a good thing, however, because “[t]he Bishops of Africa and Madagascar
consider as being completely out of date the so-called theology of adaptation. Instead they adopt
the theology of incarnation.”217 This approach is appropriate because it looks at Jesus Christ as a
disciple of the Jewish cultural heritage.
Second, in the words of Shorter, “the analogy indicates Christ’s need of cultures in order
to spread his good news of the kingdom and to share his life with humanity. There could have
been no earthly ministry for Jesus if he had not adopted the cultural concepts, symbols and
behavior of his hearers.” 218 Shorter’s dogmatic reference is to Ad Gentes #22, which highly
favors Justin’s concept of “seeds of the word.” Shorter’s ideas in relation to the Church’s
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understanding of incarnation as inculturation raises some doctrinal as well as pastoral issues,
especially in the context of the Church’s position on the theology of interreligious dialogue.
This openness to dialogue with non-Christians, especially the pagan philosophers, was
instrumental in the shaping of the logos-theology of the early Church Fathers. Underlying the
theology of Justin’s Logos Spermatikos (sower), Ireneaus’s Logos emphutos (revealer), and the
Logos protreptikos (conventional) in Clement, there is the presupposition that God before His
incarnation in Jesus was already manifest in creation and human history with its civilizations.219
The use of the hermeneutics of logos-theology by the Church Fathers as a tool for
dialogue had a positive result in their understanding of non-Christians. It furnishes the early
Church with the philosophical terminologies (language) to theologize, and it facilitates the
development of the concept of the Logos as a divine “pedagogy” concerning things to come.
Later on, Eusebius of Caesarea developed this expression to illustrate the doctrine of
“preparation for the gospels” (praeparatio evangelica). In recent times, Karl Rahner’s concept of
the “anonymous Christian” lays the foundation for an inclusivist Christian theology of religions.
Rahner argues for both an explicit and implicit connection between incarnation and salvation.
The Second Vatican’s Nostra Aetate in its appreciation of non-Christian cultural values
and religions rejects theological exclusivism and moves toward inclusivism. Despite the apparent
ambiguity in Nostra Aetate, we see implicitly the Church’s first official positive attempt towards
inclusive dialogue with all religions. This dialogue is based on shared commonalities about the
origin and destiny of man and the search for answers to the most existential question and the
meaning of life. 220 The central doctrinal statement of Nostra Aetate states “that the Church

219

See Peter Phan’s adoption of the logos asarkos in his book. Peter C. Phan, Being Religious
Interreligiously: Asian Perspectives on Interfaith Dialogue (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004), 65-66, 143.
220
Austin Flannery, Vatican II (New Delhi: St. Pauls, 1975), 653.

66

rejects nothing of what is true and holy in these religions.”221 This is an open-ended declaration
and can conversely be reframed in a positive way: The Church accepts the things that are true
and holy in these religions.
The question that remains unanswered, however, is what are the Church’s criteria to judge
what is true in other religions, and whether that which is true is in any way essentially the same
as, or different from the fullness of the Truth possessed by the Church. Is it possible to have
some values, doctrines, and belief systems as “True” that have nothing to do with “Truth”? If
what is true relates to soteriology, would the Catholic Church accept as ‘true and holy’ the de
jure salvific doctrine of salvation evident in other religions?

1.6.2. The librational and hermeneutical method.
Furthermore, the method used in this work relies heavily on hermeneutical analysis and
comparisons derived from inductive reasoning. Panikkar in many ways subscribed to this
methodology of doing theology, which he shared in part with Jacques Dupuis who proposes a
new “interreligious hermeneutical theology” that is inductive, contextual, and hermeneutical.222
In contrast to the deductive methodology of traditional theology which feeds on general doctrinal
principles, this proposal endorses inductive reasoning that is derived from contextual and
hermeneutical theology.
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Since the demand of praxis and specificity remains at the heart of post-colonial discourses,
current studies in religious pluralism call for a drastic change in methods and hermeneutics.
Panikkar, for instance, insists on a hermeneutics that builds on existential situations,223 which
recognizes others “in their very otherness (the other qua other)” 224 as the prerequisite to
pluralism achieved through dialogical dialogue. Walter Mignolo designates this new
hermeneutics as border thinking: “[T]he transcending of the colonial difference can only be done
from a perspective of subalternity, from decolonization, and therefore, from a new
epistemological terrain where border thinking works.... Border thinking can only be such from a
subaltern perspective, never from a territorial (e.g. inside of modernity) one.” 225 In other words,
doing theology in post-colonial Jos, Plateau, requires a hermeneutics that transgresses 226
traditional methods and is drawn from territorial/global designs.227
Panikkar also insists on the footing of theological discourse on epistemological grounds.
Such a way of doing theology considers “the signs of the times” and the current human condition
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and predicament. Accordingly, “Panikkar’s theologizing is hermeneutical in approach, and
attaches crucial importance to experience.”228 As he draws more spiritual depths and insights
from his cosmotheandric experience, his “methodological distinctiveness is that he tries to put
experience in dialogue not only with Christianity but also with Hinduism and Buddhism
traditions.” 229 Correspondingly, this research will benefit from Panikkar’s methodology as it
seeks to formulate theoretical paradigms from a Christian theological perspective for
interreligious dialogue.
Evidently, exclusivist absolute conclusions, which are drawn from claims based on
deductive reasoning, labor under the scrutiny of specificity. The demands of specificity and
particularity characterize the postcolonial inclination for inductive reasoning. Put in another way,
theology now confronts the basic scientific scrutiny for proven propositions that are data-driven
through verifiable methods. Scholars like Jacques Dupuis, Raimon Panikkar, and David Tracy230
have expressed their indebtedness to inductive methodology. The preference for an inductive
methodology that is guided by the specificity of the context shields theological formulation from
drifting towards the generalizing trends of “fulfillment theology”231—the product of deductive
reasoning and dialectical hermeneutics.
The de facto reality of religious pluralism makes the tools provided by praxis and culture
indispensable in the studies of interreligious dialogue. The hermeneutical triangle of “text,”
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“context” and “interpreter” 232 revolves around the axle of culture. This means that no text,
context, or interpreter can exist outside the periphery mapped by culture. Thus, the framework of
the studies of interreligious dialogue culture now assumes the epicenter of what Panikkar
describes as diatopical hermeneutics.
I call it diatopical hermeneutics because the distance to be overcome is not
merely temporal, within one broad tradition, but the gap existing between two
human topoi, “places” of understanding and self-understanding, between two—or
more—cultures that have not developed their patterns of intelligibility or their
basic assumptions out of a common historical tradition or through mutual
influence. To cross the boundaries of one’s own culture without realizing that
another culture may have a radically different approach to reality is today no
longer admissible.233
In order to effectively carry out this cross-cultural hermeneutics, we borrow from the
cognitive anthropology of James P. Spradley, which defines “culture as the acquired knowledge
[and information] people use to interpret experience and generate their behavior.” 234 This
definition of culture allows interlocutors engaged in dialogue to define the world as they live in it
and see it. Thus, a strong emphasis will be laid on the African concept of hospitality, which is
deeply rooted in signs and symbols.235
Finally, Paul Tillich’s correlative method and the hermeneutical method provide a useful
resource in delineating the methodological framework of this project. In its core, the correlative
and contextual methodology draws insights from theology to address the philosophical and
cultural issues facing human beings. This way of doing theology from below has enormous
influence on inculturation, contextualization, and liberation approaches to theology. Our
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methodological presupposition is as follows: culture and its interpretation through the lens of
dialogical dialogue remains the necessary raw material for doing the theology of interreligious
dialogue.
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CHAPTER TWO
HERMENUETICS OF EXCLUSION: JOS AS A CHRISTIAN CITY
AND THE MUSLIM RESPONSE
2.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, we discussed the implications of British colonialism and its
ripple effects over the entire Sokoto Caliphate in general and the Jos Plateau in particular. The
implication of colonialism and capitalism coupled with the urbanization project made the city of
Jos a melting pot of various ethnicities. 1 In the midst of scarce resources amidst a nascent
capitalism, the problem of resources control triggered ethnic and religious maneuvering and
conflict. We subscribe to Coser’s definition of conflict as “a struggle over values and claims to
scarce status, power and resources in which the aim of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or
eliminate their rivals.” 2
Along similar lines, Nnoli identifies four major traits of ethnicity in relation to conflict:
“first, it exists in a polity in which there is a variety of ethnic groups; second, it is characterized
by exclusiveness which is manifested in inter-ethnic discrimination; third, conflict is inherent
particularly in situations of strong competition over limited resources; finally ethnicity involves
consciousness of being one in relation to other ethnic groups.”3 The key term Nnoli employs
includes exclusivism, competition, and violence. On these grounds, we can agree with Dung Pan
Sha that the struggle for scarce resources has led to the “settlers’ problem” in Jos Plateau.4
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In this work, the term “settlers” denotes ethnic groups in the Jos Plateau that have
ancestral ties to established ethnic homeland outside the geographical space they now occupy.
Members of these ethnic groups, in other words, belong to and can lay claim as indigenes to their
ancestral homeland in ways that, for instance, a Jos Plateau native Berom, Afizere, or Anaguta
cannot. It is in this sense that we can categorize the following dominant ethnicities—Hausa,
Yoruba, Igbo, and Tiv—as settlers in the Jos Plateau terrain. However, reference is made to the
attempt by the Hausa/Fulani-Jasawa group in Jos to dissociate themselves from the Hausa/Fulani
of the other Northern States.5 According to Iwuchukwu, “The Hausa/Fulani people in Jos selfidentity as Jasawa people. This name is a product of political construct to symmetrically identify
their ethnicity with the founding of Jos, as a city.”6
In addition, the other aforementioned ethnic groups in the Jos Plateau are referred to as
natives of the land. These indigenous people were “known to have resisted the pressure of
conversion to Islam by the Fulani jihadist, which came principally from the Bauchi and Jema’a
emirates.”7 According to Fwatshak, “the Anaguta, Berom of Bukuru, Afizere, Buji and Arno (all
Jos Plateau groups) in about 1873, repulsed [the] jihadists from Bauchi, led by Ciroman Bauchi
Usumanu, Aijiyan Bauchi, and Magajin Bauchi, by combining their forces against the invaders
in Jos. The invaders were beaten back as they were chased from Rafin Jaki to Toro.” 8
Subsequently, all other later arrivals prior to and shortly after the 1940 recruitment exercise by
colonial administration to the minefield, railway, and other sectors, are referred to as migrant
residents. The pursuit of happiness or the desire to join the white-collar labor force brought
5
Jana Krause, “A Deadly Cycle: Ethno-religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria.” Working Paper,
(Geneva: Switzerland, 2010).
6
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8
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people “from Bauchi, Benue, Borno, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Plateau, Sokoto, and Zaria. The highest
number of migrants came from Zaria with 19 per cent, Sokoto with 16.1 per cent, Bauchi with
15.8 per cent, and Benue with 12.9 per cent. These migrants settled in Jos and its environs.”9
On religious policy, the British maintained freedom of religion and the rights of the
natives in Jos. However, in retrospect, this policy was carried out merely on paper. While the
British continued its containment policy on Islam, it supported the efforts of the Christian
mission on a larger scale. Politically, the British colonial administration, through indirect rule,
set up the dominant Hausa/Fulani ethnicity as rulers over the Middle Belt minorities. 10 The
indirect rule system created the belief among the ruling Hausa/Fulani that political leadership
equals ownership of the people and its landed resources. On the other hand, the dominant ethnic
minorities of Jos Plateau have a different take: political leadership is by conquest and ownership
through ancestral inheritance.
According to Adamu and Kirk-Green, “The term ‘Jos Plateau’ denotes a geographical
entity. It occupies about 7.762km2 within the area marked by 10°30’E. It includes high plains
1,219m above sea level with granite hills rising to over 1,719m on the Shere hills east of Jos. The
term Jos Plateau refers here to the Plateau province created by the colonial regime in 1926.”11
Jos is also the capital city of Plateau State. It is located on a mountainous plateau that rises more
than 1,000 meters over the surrounding plain. Therefore, given its high altitude, it offers a
temperate climate and has long attracted both foreign visitors and retired elites. Until the regime
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change in 1999, it was also known for its relatively harmonious communal relations.12 According
to official records, the city was founded in 1913 and inaugurated in 1920.13 It is located in the
Middle Belt region of Nigeria.14 The 2006 Nigerian Census pegged the population of Plateau
State at 3,178,712.15 The state has seventeen local government areas, and the metropolitan city of
Jos is made up of three of these areas: Jos North with 429,300 people, Jos South with 306,716,
and Jos East with a population of 85,603.16 According to Anthony Ham, “although Jos seems an
outwardly religious city to the visitors, it sits astride one of Nigeria’s major Christian-Muslim
fault lines.”17
The geographical location of the city on the highland with relatively flat terrain supports
the agricultural activities of nomadic pastoralism and land farming. This orientation gives
agricultural occupation a key factor that defines the ethnic and religious identities of the people.
The demographics and multi-religious context of Jos shows that the city has a predominantly
Christian population as compared to many northern cities where Muslims are the majority. The
1952 census has the Christian population of the Jos town as 84.5 percent as against the Muslim
population of 12 percent. However, recent studies show the population in the entire Plateau State
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to be overwhelmingly Christian majority at 95 percent, with Jos town itself forming the
nucleus.18
Population wise, the pastoral nomadic Hausa/Fulani Muslims are the minority. They are
generally regarded as settlers—i.e., non-indigenous. The Christian majority constituting the
ethnicities of BAA claim to be the authentic indigenous owners of Jos, and other ethnicities are
considered settlers. Like other metropolitan cities in Nigeria, Jos is a conglomeration of the
Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Tiv, Idoma, Urhobo, Igala, Nupe, Bassa, and Jukuns. This mass migration
into Jos by the various ethnic groups, especially those who identified themselves as Christians,
increased the numerical strength of Christians in Jos.
Marinus Iwuchukwu lists the following historical factors as fundamental in shaping the
identity of the people of Jos: “the migration to the hills of the plateau some centuries ago; the
consolidation of the territories from the attacks of bigger kingdoms… living under the control of
the Hausa-Fulani emirate system under the supervision of colonial authorities; the struggle for
autonomy… and the close proximity to several ethnicities with identical but different languages
and cultures.” 19 These factors partially account for the protest and vehement opposition
registered by the indigenes to the British indirect rule policies and the reluctance to grant the
Hausa-Fulani settlers full residential status as fellow land owners in the Jos Plateau.
Plateau State consists of about fifty-two ethnic groups, making it the most diverse state in
Nigeria alongside Adamawa State. 20 Of these various ethnicities, the Berom, Anaguta, and
Afizare (BAA) are the most dominant. Apart from their numerical strength, the BAA had been in
Umar HabilaDademDanfulani and Sati U. Fwathak, “Briefing: The September 2001 Events in Jos,
Nigeria,” African Affairs (2002): 101, 243.
19
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the forefront in the fight against Islamic intruders into the Jos Plateau region. 21 According to
Umar Danfulani,
Three major language families of Africa meet on the Jos Plateau. These are the
Kwa and Bantu sub-groups of the Benue Congo family and the Chadic sub-group
of the Afroasiatic. In the Jos Plateau region, Kwa-speaking groups include among
others, Berom, easily the largest ethnic group in the area, Pyem, Ganawuri, and
Tarok. Chadic-speakers constitute a number of small ethnic groups to the east of
the Jos Plateau stretching all the way towards the Chad basin. These include
among others the Ron, Kulere, Mushere, Ngas, Mwaghavul, Mupun, Mship, Jipal,
Chakfem and Goemai. Most of these groups share traditions of origin from the
Chad-Borno region.The Bantu-speakers also live on the high plateau. These
include the Anaguta, Afisare, Bache and the Irigwe. These are cousins with the
Ham, Kataf, Bajju, Kagoro, Kagoma, Chawai, Kaningkon, Nimzon and several
other such small groups found in Southern Kaduna.22
Nigeria became an independent nation in 1960, yet remained deeply dependent on ethnic
affinities and affiliations. Each space and spot in Nigeria is defined by ethnic identifications and
relations. This creates a consciousness of double identity: first, of the claim to this ethnic space
and second, a realization that the “other” is present within the ethnic space. These “others” are
equally conscious of their abandoned ethnic space and the new space of welcome or possession.
The reality of this double identity means that one cannot simultaneously belong to both realities.
In other words, one cannot be both an indigene and settler in the same community. “The
indigene-settler distinction is also explosive because it reinforces, and is reinforced by, other
identity-based divides in Nigeria.”23 The question is, can any ethnic group(s) lay claim to the
ancestral ownership of Jos Plateau like the Hausa in Kano, the Kanuri in Maiduguri, the Yoruba
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in Ibadan, the Igbo in Enugu, the Tiv in Gboko, Nupe in Bida, Igala in Idah and Idoma in
Oturkpo? The question remains: Who owns Jos?24
The prevailing narrative that Jos Plateau fell under the British rule and by proxy under
the Bauchi emirate no longer holds, for the above named ethnicities (Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo) and
their various cities fell under the same British rule, yet they maintained their lands and cultural
identities. We argue that the narrative of indirect rule by proxy of the Hausa/Fulani dynasty over
Jos Plateau, coupled with the scarcity of resources in a nascent capitalism, is fundamental to
crisis between the Hausa and the natives; between the Hausa and other residents (the 1932
uprising); the Hausa and the Igbo (the 1945 potato riot), and the Hausa and natives against the
Igbo in 1955.
The recent phase of the Jos crisis began in 1994 and reached its climax in 2001. This
crisis has demonstrated repeated cycles of reprisals in 2004, 2008, 2010, and 2012 from both
Christians and Muslims. The death toll of victims over these years rose to about 5,000.25Before
the genesis of the crisis in 2001, the city of Jos was known as the “home of peace and tourism”
and a center of religious liberty and harmony. Prior to 2001, the last episode of extremely brutal
violence in Jos was in 1966 during the events of the Nigeria-Biafra Civil War. 26 The peace
experienced in Jos attracted expatriates, retired military personnel, and business moguls from
diverse ethnic groups from the southern and northern part of the country. For the vast majority of
the inhabitants of Jos, both settlers and indigenes, the Hausa language continues to be the lingua
franca among all the ethnic groups, which cut across political and religious traditions. Inter-
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religious and ethnic marriages are also rampart among indigenes and settlers alike. These ethnic
and cultural elements are long-standing, and they shape inter-communal harmonious relations as
well as generate frequent inter-tribal conflicts, intolerance, and violence.
In recent times, instances of religious conflicts and violence have assumed a peculiar
character in Jos. Unlike previous instances of violence in other parts of northern Nigeria, the
2001 Jos crisis defied earlier characterizations of violence occurring in predominantly Muslim
populated areas where the politics of the implementation of the Sharia law has led to bitter
confrontations between Muslim indigenes and Christian non-indigenes. 27 The connection
between the formerly peaceful city of Jos and its post-crisis outlook at the wake of the 2001
massacre is an interesting case study for interreligious dialogue.
The frequent attacks on churches, mosques, and military barracks demonstrate numerous
widespread cases of terrorist brutality. 28 They suggest a rising tide of continuous, internecine
conflict, now turned into guerilla warfare. In recent times, the emergence of an organized
terrorist group called Boko Haram29 has changed the context of conflict and difference into a
terror campaign. The activity of this group has sparked inter-communal violence, spearheaded by
perceived religious differences.
The Jos mayhem contradicts the claim that Christians in northern Nigeria are the target of
violence given their lesser numerical strength. Although there are sound reasons to adhere to the
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thesis of a persecuted Christian minority in northern Nigeria, the Jos crisis gives a contrary twist
to Christian-Muslim conflict in northern Nigeria. The claim that portrays Christianity as a
persecuted minority standing always at the receiving end of most interreligious conflict and
violence in northern Nigeria must be qualified in this context. The dynamics that triggered this
magnitude of violence leading to the wanton destruction of lives and property in a predominantly
Christian city makes the Jos crisis an exception in the cases of violence in the history of
Christian-Muslim relations in northern Nigeria.
2.2. Pre-colonial and Post-colonial Critical Review of Violence in Jos
The 2001 ethnic-religious crisis in Jos Plateau shocked the nation and aroused
international interest and alarm. However, it was not the first of its kind. There were instances of
resistance in pre-colonial times between the inhabitants of the Jos Plateau, who were adherents
of the African Traditional Religion (ATR), and the onslaught of the Usman dan Fodio’s jihad.
Under the geopolitical mappings of the Sokoto Caliphate, Jos Plateau occupied a strategic
position along the boundary between the Caliphate and the southern Oyo and Benin Empires.
Scholars referred to this vast savannah area as Kasanchen Bauchi.30 It comprises what is today
known as the Middle Belt geopolitical region—Bauchi, Plateau, Keffi, Nassarawa, Toto, Lafia,
Benue, and the Nupelands, with the exception of the Adamawa mountainous region, which lies
below the Kanem-Bornu. 31 At various periods, areas of the lowlands of the Plateau and its
adjoining environs had fallen under the Caliphate’s emirate of Zaria, Ninga, and Bauchi.
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Consequently, during the post-jihad era, the Sokoto Caliphate had already established
sub-emirates in the lower-Plateau towns of Keffi, Doma, Lafia, Nasarrawa.32 But the question of
whether Jos was part of the Kasanchen Bauchi is still controversial. Some scholars who are
affiliates of the Sokoto Caliphate argue that Jos Plateau was part of the Bauchi emirate by proxy,
because the Caliphate expanded its growth south to Keffi, Doma, Lafia, Nasarrawa, and Ilorin.
Others contended that because of its hilly nature, the Sokoto jihadists never captured and settled
in the Jos Plateau prior to the British takeover in 1902.33
The fact that the Sokoto Caliphate was unable to penetrate the hill country of the Plateau
gave the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere ethnicities the needed fortress to launch a reprisal attack
in 1873 against the jihadists led by the Ciroman Bauchi.34 Although the jihadists lost the war on
the hills of the Plateau, mainly to the un-subdued Anaguta and Afizere,35 they made some gains
on the lower land, thus establishing Islamic presence and sub-emirates in Wase and Kanam.36
The acceptance of Islam and the use of its military support under the Bauchi emirate further
exacerbated the thorny relationship between the ethnic minorities around and up the Jos Plateau
who were predominantly adherents of the African Traditional religions. These ethnic groups
opposed and resisted Islamic cultural dominance and demand for religious conversion.37
Bauchi has a complex history in relation to the Hausa states. The Hausa etymology for
Bauchi38 means “slave” or “the land of slaves.” Thus, the term Kasanchen Bauchi denotes the
current regions of Bauchi, Plateau, Southern Kaduna, Northern Niger and South Sokoto (Zuru
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and Yawuri).39 It was notorious as the hub of slave raiders for the Kastina and Kano boundary
line of the trans-Sahara trade route. 40 Although there was evidence of an established seat of
government in Bauchi by the Kamgari and Kamuka peoples in the sixteenth century, recent
archaeological findings about the Nok culture show activities of peoples in the Jos Plateau region
that pre-date the Bauchi and the Sokoto Caliphate.41
In the pre-colonial setting, the relationship between the non-Muslim ethnic minority in
the Jos Plateau and the dominant Islamic Bauchi emirate was maintained through the traditional
amana 42 contractual relationship, wherein ethnic minorities pay either to retain or regain
autonomy from external dominance. The Sokoto Caliphate through its application of the Islamic
proviso of the amama contractual agreement ensured that “the non-Muslims shall maintain their
religious and social autonomy while preserving their distinct characteristics.” 43 This form of
treaty was foundational to the Caliphate’s attitude on religious tolerance and conflict
resolution.44 Lamentably, this positive attitude of the Caliphate towards ethnic minorities is not
often the subject of Western interest and discussion.
However, the amana policy was taken by the British colonial authority as sign of
weakness and surrender to defeat. Ochunu points out the confusion inherent in the British
application of the amana contract formula: “The formula for discerning these preexisting
39
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conditions was less than perfect and sometimes arbitrary. The result was a default exaggeration
of Bauchi’s prior control, and the equating of amana and other relational modes with emirate
conquest. For instance, British colonial officials asserted Bauchi’s political control ‘over the
pagan district of plain Angass.’”45
The resistance of the ethnic minorities of the Jos Plateau to Islamic infiltrations through
the Bauchi and Jema’a emirates lasted until the British defeat of Bauchi in 1902 and the fall of
the entire Sokoto Caliphate in 1903. The British announcement of the beginning of a new era
brought relief and a sign of hope to ethnic minorities who initially welcomed British occupation
as a genuine political substitute and a divine intervention against Islamic domination. Contrary to
the expectations of the people of Jos Plateau, the British colonial authority stripped the ethnic
minorities of their traditional autonomy maintained through amana contractual relationships.
With this British fiat, the entire Jos Plateau and its adjoining regions were completely
submerged into the Bauchi Province. The British regarded this arrangement as evidence of
indirect rule, but for the natives, it was an indirect rule by proxy46 and a postmortem victory for
the Hausa/Fulani hegemony of the defunct Sokoto Caliphate. Moses Ochonu questions the
integrity of the British indirect rule towards the Middle Belt ethnic groups: “How is it that
northern Nigeria is seen in the Africanist colonial studies literature as a bastion of indirect rule
when, all over the vast Middle Belt region, a system of colonization that violated the
foundational rationale of indirect rule held sway?”47
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Furthermore, the discovery of tin ore around the Naraguta hills attracted the British Royal
Niger Company to the Jos Plateau. As far back as 1884, elements of “straw tin”48 produced by
the local tin industry in Jos found their way into the Niger-Benue river basin and West African
coastal markets. In March 1902, under the patronage of the Royal Niger Company, mining
engineer G. R. Nicolaus’s report from the British resident official, Colonel H. W. Laws led to the
permanent takeover of Jos Plateau in 1904.49 The internecine warfare between the peoples of Jos
and the Bauchi Province Hausa/Fulani administrators, on the one hand, and the British
expatriates mine workers, on the other, forced the British to pacify the locals by opening the
Bukuru zonal office in 1907. The people’s resistance paid off later with the creation of an
entirely new Jos Plateau province from the existing Bauchi province in 1926.
Ultimately, with the arrival of European expatriates, Christian missionaries, and other
ethnicities from Southern Nigeria, Jos acquired its urban look and characteristically Christian
identity, which was antithetical to the Islamic North. The Scottish branch of the Christian
missionaries identified the British policy of indirect rule as a tool for oppression at the disposal
of Northern hegemony. Thus, British indirect rule by delegation was hardly successful in the
Middle Belt among the native ethnicities. The dominant ethnicities—Berom, Anaguta and
Afizere—of Jos Plateau resisted the imposition of the emir’s religion—that is, Islam—even after
the British’s subjugation of the entire Jos Plateau under the Bauchi emirate.
The new cultural and religious independence of Jos Plateau in 1926 raises the question of
ethnic and religious re-alliance in a radically new fashion. Whereas the indigenous ethnicities
who were adherents of the traditional religion maintained their opposition to Islamic domination,
“So-called ‘straw tin’ because of its appearance as thick strands of wire. This was the form in which tin
smelted by Africans was transported and traded. Africans used it to tin brassware.” See Leonard Plotnicov,
Strangers to the City: Urban Man in Jos, Nigeria (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), 33.
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there is evidence for the sporadic phenomenon of religious conversion to Islam, as well as the
presence of some Hausa/Fulani migrants shortly before, but mostly during and after, the tin
mining expeditions. Though some of these migrants were legates of the defunct Bauchi
hegemony, others were traders and workers at the mining industry. In the strict sense, the
relationship between the ethnic indigenes of Jos Plateau and the settlers took a different turn with
the arrival and establishment of Christian missions in the predominantly non-Muslim areas in Jos
Plateau.
2.2.1. The Jos crisis of 1932
The event that led to the 1932 crisis was born more out of the rumor that a potential crisis
was looming in the horizon than from its actual occurrence. The scramble for scarce resources in
Jos Plateau was not unconnected to the global economic events that preceded the World War II.
As observed by a global economist columnist,
The crash of the U.S. stock market in October 1929 and the ensuing Great
Depression did not immediately sweep the world in a universal wave of economic
decline. Rather, the degree, type, and timing of economic events varied greatly
among nations. Many believed the Depression was largely “exported” by the
United States to Europe and other countries in the 1930s through the various
economic policies it adopted.50
The consequences of the depression in Britain soon had an adverse effect on the mining
industry in Jos. The first outcome for the Jos mining industry was mass retrenchment of
unskilled workers who were mainly the migrant Hausa/Fulani. Next, there were rumors of an
impending mass exodus of European expatriates from the mining industry as a result of the Great
Depression. Thus, it was believed that the affairs of the company would be left in the hands of
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skilled employees who were dominated by other African workers, of which the Igbo were the
most dominant. As Plotnicov describes, the rumors were many and varied:
Coupled with these accounts was the rumor that all Europeans were preparing to
vacate the area, and Jos would be left to its African residents. Informants were
consistent in stating that the unemployed minefield laborers, mainly Hausa, who
had drifted into Jos after being retrenched, were boasting that, once the Europeans
departed, they were going to take for themselves all European property, homes,
automobiles, and so on. Furthermore, since there were not enough of these
possessions to be shared among them, the Hausa were alleged to be planning to
drive out of Jos all the Africans who were not northern Nigerians or Muslims, and
to seize their valuables as well. And finally, rumor had it that the indigenous
people in the villages near Jos were taking their weapons out of mothballs in
anticipation of driving out the alien Hausa, thus restoring their country to the
conditions in which the Europeans had first found it almost thirty years earlier.
The Europeans, of course, did not leave, and the anticipated anarchy did not
occur.51
Although the events of 1932 did not develop into a full-blown war, these rumors raised
the underlying concern among the Hausa and the native ethnicities about a take-over of the local
resources by outsiders. This fear was later manifested in the ethnic and religious crises that
ensued in 1945, 1953, and 1966.
2.2.2. The October 1945 Jos crisis
The establishment of the tin industry and the railway project made Jos the center of
excellence and a growing metropolitan city in northern Nigeria. By 1945, the presence of the
three dominant ethnicities of Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo became obvious in the socio-political,
economic, and religious sphere in Jos. The Hausa and Yoruba made initial progress in the area of
petty trade and skilled and un-skilled labor force. However, the coming of the liberal and
autonomously minded Igbo group into Jos brought competition into the commercial and political
life of the city. In Jos, as well as in other Northern cities, the British were uncomfortable with the
Igbo presence and their type of egalitarianism, which was drawn from the Igbo cultural
51
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experience of autonomous political structures. For the British and the Hausa oligarchy, an
infiltration of egalitarianism threatened the centralization of government and the indirect-rule
policy.
According to Leonard Plotnicov, 52 the British had a paternalistic and preferential
treatment for the supporters of its indirect rule system. The presence of the progressive and
autonomous Igbo people provided the natives of the Jos Plateau with the necessary tool for
liberation and independence. The Igbo popularity and influence doubled as they became
successful businessmen and pastoral agents to the various Christian Missionary groups. The Igbo
cherished “economic autonomy and independence at the individual level and political autonomy
and independence at the group level.”53
Although the colonial authority was uncomfortable with the political liberalism of the
Igbo, it did grant them favors on numerous occasions based on their religious affinity as
Christians. The Igbo are predominantly Christians. Most of the Igbo offered volunteered services
to the missionaries as pastoral agents. In the local church setting, the financial support from the
Igbo towards Christian ministry is unequal compared to other ethnic groups.
As a result, the British understood that support for the Igbo would remain so long as the
latter stayed away from the political domain—a safe haven for Hausa/Fulani hegemony. In this
wise, the British indirect rule policy was narrowly interpreted by the Hausa/Fulani to mean
legitimacy of political leadership, in similar way that the Yoruba are viewed to be technocrats
and the Igbo entrepreneurs.54
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Through commerce and religious activities, the Igbo continued their advocacy for both
individual and group autonomy and independence and created such consciousness among the
natives. During the initial stage of their struggle for emancipation, the converted natives easily
formed alliance with the Igbo on the basis of religious similarities. However, not the same bond
existed between the natives and the Yoruba most of whom were Muslims. The Igbo alliance with
the natives was not a welcomed development by either the colonial authority or the Hausa ruling
class. The Hausa ruling class was gradually losing out in the new political dispensation. Hence
the need to curb the political enthusiasm of the Igbo led to the 1945 potato crisis.
According to Plotnicov,
In October I945, the Hausa and the Ibo in the city of Jos fought one another for
two days, during which at least two people were killed, many others injured,
considerable property was destroyed or damaged, and Nigerian police and army
units had to be brought in from Kaduna to restore order. Later, one man was tried
for homicide. Yet there is no report by the Nigerian Government on the rioting,
nor any mention of it in the annual administrative reports, which generally record
minor disturbances.55
The 1945 riot was the first of its kind in Northern Nigeria; yet it was not recorded
anywhere in the annals of the British or Northern Nigeria chronicles. The absence of records was
not coincidental. However, it is interesting to note the Biafran account of the crisis: “At Jos in
I945, a sudden and savage attack by Northerners took the Easterners completely by surprise, and
before the situation could be brought under control, the bodies of Eastern men, women and
children littered the streets and their property worth thousands of pounds reduced to shambles.”56
The silence from the government on this crisis led some scholars to believe that the British
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incited the Hausa against the Igbo, who were viewed as harboring anti-colonial sentiments.57 The
government’s nonchalant attitude in curbing anti-Igbo sentiment in 1945 set a precedence for the
Kano violence eight years later, in 1953. No doubt, similar anti-Igbo sentiments were manifested
during and shortly after in the events that led to the pogrom of 1966 and the inhumane NigeriaBiafra war that followed in 1967-1970.
2.2.3. The Jos crisis in 1994
After the Nigeria-Biafra war in 1970, there was relative peace among the settlers and
indigenes of Jos Plateau. The state of peace in Jos led to the choice of the motto of Plateau State
when it was created in 1976 as “the home of peace and tourism.” The Jos crisis of 1994 was
purely the outcome of the tense religious-political situation in Nigeria. In the background of the
1994 crisis lie the following factors: (a) the return of political power to the Hausa/Fulani
hegemony with establishment of the Second Republic with President Shehu Shagari (1979-1983)
and (b) the interruption of political power by the military Heads of States: Generals Muhammad
Buhari (1983-1985), Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993), and Sani Abacha (1993-1998).
Under the regime of General Sani Abacha, the Jos North Local Management Committee
was created (in 1994), with Sanusi Mato, a Hausa/Fulani from Bauchi, as chairman. The
indigenous people of Jos protested against the appointment on grounds of ethnicity and religion.
Sanusi Mato was a Muslim and a non-indigene. Accordingly, the nomination and subsequent
swearing in of Sanusi Mato was withdrawn on April 5, 1994, leading to the Hausa/Fulani reprisal
and protest by April 12, 1994. This conflict led to the crisis that left the Jos Modern Market
partially burnt. There were other appointments of Hausa-Fulani in 1996 and 1998 respectively.
2.2.4. The Jos crisis 2001
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Another Jos crisis began in 2001. This crisis was repeated in cycles of reprisals in 2004,
2008, 2010, and 2012, stemming from both Christians and Muslims. The death toll of victims
within these years rose to about 5,000. 58 Prior to 2001, the last episode of extremely brutal
violence in Jos had been in 1966 during the events of the Nigeria-Biafra civil war.59 Indigenous
Christian opposition to the appointment of Mukhtar Muhammad, a Muslim/Hausa non-indigene
as the Chairman of the Poverty Eradication Program, set off the crisis. Earlier in 1998, Mukhtar
Muhammad had witnessed similar opposition when he was appointed caretaker chairman of the
newly created Jos North Local Government Area. The Human Right Watch supported the view
that the Mukhtar Muhammad saga triggered the 2001 crisis:
His subsequent appointment to the coveted post of poverty eradication
coordinator was seen by some as a provocation and was strongly opposed by
Christian groups. While some of the questions raised about the poverty
eradication coordinator’s appointment may have been legitimate, the protests soon
escalated into an ugly exchange of abuse in the days leading up to September 7.
Some groups seized the opportunity to launch personal attacks on Mukhtar
Muhammad, posting death threats at his office, such as “Trace your roots before it
is too late,” “Run for your life,” “You are warned once again not to step in,” “This
office is not meant for Hausa-Fulani or any non-indigene,” “Mukhtar Muhammad
is a wanderer. If you want to stay alive don’t step in.”60
The underlying argument against the appointment of Mukhtar was purely on the grounds
of religion and ethnicity. The Indigenous point to the political injustices suffered by ethnic
minorities in Hausa-dominated cities like Kano.
Many Christians in Jos point to the discrimination against fellow Christians in
Muslim-dominated Northern states and therefore see no wrong in political
exclusion of the Jasawa community in Jos. For instance, the ancient city of Kano
hosts a significant Christian population that is denied indigene rights. Non-Hausa
there have never been granted a local government area but ‘were divided and
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placed at Hausa dominated areas just to ensure that non-indigenes never
dominated any political space in Kano’.61
2.2.5. The Jos land controversy: Indigenous versus Settlers
The events that triggered the 2001 Jos massacre are traceable to both remote and
immediate factors. The remote factor was characterized by structured and perceived differences
between the two dominant ethnic groups concerning the origin and ownership of the city of Jos.
The Human Right Watch identifies ethnicity and the indigenes/settler phenomenon as the root of
the violence in Jos.62 The contest for the land has been between the Jasawa Muslims and the
dominant Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere (BAA) ethnic groups. This study is motivated by
William E. Connolly’s analysis of the etymologies of Land and Territory.
[land] it is presumed by most moderns to derive from terra. Terra means land,
earth, soil, nourishment, sustenance; it conveys the sense of a sustaining medium
that fades off into indefiniteness. People, you might say, feel the claim the land
they belong to makes upon them…But the form of the word territory, according to
the Oxford English Dictionary, suggests something different from the sustenance
of terra. Territory derives from terrere, meaning to frighten, to terrorize, to
exclude. And territorium is “a place from which people are warned” To occupy
territory, then, is both to receive sustenance and to exercise violence. To become
territorialized is to be occupied by a particular identity.63
In Jos, the understanding of terra as both land and territorial boundary were operative in
settling dispute. The crux of the matter has been a sheer battle for existence and survival between
the “indigenous and settlers.” From the perspective of the indigenous, the fear of re-establishing
the Hausa hegemony is imminent through the infiltration of the Jasawa into mainstream political
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life. For the Jasawa settlers, the claim for joint ownership of the city of Jos 64 is an issue of
equity; they have lived in Jos all their lives, and “they have no wish to go anywhere else and in
many cases nowhere else to go.”65
According to Danfulani, “labels such as ‘settler,’ ‘native,’ ‘non-native,’ ‘host
community,’ ‘foreigner,’ ‘native foreigner,’ ‘stranger element,’ ‘squatter,’ ‘non-squatter,’
‘immigrant,’ ‘migrant,’ ‘indigene,’ ‘non-indigene,’ ‘mbák,’ ‘Gambari,’ ‘Hausa-Fulani,’
‘nyamiri,’ ‘nasara,’ ‘ngwa,’ ‘arna,’ ‘kirdi,’ and ‘baro,’ among many others are in use daily in
Nigeria to stigmatize, stereotype or describe, the ‘other’ as a category which ‘does not
belong.’”66
At the heart of the complex and contentious Jos land controversy, was the issue of
identity, understood in all its ramifications—social, political, religious, and cultural. This
disagreement led to a visible and acrimonious divide between the autochthonous indigenous and
perceived settlers. The indigenous perceived themselves as such and were constantly redefining
themselves in relation to those deemed as settlers. As Ogoh Alubo suggests, there is no readymade concept of identity. The entire process of identity formation and self-definitions is
characterized by being and becoming, of ‘othering’ and being ‘othered.’
An identity is a distinguishing label that objectively exists, is subjectively felt, and
enables its bearers to experience individually and collectively a sense of
solidarity. As a label, it can be assumed by, or imposed on bearers. It is also a
prism by which objects, people, and collectivities are sorted, organized, mapped
and ordered into meaningful [and] understandable units. Identities are socially
constructed, dynamic and multifaceted. Subjectively, identification with a
64
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category is simultaneously a definition of self, so that groups come to identify
themselves as ethnic, religious, occupational, national and other terms.
Objectively, individuals do not identify in general, but do so in relation to others’
definitions of themselves and the boundaries implied in such definitions.67
Prior to the colonial takeover of Bauchi in 1902, the Sokoto Caliphate had desired to
extend its rule throughout the Jos Plateau down to the Igala Kingdom in the South-East, to the
Bini Kingdom in the Mid-West and the Oyo Empire in the South-West. Scholars of the history of
Jos Plateau are agreed that there was never a time when the entire area was suppressed under the
Sokoto Caliphate prior to British takeover in 1912.68 Danfulani develops the claim that “by 1920,
the British had conquered the whole Jos Plateau and brought it under firm British control, a feat
which the Muslim jihadist Uthman dan Fodio (1754-1817) and his sons and flag bearers had
never achieved.”69 As the late Sadauna of Sokoto and Premier of the Northern region testified:
“The countries which did not come under Fulani rule were areas known as the Borno Province,
the Plateau province, the Junkun, the Tiv, [Igala], and Idoma peoples of the South of Benue and
small parts of Kabba and Ilorin Provinces.”70 Thus, we agree with C. G. Ames’ assertion “that
the influx of Muslims took place during the establishment of the British Protectorate.”71
Though the Sokoto Caliphate never achieved total victory, by ascending and descending
the Plateau hills, it nonetheless recorded success in establishing Islamic malams and traders on
the lowland adjoining the Plateau. In addition, the British encouraged mass immigration of
Hausa/Fulani unskilled laborers from Sokoto, Kano, Kastina, Lare, Zaria, and Bauchi to work in
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the tin industry because the traditional agrarian natives initially refused to abandon farm work for
the industrial labor.72 By 1912, there were enough residents in the city of Jos to warrant the
British colonial authority designating a “Hausa settlement” in Jos.73 It was intended to preserve
the Islamic identity of the Hausa/Fulani hegemony and, by extension, to fortify the base of
indirect rule system.74
The activities of the tin industry and the railway transportation system from Port Harcourt
in the southeast opened the city of Jos to attracting non-Hausa settlers from Europe, Southern
Nigeria, and other parts of West Africa. From the onset, the British intended to create a
segregated settlement, first for its Christian European expatriates and later for the African
workers who were predominantly Christians. According to Plotnicov,
[F]rom the very beginning, the colonial administration tried to keep culturally
dissimilar ethnic groups separated... the urban center of Jos was divided into two
separate administrative units: a Native Town, subordinated to the Jos Divisional
Native Authority who was then located in Naraguta; and the Township which was
separate entity of its own within Jos Division, where Asians and Europeans
eventually settled.75
Excerpts from the archives captured a similar intention to segregate:
The non-indigenous natives who arrived in the Naraguta (now Jos Division)
consequently upon the European Mining Activities have been administered since
1912 by a special introduced native administration, as the primitive pagan
administrations could not deal with the civilized and acute incomers. The local
pagans are independent of this special administration.... The non-indigenous
natives mentioned above are mostly Mohammedans and Hausawa.76
The creation of the Hausa settlement by the British in Jos was deliberate for purposes of
appeasing the dominant Hausa/Fulani oligarchy, for the success of the British indirect rule
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depended on the dual foundations of oligarchy and Islam.77 However, opposition and hostility
from the natives forced the British to engage in a pacification policy from 1910 onwards that
gradually subjugated the Hausa settlements in Native Town under the administrative seat of the
Jos Plateau in Naraguta. Problems began to ferment with the transferring of the administrative
headquarters from Naraguta to Jos city in 1921-26.
The first was the abolition of the Hausa District Head in 1921. 78 This shift in policy
ended the British indirect rule as it had been established and practiced in the Northern Nigeria
region. Yet, the “administration still considered the ‘Hausa Settlements’ as ‘purely alien
enclaves’ having no sort of authorities over the pagans [the native people of the Jos Plateau]: the
policy is the other way on...the land is the pagans and their right is jealously guarded.”79 The
Hausa settlement in Native Town maintained its local chief, called the Sarkin Hausa, alongside
other ethnicities like the Sarkin Yorubawa and Sarkin Iboawa for the Yoruba and Igbo ethnic
groups, respectively. Later, with the support of the British indirect rule system, the Sarkin Hausa
title was transformed into Sarkin Jos, which ruled over the Yoruba and Igbo, as well as all the
other ethnic groups in the Jos Plateau. This title was held by the Hausa/Fulani from 1904-1947
until the death of Sarkin Isiyaku, who was listed as the last of the thirteenth of the local chiefs of
the Native Town Hausa quarters.80
Prior to the death of Sarkin Isiyaku in 1948, the Plateau Provincial Administration had
begun plans to end the British indirect rule through the instrumentality of the Hausa/Fulani
hegemony. Precisely, by 1931, the colonial administration under Governors General of Nigeria,
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Sir Hugh Clifford and Sir Donald Cameron, had ruled the emirate’s indirect rule of the natives
by proxy counterproductive. Hugh Clifford stated in his report that “[t]he Plateau Province
would provide, in a very real sense, a school of pagan administration, functioning in an
atmosphere undisturbed by the alien influence of the emirate.” 81 Clearly, then, the abysmal
failure of indirect rule in the Middle Belt region left the colonial administrators with no real
alternative to transferring the leadership of Jos to its rightful indigenes.
Thus, in 1948 the traditional stool of the Sarkin Berom was elevated to the status of
Gbong Gwom Jos with the appointment of Mr. Rwang Pam Bogom as the new traditional ruler
of Jos. By implication, the Government Gazatte abrogated the office of the Sarkin Hausa and
reduced it to the status of Wakili—councilor. Accordingly, Mr. Rwang Pam—the Gbong Gwom,
became the President of the Town Council, with an elected Vice-President and three Wakilai
from the dominant ethnic groups, Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo. 82 The subjugation of the three
dominant ethnic groups under the native authority, Gbong Gwom, began the first wave of
agitation from the Hausa/Fulani, who perceived the British support of the “pagan administration”
as a breach of contract with regard to the indirect rule system.83
The persistent resistance offered by the Hausa/Fulani group in Jos developed into the
political formation of the Jasawa identity. They alleged that their forefathers migrated to Jos
when it was a desert area. According to Ishaku, “the Jasawa based their claim on a tripodic
argument; first, they have lived so long in Jos to the extent they do not know nor have any
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connection to their ancestral origins, second, they own property in Jos and therefore have
contributed to the prosperity and growth of the city, and third, they had established a ruling
house in Jos in the past.”84 The Jasawas’ argument was strictly based on the immigration factor:
namely, the claim that all the ethnic groups in Jos Plateau migrated from somewhere else and
that their ancestors built the city of Jos from the scratch; therefore, as such they should be
accorded both right of citizenship and indigene status.
But, as the few excerpts from a number of historical studies, carried out in this
edition of Analysis clearly bring out, all the ethnic groups in Plateau State are
settlers, in many cases relatively recent settlers; settling in the last few centuries,
on the Plateau, with their places of origin, largely, identifiable. ... Historical
documents have brought out clearly, how through migration and settlements,
various ethnic groups have been transformed and intermeshed to shape the
various tribes that today inhabit the state.…Immigrants from Gobir settled in
Pengiji and became the Pyem tribe that now inhabits Gindiri.… The Ron-Kulere
tribes which inhabit the Bokkos area, where the suspended Governor of Plateau
State, Joshua Dariye comes from, were also immigrants. (The Ron-Kulere are said
to be recent settlers who immigrated from the Chad basin and speak Chadic
languages with non- Nigerian origins. The Angas, who were inhabitants of parts
of the present day Yobe and Borno States, migrated and eventually settled in the
present Angas area...the Birom tribe came from the forest area somewhere around
Wukari in Taraba State...the Amo or Ba tribe, the Rukuba tribe and the Fakara
tribe are of semi-Bantu origin. The Mwaghavul tribe, on the other hand, are
products of integration between immigrants from Borno and the earlier settlers
in the area. The Goemai tribe... also migrated from Borno alongside their Angas
brothers and finally settled in Shendam....The Muryam or Kufiyar people found in
Namu, Kwalla, Dimmak, and Kwa districts of Shendam were actually Hausa
migrants from Gwarzo in Kano State, while the Hausa group in Kwande were
Gwandaraim migrants who migrated from Kano around the seventeenth century,
earlier than many other Plateau tribes.85
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Contrary to the Jasawa theory of Jos as terra nullius—nobody’s land—the Plateau
Indigenous Development Association (PIDAN)86 proffered a different version of the origin of
Jos. Accordingly, this version holds that Gwosh—the original word for Jos—was the boundary
land between the Beron, Anaguta, Afizere (BAA) ethnic groups before the advent of Christianity
and Islam. Consequent on the British invasion of 1899, the three ethnic groups relinquished part
of the land to the British tin mining company and moved towards the lowlands in pursuit of
subsistence agriculture.87
Central to the narrative of the BAA, the need for skilled laborers to work at the tin mining
company led to the migration of the Hausa/Fulani workers from Sokoto, Kano, Kastina, Lare,
Zaria, and Bauchi. This description of the origin of the Hausa/Fulani in Jos is widely accepted as
the most credible by anthropologists, sociologists, and politicians.88 Additionally, verifiable and
objective evidence supports this claim, the most credible of which comprises the personal
testimonies of the three dominant tribes that settled in Jos from the early 1920s (Igbo, Yoruba,
and some Hausa), who attested to the fact that they bought the land from the BAA owners.89
Evidently, the tin mining industry brought prosperity and fame to Jos—employment
opportunities, developed infrastructures, and immigration. It is equally accurate to argue that the
collapse of the tin mining industry dealt a fatal blow to the initial momentum evidenced by the
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development of the city. Lofty projects were abandoned, and the economic opulence of the city
of Jos and the entire Plateau region began its decline. This development was significant in the
beginning of the social, political, ethnic, and religious upheavals in Jos.90
The demise of the tin mining projects in Jos and its surroundings left the lowlands of the
Plateau with abandoned ponds, uncompleted dams, canals, and excavation sites. These sites
became a huge resource for Hausa dry-season farming. For the Jos Plateau natives, the practice
of dry-season farming was a relatively new phenomenon, as they were accustomed only to the
rainy season agriculture.91 Consequently, the exit of the colonial administration and the collapse
of the tin-industry made land reallocation the topmost priority of the autochthonous population.
In most cases, the land was leased out to the Hausa dry-season farmers according to the rules
previously established by the amana trust contract.92
The transfer from the traditional amana land tenure arrangement to a complete
government overhaul of the estate system and ownership was a purely one-sided political
calculation. The indigenes of Jos were grossly at a disadvantage according to the federal
government policy on land use. 93 They lacked sufficient funds and the necessary credit and
capital to enter into genuine land deals with government officials. While the Hausa/Falani had
the backing of the emirate and later the federal government through easy access to credit and
loan facilities from financial institutions like the Bank of the North and Northern Development
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Companies, the Yoruba relied on the United Bank of Africa (UBA), and the Igbo were supported
by the African Continental Bank.94 On the other hand, the indigenes were left with subsistence
economy accruing from farming.
For the Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups, the possession and use of land was strictly for
economical purposes and was, therefore, not linked to the issue of indigene-ship. The question of
ownership of the land was clearly unnecessary because both the Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups
had ties to traditional homelands. However, the Hausa/Fulani group understood possession with
ownership and therefore indigene-ship. Thus, the problem remains that of the politics of land by
the settlers and the symbolism of land as understood by the indigenes.95
With the collapse of the tin industry, the majority of the inhabitants returned to their
traditional means of sustainability: namely, agriculture. With this new focus on the land and its
use, people redirected their business investments to the agrarian economy. Consequently, with
the earlier migration to Jos, there emerged the problem of scarcity of resources and land
ownership. Uppermost on the migration list was the mass movement of the pastoral Hausa/Fulani
into the Jos Plateau.
Besides ethnicity, religion, and commerce, events attributed to natural disasters made the
Hausa/Fulani migrate to the Jos meadowlands. Most notable were the pest epidemics of 1885,
1901, and 1919, and the drought in Northern Nigeria during 1901-03.96 Even more important was
the fact that the Jos Plateau hills and plains were free from tsetse fly infection; as a result, they
became a dream land for the Fulani cattle rearing business. As Adamu further observes,
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[T]he apparent result was that between 1900-1946, the pastoral Fulani entered the
Plateau in ever greater numbers and expanded into areas that possessed adequate
water, grazing and suitable market areas particularly around the mining areas...As
a result of free access to grazing areas, the Jos Plateau has continued to be one of
the largest concentration area for cattle in Nigeria...In 1940s the Fulani cattle in
Jos comprised 859,392 head, while in the neighboring division of Pankshin there
were 140,000. This amounted to approximately six acres per cow.97
Initially, opposition from the native farmers toward the British sedentarization policy of
Hausa/Fulani nomads was across ethnic and religious lines. For the most part, the hostilities of
the natives towards the Hausa/Fulani nomads resulted from unsettled grievances arising from
the misgivings about the role of the latter in the slave trade and the jihad movement. In this
connection, Reuben Odo’s findings lend support to the claim that “official thinking is in
support of encouraging the sedentarization of the Hausa/Fulani in the hope that such settlers
could be profitably used to initiate schemes of mixed farming in the region.”98
Agronomic changes on the Jos Plateau led to the idea of mixed farming to accommodate
the demands of the nomadic pastoralist and native farmers. This innovation intensified local
conflicts. In most cases, stray cattle destroyed the farms and harvests of the natives, triggering
reprisal attacks from farmers.99 The colonial authorities were aware of these dynamics among
the majority of conflicts between the Fulani nomads and the native peoples of Jos Plateau as
early as 1940. 100 Conflicts resulting from the use of land necessarily raised questions about
ownership. In most cases, the identification of the Hausa/Fulani as “settlers and Muslims”
transformed land-generated conflicts into full blown ethnic and religious wars.
2.3. Christian Supersessionism and the Jos—Jesus Our Savior—Narrative
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In tracing the roots of Christian supersessionism in the Jos Plateau, we need to explore
the activities of the Sudan United Missionaries (SUM) 101 who worked in the Middle Belt of
Nigeria, especially in the Jos Plateau and Southern Zaria-Kaduna. This combined effort, led by
the Church of Scotland, Wesleyan Methodist Church of England, the Methodist Church of
England, Congregational Church of England, and the Calvinistic Methodist Missions of Wales,
led to the formation of the Sudan United Missions.102 The SUM was the offshoot of the 1910
Edinburgh Conference of World Missions. The words of Dr. Robson at the end of the Edinburgh
Conference sets the Mission agenda for the SUM, “the very first thing that requires to be done, if
Africa is to be won for Christ, is to carry a strong Missionary force right across the center of
Africa to bar the advance of the Muslims.”103
Within the entire northern Nigerian region, Jordan S. Rengshat identifies twelve branches
of the Sudan United Missionaries-SUM:
There were many branches of the Sudan United Mission. There were two
American Branches (C.R.C.B. and E.U.B.B.), a Danish Branch, the Netherlands
Reformed Congregation Branch, the South African Branch and the British
Branch. Others were the Australian and New Zealand Branch, the Canadian or
North American Branch, the French Branch, the Norwegian Branch, the German
Branch and the Swiss Branch.104
The twelve branches had, at various times, worked in different parts of Africa but with a
singular objective: namely, to counter Islamic growth and to implant the Church among natives
101
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through rigorous evangelism. Of the twelve branches enumerated above, the focus is on the
British Branch (Scottish group) and the Canadian North American branch (Sudan Interior
Missionaries—SIM) who worked in the city of Jos and other parts of Plateau State.
The re-naming of the city of Gwosh into Jos in 1904 was purportedly attributed to a
German missionary, Dr. Herman Wilhelm, of the Sudan United Mission (SUM).105 The change
of name was necessary to fit the Christological acronym—“Jesus Our Savior.”106 Thus, the SUM
established a narrative among the Christians natives that rendered Jos, “as a Christian city and
the New Jerusalem of Africa.”107
A similar narrative connecting the founding of Jos with the arrival of European
missionaries is found in Anthony Ham’s chronology, titled “West Africa”’ This account projects
Jos as the bastion of Christianity in northern Nigeria and the fulcrum of its evangelization
activities:
Modern Jos is a British creation which grew on tin mining, and popular tradition
claims its name is an abbreviation of “Jesus Our Savior,” from its first
missionaries. It's a good story, but a corruption of a local name [gwosh] is a more
likely and prosaic explanation. With a population between one and two million, it
is a popular destination in Nigeria.108
Likewise, the English professional travel-writer David Else corroborates this view about
the uniqueness of the name Jos.
Jos (an abbreviation of Jesus Our Savior), with a population between one and two
million, is a popular destination in Nigeria. The two major attractions are the
cooler climate and the unique Jos museum. At 1200m above sea level, the Jos
Plateau is noticeably cooler than most other areas in the country. The stone
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covered rolling hills also make it more scenic. Ask a Nigerian—they‘ll lift their
arms in the air and utter sweetly, “Jos!”109
From the religious perspective, the city of Jos is conceived by Christians as the
“Jerusalem of the Christian North,” 110 parallel to the Muslim cities of Kano and Kastina in
northern Nigeria. The SUM Missionaries reinterpreted Christian identity, turning existing
frameworks into religious nationalism, sectarianism, and ethnicity.111 For this reason, this study
investigates the effect of SUM evangelism through the rhetoric of supremacy over Muslims
while also assessing the impact of SUM hermeneutics of exclusion and supersessionism claims.
Among the Christians, there was the feeling that the massive influx of Hausa/Fulani ethnic
groups into Jos Plateau would continue the Islamization of the indigenous people. An
inconclusive debate also occurred among the Christians about a possible complete takeover of
the city of Jos by the Islamic Northern hegemony. The line of argument was, “‘If the Muslims
have Jos, they have Nigeria. And if they have Nigeria, they have Africa.’... Still, many
Christians—among them high-level religious leaders, academics, and journalists—invoke the
terms ‘jihad’ and ‘terrorists’ to explain the current situation.”112
The traditional religious system of the people of Jos Plateau stood firm against Islamic
influence and domination.113 The phenomenon of conversion to Islam among the natives was not
only uncommon but also visibly resisted. Conversely, the traditionalists were opened to the
“good new” brought by the Whiteman—colonialists and missionaries alike—the “good news”
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being freedom from the harassment of Islamic jihadists.114 Some have dissented from the view
that the indigenes’ decision to accept Christianity was mostly on doctrinal grounds. For instance,
Afe Adogame thinks that Christianity simply functioned as an alternative, a veritable tool of
liberation from Islamic hegemony.115
For the natives, the arrival of Christianity brought some relief from the menace of Islamic
jihadists. To this end, the role attached to social welfare programs initiated by the colonial
administration and Christian missionaries played a significant part in swaying the peoples’
allegiance to Christianity. It is well known that the missionaries provided care and a cure for the
most dreaded disease of leprosy to Muslims, Christians and Traditionalists alike in Northern
Nigeria. Dahiru Rabe describes the connection between the British colonial authorities and the
missions.
The colonial authorities saw the advantage of using the Mission to address the
pressure to enter the area by assigning specific roles to them. In the middle of the
1920s, the subject of social welfare in Northern Nigeria attracted new
consideration from the colonial government. The Mission society exploited this
opportunity to press hard on the colonial government to allow them extend their
activities into the emirates. Dr. Roland Bingham, the founder of the Sudan
Interior Mission, used that opportunity and pressurized the British colonial
government to allow the Missions to enter the emirate of the Hausa land,
especially Kano, Kastina and Sokoto.116
2.4. Protestant and Evangelical Hermeneutics
The Scottish missionaries operating in Jos Plateau and other Middle Belt cities were
familiar with oppressive hegemonic structures. Indeed, Scotland has a long history of resistance
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to the British domination.117 Scotland rejected the political and industrial dominance of Britain
and also its version of Anglo-Protestantism. As a result, Scottish Christian nationalism developed
in Scotland, which was based on a hermeneutic derived from perceived exclusivism. Musa A. B
Gaiya and Jordan S. Rengshwat argue
that the Scottish Missionaries who worked among the Berom, in Jos Plateau State
and among the Kagoro of Southern Zaria, inspired a Christian Nationalism that
was directed at reversing the internal colonialism that was created by the British
administration by implementing the Indirect Rule Policy. Influenced by their
experience in Scotland under English hegemony, these Missionaries encouraged
their converts to seek independence from the Hausa/Fulani overlord imposed on
them by the British colonial authorities. Thus, the first nationalist movement
created in this region under study, was strictly speaking Christian, anti-Islam and
opposed to Hausa/Fulani overload and exploitation.118
The implantation of a church with nationalistic tendency by the Sudan United Mission
fueled existing biases among the dominant Christian indigenes toward their perceived Muslim
opponent, creating what Paul Ricoeur describes as a destructive hermeneutic of suspicion. 119 In
the words of Scott-Baumann, “Ricoeur recognizes that suspicion can function to endorse our
beliefs, as we become unquestionably suspicious and unwilling to learn by avoiding
conversations with the ‘Other.’”120 In this context, the Christian missions in Jos Plateau were
suspicious of intended Islamic domination and expansion. The question remains whether the
hermeneutic of Christian nationalism hindered collaborative dialogue with Muslims and thereby
enhanced Christological exclusivism?
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Whereas scholars like Matthew Hassan Kukah121 and Yusufu Turaki122 are silent over the
role of Christian nationalism in the history of religious violence in northern Nigeria, others like
Niels Kastfelt,123 Paul Chunun Logams,124 and Nanyak Barko Gaifa125 agree on the impact of the
Scottish missionaries in developing the Christian nationalism that thrived in Jos Plateau and
Southern Kaduna. More particularly, Elizabeth Isichei’s work treats the theme of Christian
nationalism as lending to recurrences of violence and unrest in Plateau State. 126 The hostile
approach of the Sudan United Mission toward evangelization of the non-Christian in Jos Plateau
and other northern Nigerian cities was described as merely a show of imperial power and the
coming to being of internationalism.
British Protestant missions in the high imperial era proved capable of combining
distressingly crude expressions of imperial pride and racial prejudice with a quite
genuine and continuing evangelical internationalism that reached its peak at the
World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh in 1910.127
The delegates at the 1910 conference largely comprised the non-conformist128 Christian
world with the exception of some African Christians, Catholics, and Eastern Orthodox who
gathered to discuss mission to the non-Christian world. According Brian Stanley, “no indigenous
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black African Christian was originally deemed worthy of an invitation to Edinburgh.” 129 The
conference had eight commissions. The fourth commission, titled “Missionary Message in
Relation to the Non-Christian World (June 18, 1910),” specifically advocated for a conversion of
the “animistic heathens” from the ravages of Islam through rigorous evangelism.130
Although there was a general sympathy towards the other world religions, sinister
observations were made about Islam by leading missionaries from the Islamic world that are
worth noting.
W. St. Clair Jisdall from the Persia Mission submits that “Islam cannot be said to
be a preparation for the older religion of Christianity, but was on the contrary one
of the greatest hindrances to the spread of Christianity.” Two Missionaries from
Nigeria, W. R. Miller and T. E. Alvarez, declared that “only a superficial
knowledge of Islam will ever lead Missionaries to see many points of contact
between it and our faith;” Henry Jessup from the Beirut Mission argues against
the hoary supposition “that Islam was a kind of quarantine of the nations
previously pagan and idolatrous, through which they would the more readily pass
on to Christianity, had been disapproved by the reality that it was easier to convert
a heathen tribe to Christianity than one who had first converted to Islam....131
In the mind of most representatives at the conference, Islam constituted a threat to
Church implantation. Islam was declared inimically dangerous and unfit as preparatioevangelica.132 The message of the conference to Protestant missionaries worldwide was strictly
that of non-tolerance and anti-Islam sentiment.
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As a product of the 1910 Edinburgh World Missionary Conference, the Sudan United
Mission (SUM) inherited an exclusive Christological attitude towards Islam. At Edinburgh,
Islam was declared a hindrance to the success of Christian missions in the colonies. This
negative approach led to a pan-Islamic movement fostering Protestant collaboration and
ecumenism.133 The findings of Ayandele provide support for the view that the formation of SUM
has historical links with the British desire and design to counteract the propaganda of Islamic
Wahhabism, which was viewed as the origin of Usman Dan Fodio’s jihad.134 The intent was
simply to establish a pure Christian kingdom with a separated identity from both Muslims and
adherents of the Traditional Religions. Rev. H. G. Harding’s caution about the resilience of Islam
in 1917 is worth noting.
The real difficulty is that the Church of Christ does not realize the vital character
of the conflict with Islam. She realizes the danger no more than she did in the year
625. We think of Islam as one among the many old world religions hastening to
inevitable extinction before the advance of knowledge and civilization. We think
of it as a religion founded and extended solely by the sword, and with the
dwindling of Mohammedan temporal power are content to believe that all dangers
to our Faith is past. We forget that today no error can be, if indeed it has been,
successfully propagated by physical force alone. The real danger is and always
has been the vital energy of Islam, and its determined aspirations after universal
dominion. Islam is the “Germany” of world religion.... Islam has been in the past
strong enough to defeat the Christian Church in her own stronghold; it is
extending today at the rate which is the surest evidence of unimpaired vitality, and
the Church is doing but little to check its progress.135
The outcome of the 1910 Edinburgh Conference on Missions had an adverse effect with
regard to Protestant hermeneutics and evangelism relations with non-Christian religions. The
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voice that resounded from the 1910 conference was unequivocally clear about its goal and divine
mandate for the future of Mission to non-Christians.
Christian religion is superior to every other religion that exist or has existed upon
earth, and …consequently we are both entitled and bound to try to persuade every
tribe or nation which has not already become Christian to exchange its ancestral
faith for our own.”136
Similarly, the following excerpt was deduced from one of the reports from the
Commissions.
Christianity claims to be, for all ages and people, the all sufficient and the only
sufficient religion. A moral obligation attaches itself to such a claim. If
Christianity be the only sufficient religion for all the world, it should be given to
all the world. Christ’s command also lays upon the Church an obligation for
nothing less than a world-wide promulgation of the Gospel.137
Prior to the 1910 conference in Edinburgh, Islam had negative coverage in the West. As
Edward Said observes, “yet there is a consensus on Islam as a kind of scapegoat for everything
we do not happen to like.”138 Thus, at the conference, Islam was deemed to be responsible for the
slave trade, religious superficiality, and its dangerous propaganda mechanism—jihad. 139 The
SUM had favorable reports about the prospects of Christianity among the ethnic group in the
Middle Belt. Most characteristic of their testimonies were stereotypes and misinformation about
Islam that abused the consciousness of delegates at the 1910 Edinburgh Conference. There was a
note of urgency in missionary enterprise as recorded:
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The Hausa and Nupe countries are now open to the preachers of the gospel. For
many years earnest prayers have ascended from the lips of God’s people that the
doors of these countries might be opened. Thank God their prayers have been
answered and the door stands now not ajar, but wide open. But where is the army
of occupation? The British force is in effective occupation, but what of the Army
of the Church of Christ? The Gwaris, with whom I came into contact three years
ago, begged me to send them teachers. These tribes will become Mohammedan if
they do not become Christian.140
In the same way, Rev. J. Atiken sounded an alarm regarding the readiness for the
indigenous people in embracing the Islamic faith.
Are not the fields here already “white unto harvest?” At present, they are open to
us. If however, we do not quickly step in, from constant intercourse with
Mohammedans under English rule, they will soon forget their old wrongs; they
will embrace the religion of the false prophet, and be no longer open to us now.
When I came out in 1898, there were few Mohammedans to be seen below Iddah.
Now they are everywhere, excepting below Abo, and at the present rate
of progress, there will scarcely be a pagan village on the riverbanks by 1910.Then
we shall begin to talk of Mohammedan Missions to these places, and anyone who
has worked in both heathen and Mohammedan towns knows what that means.141
With the formal endorsement of the 1910 Edinburgh Conference, the SUM began full
scale evangelism of the Muslim territory of Northern Nigeria. The missionaries opted for an
aggressive evangelism, supported by a hermeneutic based on racial superiority, of exclusion and
Christian supersessionism over Islam and the African Traditional Religion. These hermeneutics
of supremacy were evident in the final documents of the conference with particular reference to
section of the documents that describe non-Christians as “heathen and uncivilized.”142 The most
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astonishing reference to racial superiority based on hierarchy was found in the report of Rev. R.
Wardlaw Thompson, titled “Among Primitive and Backwards People.”143
In its aggressive approach to missions, the SUM undermined and sidelined the Niger
mission, which was under the leadership of the indigenous Bishop Ajayi Crowther, who had a
dialogical approach with emirs of Northern Nigeria. 144 Besides their differences in mission
policy with the CMS Missions, the SUM had strong affiliations with the nationalistic agenda of
their home countries.145 As a result, the sudden takeover by SUM of the CMS Mission, headed
by the indigenous Ajayi Crowther, created an air of mistrust. As Kim Caroline Senecki puts it,
Historians don’t agree on the reasons for the trumped up allegations brought
against Crowther’s men in the 1881, but I believe the actions were part of a
general shift in white missionary attitudes toward indigenous missionaries: earlier
in the century, native pastors were seen as the future of the local church, but by
the end of the century, white missionaries were questioning their very capability
to lead local faith communities. Crowther’s pastors were discredited to make way
for increased white missionary control, thus sparking the establishment of several
independent African churches, not only within the Anglican denomination, but in
other denominations as well.146
The SUM group interpreted Crowther’s approach to mission through mutual negotiations
with Muslim emirs and traditional chiefs as a sign of moral ineptness and an attempt to
undermine the superiority of Christianity. For SUM, the Christian religion, as the religion of
Great Britain, could not compromise with the religions of the inferior and uncivilized. Thus, with
the systematic dismantling of the CMS Missions in the Middle Belt, more assistance was granted
143
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to SUM by the colonial administration in Jos Plateau to hasten evangelism through education,
medicine, and works of charities. Quick estimations and projections were put forth by zealous
evangelical missionaries about the timely demise of Islam. It was predicted that Muslims would
eventually surrender and embrace Christianity on the grounds of its superiority over Islam.
Thus, the SUM developed a hermeneutic of mistrust and a strategy of competition and
confrontation with Islam.147 Not surprisingly, the missionary ambition failed woefully as Islam
maintained its stature under the policy of indirect rule, and the initial effort to convert Muslims
was a colossal failure. According to Ayandele, “the missionaries called the Sudan Party expected
very quick results, for Brooke had calculated that within six months, much of Northern Nigeria
would be converted...Not a single convert was made. One by one the Sudan Party fell off, either
by resigning or by being invalidated home or by dying.”148
The question whether British non-interference policy149 and the indirect rule system were
among factors that led to the failure of the missionaries in Northern Nigeria has caused much
debate. A closer look at the data indicates that British colonial authorities had employed divisive
policies to split Muslims and Christians. On many occasions, it pitched the Emirs against the
Missionaries. Though it was true that “the British colonial authorities preserved Islamic identity
in the North through the indirect rule policy, it was the case equally that Christian missionaries
enjoyed the support, cooperation, and sometimes protection of the British colonial master.”150
For the most part, the missionaries accused the colonial authorities of putting economic
interest ahead of the demands and urgency of the gospel. Temple Gairden offered an even more
147
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splendid critique: “Contemporary British colonial policy was cowardly and unchristian…The
British official may one day see that all this subservience to the Muslim and neglect to his own
faith gains him neither the respect, gratitude nor affection of the people, but the very reverse.”151
For these missionaries, British rule over Islam was synonymous with the idea of Christian reign
and supremacy over the Muslim.
In other words, the colonial administrators actually undermined the fundamental role of
the ideological use of religion in the ground scheme of colonialism: namely, that the Christian
missions would continue to be at the services of the colonist and the British Empire.152 Kuum
narrates the missionary frustration vividly: “Shall Great Britain thus send hundreds of her sons to
conquer, rule, explore and traffic in the land, and shall the church maintain her two small mission
stations among million of souls? The lands are in a temporary state of religious
revolution….Islam is arriving and has arrived. Shall Islam prevail?153
In the estimation of most missionaries, the colonial administrators failed to collaborate in
the Christianization of the Muslims.154 On the other hand, although, it seems unpretentious that
the British colonial administration in principle would bar missionaries from all of Northern
Nigeria, in practice, the colonial administration to a larger extent supported the fundamental
grand plan of the British government to stop Islamic advancement in the Sudan Sahara. 155
At various times, Scottish pioneer groups, like that of David Livingstone in the African
scene and Mary Slessor in Southern Nigeria, played the dual roles of being both missionaries and
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representatives of British government.156 For instance, “the Lucy Memorial Freed Slaves Homes
in Northern Nigeria, an institution of the SUM, has the sanction, sympathy and support of the
British Government. Indeed the Mission has had no difficulty with representatives of the
European government, who have invariably been friendly.” 157 The fieldwork conducted by
Salamone indicated moves by the SUM to create a united Christain uniqueness that would battle
Hausa/Fulani Muslim identity.158
With the political and religious unrest in Nigeria in the 1960s and 1970s, most expatriate
missionaries faced massive repatriation to their homelands. As a result, the majority of
mainstream SUM and SIM members merged into the ECWA and COCIN denominations as the
core members of the SUM departed in 1977. Their departure brought to an end the initial puritan
agenda of the missions: total conversion of the Muslims for Christ. While still maintaining its
confrontational stance with Islam, the new Protestant mission, in collaboration with other
Pentecostal and African initiated/independent churches, diverted its missionary activities towards
revival and re-conversion (the born-again syndrome) of members of traditional Christian
denominations through rigorous campus evangelism at universities and other institutions of
higher learning.
2.5. Nostra Aetate and Christological Triumphalism
In the Catholic context, the interpretation and application of the texts and context of the
entire Second Vatican Council have become the center of recent debate between conservatives
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and progressives. The question remains whether the Council constitutes rupture or continuity
with Tradition?159 In a more specific fashion, the debate surrounds the correct interpretation of
the document Nostra Aetate. Within the general framework of the Catholic Church’s relation to
non-Christians, the question remains: Is Nostra Aetate a rupture or discontinuity with Tradition?
Evidently, Nostra Aetate broke new grounds in the Catholic Church’s attitude towards
other religions. Historically speaking, the intent of the document was geared towards repairing
the Catholic and Jewish relations. In this context it is restrictive in its hermeneutics and
consciousness of the other religions. 160 In the words of Lutheran scholar Paul D. Peterson,
Nostra Aetate, “was both a breakthrough and disappointment.” 161 As a breakthrough, it
constituted the first positive step by the Catholic Church towards non-Christians since Nicolas of
Cusa.162 The Church conscientiously accepts the truth value inherent in non-Christian religions—
although to a varying degree. In this sense, it is not out of place to argue that Nostra Aetate as
such is not a finished product, but a work in progress. As Grant Kaplan puts it, “the text of
Nostra Aetate does not enact interreligious dialogue; it simply sets the stage for the Church to be
engaged in such dialogue.”163
According to John O’Malley, “even the use of such words as ‘dialogue’ indicate the
Church’s shift in fundamental thinking: no longer, for instance, were non-Christians to be called
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‘pagans.’ Yet the question of how Catholic Theology engages non-Christian religions remains
one of the central tasks for Catholic fundamental Theology.”164
From a doctrinal point of view, the solemn proclamation of Nostra Aetate teaches a
fundamental theological truth: namely, that God wills something good and noble in the other
religious traditions apart from Christianity, which can collaborate through genuine dialogue with
these religions in addressing the enigmatic and existential problems facing humanity. Despite the
apparent ambiguity exuding from the historical complexity of Nostra Aetate, we see implicitly
the Church’s first official positive attempt to inclusive dialogue with all religions based on their
commonalities about the origin and destiny of man and their efforts to search for answers to the
most existential question and the meaning of life.165
The second paragraph of Nostra Aetate stands out the most in this regard. It reads:
The Catholic Church rejects nothing that is true and holy in these religions. She
regards with sincere reverence those ways of conduct and of life, those precepts
and teachings which, though differing in many aspects from the ones she holds
and sets forth, nonetheless often reflect a ray of that Truth which enlightens all
men.166
However, it is also historically undisputable that Nostra Aetate was the reflection and the
product of the culture and context of its time.167 In a critical appraisal of the Council, Paul F.
Knitter opines that while “Vatican II forms a watershed in Roman Catholic attitude towards other
faiths,” there still remains “a residual ambiguity in its understanding of just how effective the
truth and grace within the religions are.”168 In like manner, Karl Rahner pushes the question a
step further, “Do non-Christians attain salvation outside of or within the life of their religions as
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such? Are such religions salvific in some manner or not?” The question is not explicitly
answered.169 The central doctrinal statement of Nostra Aetate, “that the Church rejects nothing of
what is true and holy in these religions,”170 truly constitutes an open-ended proposition which
can be reframed positively: “The Church accepts whatever is true and holy in these religions.”
Regardless of the framing of the proposition, it left some pertinent questions unanswered: What
are the Catholic Church’s criteria to judge what is true and holy in other religions? And will the
Catholic Church accept as de jure the salvific doctrine evidence in other religions, if it
constitutes what is “true and holy”?
With reference to the de jure salvific value of other religions, Catholic Church
documents, both ancient and modern, uphold the age-old doctrinal position of regarding other
religions and their traditions as preparation evangelica. For instance, the Catechism of the
Catholic Church states:
The Catholic Church recognizes in other religions that search, among shadows
and images, for the God who is unknown yet near since he gives life and breath to
all things and wants all men to be saved. Thus, the Church considers all goodness
and truth found in these religions as “a preparation for the Gospel and given by
him who enlightens all men that they may at length have life.”171
Thus, the Catechism develops the claim that non-Christian religions perform a
rudimentary function in salvation history. The document Dominus Iesus identified the
fragmentary nature of these religions as being conditioned by the theological fact that they
“contain omissions, insufficiencies and errors.”172 However, the plurality of religious experience

169
Karl Rahner, “On the Importance of the Non-Christian Religions for Salvation,” in Theological
Investigations, 18:288-95. See also Jacques Dupuis, Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation to Dialogue
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2006), 64-65.
170
Ibid, 654.
171
Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd Ed. (New York: Doubleday, 1995), no. 843. The Catechism
interestingly references the Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church (Lumen Gentium), no.
16; Nostra Aetate, no. 2, and Pope Paul VI, Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Nuntiandi, 53, AAS 68 (1976): 5-76.
172
Ibid; and Dominus Iesus, 8.

118

raises more challenges for Dominus Iesus, as well as for the Catholic Church’s traditional
viewpoint on preparatio evangelica.
In the light of the Church’s preparatio evangelica position, Peter Phan offers an
interpretation based on the retrieval of the patristic logos theology. More important, however, is
Phan’s distinction, between the incarnated logos and un-incarnated asarkos. This view adds a
new vista to the debate on the salvific role of Jesus Christ in the grand plan of other religions.
Phan submits that the activity of the Logos and the Spirit as manifested in other religions and
traditions is beyond the ecclesiocentric and christocentric dimension of the activities of Jesus of
Nazareth. Put differently, the incarnation of Jesus as the Logos did not exhaust God’s plan for
salvation. According to Peter Phan,
Religious pluralism . . . is not just a matter of fact but also a matter of principle.
That is, non-Christian religions may be seen as part of the plan of divine
providence and endowed with a particular role in the history of salvation. They
are not merely a “preparation” for, “stepping stones” toward, or “seeds” of
Christianity and destined to be “fulfilled” by it. Rather, they have their own
autonomy and their proper roles as ways of salvation, at least for their
adherents.173
Such a contrarian view must, nevertheless, be taken seriously for a coherent Christian
response to the problem of religious pluralism. Phan’s contribution from the Asian perspective is
similar to Panikkar’s in that it offers a non-Western dialogical approach to the question of
religious pluralism. As a result, one cannot fail to notice the heavily loaded dialectical language
and conceptual framework behind the drafting of this declaration on the non-Christian religions.
In structure, Nostra Aetate is Western in outlook. The document reflects and continues
the European tradition of the dialectical hermeneutics of power and centralization.174 For this
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reason, therefore, scholars from non-Western cultures, especially Asia and Africa, raise serious
concern on epistemic grounds against the absolute claims evident in Nostra Aetate. The
argument still holds that in Nostra Aetate, the Catholic Church officially but gradually moves
away from exclusive claims of religious superiority and embraced religious pluralism de facto.
Though the document also profoundly reshapes the Catholic theology of interreligious dialogue,
reconfiguring it anew, yet there are within the document claims of theological exclusivism that
obfuscate if not deny the fundamental de jure right of the other religions. Simply put, Nostra
Aetate in its dialectical approach to interreligious dialogue treats other religions as mere objects
of discourse and not as mutual-equal subjects.
Furthermore, in the context of interreligious dialogue in Jos Plateau, it is noteworthy that
Nostra Aetate was the first Christian document, in principle, to accept Islam as a religion on the
same footing with Christianity. 175 Umaru refers to this influence in his recent work: “Nostra
Aetate has been a source of inspiration within the Roman Catholic Church in Nigeria,
influencing religious circles in the country.”176 However, the recognition of Islam de facto does
not erase the deep seated biases created over the years by the exclusivist hermeneutic that was
established by the SUM and is employed, mostly by evangelical and Pentecostal Christians,
today.
In a similar fashion, Iwuchukwu draws attention to the development of Christianity and
its diversity in northern Nigeria and the social problems arising from the missionary evangelism
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of some denominations, as well as the exclusive theological assumption of many Christians.177
The implications of an exclusive Christology have far reaching consequences on Christians’
readiness to accept Islam as a religion de jure.
Far more problematic within the context of Jos Plateau, however, are the traces of
Christological triumphalism evident in the application of Nostra Aetate and the exclusivist
Christology propounded by the Plateau State evangelical wing of the Christian Association of
Nigeria (CAN). From the Catholic perspective, the position is further complicated by the posture
of Christological superiority supported by the enforcement of the declaration Dominus Iesus,
regardless of the pastoral sensitiveness posed by militant Islam.
For the most part, there are actually sound reasons to raise the question of whether
Christianity in Jos still upholds the age-old doctrinal position of regarding Islam and the
traditional religions as preparation evangelica—“a preparation for the Gospel and given by him
who enlightens all men that they may at length have life.”178 Put in a different way, in what ways
is the Western Christological framework of dialectical hermeneutics, which underlies the
semantics of Nostra Aetate, relevant in framing the dialogical debate between Muslims and
Christians in Jos Plateau?
As it stands, the vaguely inclusive language deduced from Nostra Aetate and the
exclusive, confrontational hermeneutics stance of the evangelical wing of CAN in Jos Plateau get
in the way of mutual and genuine dialogue: namely, openness and an equal opportunity for each
religion to stand on its merit and speak for itself from the bosom of its tradition.
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In this regard, Panikkar opines that “‘dialogue’ is not just an external meeting with
somebody who has other ideas than I have. Dialogue in the real sense arises precisely where I (or
we) discover the same currents and problems within the religion of the ‘other’ as I (or we) find in
my (or our) own religious world.” 179 Besides, the pyramidal-hierarchical model of dialectical
hermeneutics maintained by Nostra Aetate accords Christianity the leisure of putting itself in the
order of priority in relation to the other religions.
Thus, Christianity alone and in relation to no-other but itself offers the standard for
interreligious dialogue. Consequently, from this position of priority in addition to its
ecclesiastical privileges and acclaimed license to divine immunities, the Catholic Church defines
the theological suitability of the other religions, judging elements of their belief systems and
practices to be worthy of what the Church considers as “true and holy.”
2.6. Review of Dialogue by Christian Association of Nigeria
Religious leaders from Islam and Christianity have adopted a reactionary approach to the
2001, 2002, 2004, 2008, and 2010 religious and ethnic crises in Jos Plateau. At the national level,
the stage for the 2001 Jos crisis was orchestrated by debate over the declaration of Shariah in the
core of Northern Nigeria. The application of Shariah law on the state level had enormous
implication for true federalism and national integration.
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Christians have fostered the debate in the political realm concerning the constitutional rights of
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incompatible; thus from within Islamic spheres, the Shariah as an intrinsically religious concept
that is the answer to, or is vastly preferred over, secular democracy.
The discussion here points to a relationship between religious rhetoric and violence. We
will look at the politico-religious events that led to the formation Christian Association of
Nigeria (CAN). Most important to this work is the relationship between the Protestant wing of
CAN in Jos and the Catholic Bishop Conferences of Nigeria (CBCN) on the Jos crisis. The
question is did the utterances of religious associations prior to or during and after the Jos
conflicts, escalate or deescalate the crisis?
Beginning with the role of the Christian Association of Nigeria, (CAN), in tracing the
origins of CAN, Iheanyi M. Enwerem identified three political situations that led to its
formation. “First, there was a centralization of power in the Federal Military Government
(FMG). Second, there was a successful consolidation of power at the centre by the Hausa-Fulani
Islamic ruling class. Third, there was the self-imposed mission, on the part of the military class,
to work for the unity of the nation.”182 There are several version of the origin of CAN. We adopt
Cardinal Okogie’s account.
The Christian Association of Nigeria, as the name connotes, is an ecumenical
association which embraces three big blocs — that is, at the initial stage. You
have the Catholics known as the CSN (that is, the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria),
the CCN (the Christian Council of Nigeria), and OTHERS (that is, those that
belong to neither the CSN nor the CCN group). The Association came up (was
formed) for a purpose, that is, following these ecumenical movements and then
the injunction from the Pope or from Rome that we should try and talk to our
Christian brethren. That was [in light of] the Second Vatican Council. So, the
Catholic Bishops felt that something just had to be done along that line. We put
our heads together and we suggested linking with the Christian Council of Nigeria
disease of the mind … The same holds for the seemingly innocuous political interpretations of secularism, such as
[the] Nigerian form of secularism which [has] equally corrosive effects on the mind. No matter how secularism
defines itself… it is inextricable from the misperception of the absolute reality and therefore a path leading to
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(CCN) ... to find the possibility of agreeing with the CCN. So we had a meeting
[with the CCN] where there was accordance and an agreement ... to move
together. But no sooner had we come together than we discovered that there were
other groups that were neither Catholics, that is, CSN, nor CCN. So if we really
wanted to form a virile Christian Association — a united one — we had to think
about them. And that's how we came to get… the group we named ‘Others.’”183
There is no doubt that CAN achieved monumental success in its response to national
issues that bothered Christians in the Nigerian polity. CAN condemned Federal policies that
were discriminatory to Christians. 184 Foremost among them was the perceived domination of
Muslims in executive positions in politics at the state and federal levels.185 Just as during the
military era, CAN was compared to an oppositional party because it condemned the atrocities
and abuses of the military dictatorship, so all through the Shariah debate, CAN was consistent in
its opposition to the implementation of Shariah law in the twelve Northern States on the grounds
that the law infringed on the human rights and religious liberty of non-Muslims. Accordingly,
CAN asserted that
[t]he adoption of sharia by some states in Nigeria has continued to create a
situation of unrest in which people are killed or maimed and thousands of others
displaced from their homes and places of work.... Many indigenes of the state
concerned continue to suffer in silence because they cannot defend their rights
and have nowhere to relocate. We have warned repeatedly that the adoption of
sharia as state law and the extension of its scope are flagrant violation of human
rights of non-Muslims in a multi-religious society and a secular state like
Nigeria.186
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The Christian Day magazine described CAN as “a leader in the anti-Shari’ah
movement.”187 In response to this claim, Muslim leaders in the North accused CAN of the intent
to “destabilize Shariah in Nigeria and counter Islamic religious propagation by portraying the
religion as a religion of intolerance and violence....”188
In the early years of the military dictatorship in Nigeria, CAN became the sole advocacy
group for Christians’ right to religious liberty and the inculcation of democratic principles. The
Rt. Rev. Anthony O. Okogie, as the national president of CAN between 1988 and 1995, was
renowned for his fierce critique against structures of injustices through advocacy. While focusing
on the ills of the military regime, CAN prudently avoided personal confrontation with Islam at
the national level. The focal point of CAN under Okogie was a “conciliatory and interfaith
understanding” approach that responded to the challenges posed by Islam through direct
engagement and collaboration with Muslims in a non-confrontational way. In short, during
Okogie’s tenure as president, CAN avoided the conservative evangelical approach that is
characterized by prejudices and stereotypes of Islam. This non-evangelical method of dialogue
attempts to overcome Islamophobia with Islamophilia.189
Subsequently, Okogie’s successors—His Eminence Sunday Mbang (1995-2003) and the
Most Rev. Peter Akinola (2003-2007)—abandoned this focal point of political advocacy for
rigorous evangelism and a confrontational stance towards Muslims. The coming on board of a
Christian sect described as “Others” 190 into CAN changed its focus and identity. These new
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groups included the Christian National Revivalist group, ECKWA/TEKN,191 and the Pentecostal
Fellowship of Nigeria. Before their admittance into CAN, these denominations had attempted but
failed to establish a mega/national Church that would counteract the activities of Islam through
rigorous evangelism and proselytism. Cyril Imo fostered the debate on the implications of the
newly evangelical domination of CAN in the North and its renewed interest in aggressive
proselytism and evangelism.192
Under the leadership of Mbang and Akinola, (1995-2007), CAN assumed an evangelical
and confrontational posture towards Islam. Accordingly, Dr. Mbang included in the task before
CAN the development of a strategy to recruit a new crop of Christians who would appreciate and
extol the virtues of honesty and accountability to take the center stage in the administration in the
country.193 Mbang’s sermon drew the attention of the Christian youth to importance of bringing
faith into politics. Nevertheless, Mbang’s call to responsible citizenship among the youth had
pastoral repercussions, as evidenced in the aggressive evangelism embarked upon by the
National Youth Wing of CAN, especially in the Northern states.
Further evidence supporting the militancy of CAN may lie in the findings of what
Andrew Meldrum vigorously described as Archbishop Akinola’s “call to arms.” In the wake of
the 2006 religious crisis, the following remarks were credited to Akintola:
From all indications, it is very clear now that the sacrifices of Christians in this
country, for peaceful co-existence with people of the other faiths, has been sadly
misunderstood to be weakness....May we at this stage remind our Muslim brothers
191
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that they do not have the monopoly of violence...in this nation. CAN may no
longer be able to contain our restive youth should this trend continue.194
Akinola’s famous anti-Islam utterance in 2006 has been linked to subsequent attacks on
the Muslims by Christian youths.195 In a related event, Enwerem showed how CAN employed
the youth wing of the association in political activism through its study group meetings. “These
meetings, which are held rotationally in members’ homes, usually begin with songs from a
variety of Christian hymns like ‘Glory, glory, ... His Truth is marching on,’ [‘The Battle Hymn
of the Republic,’]‘Soldiers of Christ Arise and Put your Armor On,’ and ‘Stand Up, Stand Up for
Jesus.’ As the titles of these songs indicate, they are meant to arouse sentiments of militancy for
the Christian faith among the participants.”196
Furthermore, there was a degree of correlation between songs of violence and media
sources in the Jos crisis. For instance, the Jasawa respondents to the Human Right Watch
interview alleged that the Plateau Radio and TV Station played Bob Marley’s lyrics “Get up,
stand up! Stand up for your right! Get up, stand up! Don’t give up the fight,” to incite the
Christian youth to violence against Muslims.197
Evidence of Christian supersessionism is borne out by research that shows an alliance of
CAN with state politics under the regime of President Olusegun Matthew Obasanjo. Ebenezer
Obadare describes this era of an unholy alliance between Pentecostal Christian and politics as the
period of the “Pentecostalization of the governance and the rise of the ‘theocratic class’ that has
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been instrumental in constituting a discursive Muslim other.”198 In a Similar trend, Kalu Ogbu
discussed “the demonization of Islam in Pentecostal rhetoric and practices to Christian Zionist
and Hebraic sources of the glory of Israel.”199
Responses from both Christians and Muslims pointed to CAN’s political extremism. The
Muslim rejoinder to CAN came from Jama’atu Nasril Islamiyya (JNI)—translated Society for
the Support of Islam. According to Foloya:
The JNI was the first major Islamic organization in Nigeria in post independence
Nigeria, founded by the northern Muslim intelligentsia under the leadership of
Premier Ahmadu Bello, the Sadauna of Sokoto...in 1962... According to
Abubakar Gumi, one of the JNI’s founding members, the organization was born
out of the desire to spread Islam and to educate Muslims about the tenets of the
faith...After 1966, JNI continued to promote the interest of the unified north and
the Islamic cause...The JNI saw itself as in direct opposition with the Christian
Association of Nigeria on the issue of secularity. To improve its position with the
struggle with Christianity, JNI spread to the south, seeking support from the
Yoruba. It recast its mission as the representative of all Nigerian Muslims
irrespective of their particularities of affiliation or beliefs. In 1973, JNI merged
with the West Joint Muslim Organization (WESIOMO), forming the powerful
Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), which was embraced by
most Muslims, and recognized by the government as the main representative
organization for Nigerian Muslims.200
Both CAN and JNI were deeply polarized, full of hateful rhetoric coupled with the
peddling of dangerous rumors. Based on the alleged involvement of CAN in political matters, the
Secretary-General of JNI Alhaji Muhammad Kolo Biu had “questioned whether the incumbent
National President of CAN [Sunday Mbang] is really a man of God; JNI went on then to accuse
CAN of not being a religious organization but a political organization with the sole objective of
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opposing Muslims and Islam by manipulating religious differences for selfish ends.” 201Likewise,
the founder of the National Association of Religious and Ethnic Tolerance, C. S. Momoh,
admits, “I can say without fear of any contradiction that CAN (Northern Zone) and [Jama’atu
Nasril Islam, a Muslim umbrella party] are the two main vehicles of religious bigotry and
intolerance in Nigeria.202
In the Jos Plateau, the late archbishop G. G. Ganaka had referenced the dangerous trend
of militancy in CAN as a recipe for future violence and retaliation. Ganaka proposed a nonviolence and considerate posture toward Muslims in Jos Plateau.
He opposed the mass demonstration of January 11, 1990, by Christians in the
North because of the unnecessary risk to which it would expose Christians.... The
Bishop-and the Youth Group wanted CAN to “believe God”, and allow him to
change “unjust structures when their cup is full”. ... The prelate and the youth
group, by implication, wanted to see CAN with a strategy in which friendly terms
are maintained with the government, helping to control social unrest in the
country — all with an aim of winning the government’s full respect and trust.203
The role of CAN in Jos Plateau came under public scrutiny after the 2004 crisis in
Yelwa-Nshar town. President Obasanjo had openly criticized Governor Joshua Dariye and the
Reverend Yakubu Pam, the President of CAN in Plateau State, for their mishandling of the crisis.
The Rev. Pam of the Assemblies of God, had questioned the judgment of President Obasanjo for
showing up when Christians militias killed Muslims and not vice versa. President Obasanjo
replied Pam: “You have the audacity to say that you did not hear anything from me. Did I hear
anything from you? What meaningful thing have you contributed to make peace in this state
other than being chairman of CAN? CAN my foot!” To this end, a ten-point Communiqué was
issue by CAN in Plateau State asking President Obasanjo’s apology. “The communiqué titled,
201

The Reporter, June 15, 1990, p. 14; quoted Iheanyi M. Enwerem, The Dangerous Awakening, 171ff.
[emphasis mine].
202
The Vanguard, September 23, 2001.
203
Interview with Archbishop G. G. Ganaka, in Iheanyi M. Enwerem, 171.

129

“Apologize Now, CAN Tells Obasanjo” was signed by the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria
(PFN) state chairman, Bishop Jonas Katung, Secretary of Baptist Conference, Rev. Nathan
Nwachukwu, Methodist Bishop of Jos, Rev. J. Jaja and nine other leaders.”204
Earlier during the 2001 crisis, Governor Dariye was also said to have been away abroad,
despite security warnings of the impending crisis looming on the horizon.205 Dissatisfaction with
the situation led President Obasanjo to declare a state of emergency in Plateau State. The
treatment meted out to a “Christian state” by a “Christian president” did not augur well with the
evangelical and Pentecostal members of CAN in Plateau State.206
From the Catholic perspective, the new Archbishop Ignatius Kaigama of Jos sought a
middle ground and continued in the tradition of non-violence set by his predecessor Archbishop
G. G. Ganaka. Incidentally, when Kaigama arrived in Jos Plateau in 2000, the crisis situation has
reached its effervescent point. Obviously, Kaigama could not reverse the trend toward violence
and retaliation practices already established by the Christian youth. As Kaigama reports:
During the 2001crisis when our cathedral parish house and other churches were
burnt in Jos, some youths came to me and said, “We are being killed, the Church
must do something. Give us arms to fight.” I took them into the chapel and talked
to them about non-violence and they listened. During another crisis they said they
were targets of attacks. While others had weapons they claimed they only had
stones. Once again they said, “We need arms, just as the others have.” My
response was, “How do you expect that I order for arms and distribute them to
you in the name of the Church?” In the November 2008 crisis, the level of
destruction on both sides left us devastated. Many on both sides believe that the
only solution is to fight to the end, and that the so-called dialogue and efforts at
reconciliation are not yielding the desired results.207
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Unlike his evangelical predecessors, Archbishop Kaigama initiated the “Dialogue of
Life” with Muslims, as the President of CAN and Chairman of the Inter-Religious Council for
Peace and Harmony (IRCPH), in Plateau State. The late Emir of Wuse, Alhaji Haruna Abdullahi,
who was the Chairman of the JNI in Plateau State, responded positively to Kaigama’s nonevangelical and non-confrontational method. This mutual co-existence and collaboration
approach to inter-religious dialogue between CAN and JNI in Plateau State was the first of its
kind in Jos, as well as all of Northern Nigeria. The quick intervention of CAN and JNI under
Kaigama and Abdullahi produced lasting results. On account of their efforts, both received
international recognition from MISSIO in Germany.208
Although relative progress was made in Jos Plateau among Christians and Muslims as a
result of peace talks and other conflict resolution initiatives by CAN and JNI, under Kaigama
and Abdullahi, pockets of reservations remained, nevertheless, in core members from both faiths.
As Kaigama admits, “Some Christian leaders believe that I am ‘compromising.’ The emir says
some of his people say he is a “sell-out.”209 Thus, research on the mutual collaboration between
the emir and the archbishop in Jos Plateau supports the view that compromise as an integral
component of dialogue is a sine qua non for peace between Christian and Muslims in Jos
Plateau.
In sum, Ignatius Kaigama used compromise as a technique for conflict resolution both in
Jos Plateau and at the national level as the President of the Catholic Bishops Conference of
Nigeria (CBCN). He denounced the confrontational and evangelistic posture of CAN under the
Pentecostal leadership of Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor, but the confrontation between Kaigama and
Oritsejafor led to the suspension of Catholics from CAN at the national level. This trend raised
208
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anew the initial fear about the Pentecostal and evangelicals’ desire to use CAN as a platform to
form a mega church with partisan political advancement and participation.210
Thus, we see that the problem of Christian supersessionism over Muslims was never
addressed as a possible trigger for religious unrest in Jos Plateau. Neither the Protestant wing of
CAN nor the Catholic Church in anyway tackled the issue of inter-religious dialogue from
within—by looking inwardly at the role of exclusive Christological rhetoric and how such views
might inflame violence against Muslims. Thus, a genuine critique of exclusive Christology was
muted in the various recommendations that advocate for peace and mutual friendliness. For this
reason, this research seriously presents Panikkar’s point that a genuine ‘intra-religious dialogue’
should precede any serious effort in ‘inter-religious dialogue.’
2.7. Review of Islamic Response to Dialogue in Nigeria
The first official response from Muslims to Christian supersessionism targeted Christian
evangelism and subsequently the threat from Western super-ordination. Muslims’ rejoinder came
from the Northern intelligentsia with the formation of the JNI in 1962 by the Premier of that
Northern region, Sir Ahmadu Bello,211 the sadauna of Sokoto. Inarguably, “Bello’s era 19511966 marked the apogee of Northern unity.”212 When the British took over the Sokoto Caliphate
in 1903 and until the establishment of JNI in 1962, Islam in northern Nigeria suffered a
monumental setback from the British colonial policy of containment, appropriation, and
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surveillance. 213 As a result of the disadvantageous position of Islam after the 1960 political
independence, the Sadauna
took[it as] a personal duty to spread Islam to all areas of Nigeria where nonMuslims predominate. The determination prompted him to travel to different parts
of northern Nigeria, particularly Southern Zaria, Plateau and the Tiv areas to teach
Islam. He was liberal in his use of material gifts—money and other valuable
gifts—to encourage non-Muslims to accept Islam.214
Islam responded to Christianity in Nigeria on two fronts: first, it viewed Christianity as
an appendix of Western civilization and culture. Thus, it perceived any democratic system of
government as essentially Western in orientation. Secondly, Islam disagrees with Christianity on
the definition of secularism and its application to the Nigerian State. For the majority of
Muslims, Islam and secularity are incompatible. Consequently, within the context of Islamic
constitutionalism, the concept of the Shariah is presented as a corrective for, and an alternative
to, liberal Western democracies.215 From this perspective, we can refer to the late Ali Muzrui’s
coinage of the word shariacracy “[as] a defense against unwanted cultural globalization [... and]
an alternate to the Western constitutional and legal inheritance....”216
As David Ogungbile observes, most Nigerian Muslims are from the Sunni tradition of the
Maliki School that interprets and governs the Shariah.217 Hence, it needs to be remarked, that on
account of the popularity of the Shariah among Muslims in Northern Nigeria, the British colonial
authority did not abolish it all through its fifty-seven years of colonialism. Although colonial
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authorities enacted policies that restricted the application of the Shariah in its entirety, they never
excluded Shariah and its religious claims from the political life of Muslims in Northern Nigeria.
It was rather the case, as J. N. D. Anderson observed in Northern Nigeria, that “up till [1960] this
was the only place outside the Arabian peninsula in which the Islamic Law, both substantive and
procedural, was applied in criminal litigation—sometimes even in regard to capital offences.”218
The foregoing demonstrates that the issue of the Shariah is not new in the politics of
northern Nigeria, as some circles seem to purport. Shariah has always been part and parcel of the
religious identity of the Muslims in northern Nigeria. Though its practice has not been without
flaws, it has existed continually in varying degrees and at different levels of emphasis.
The Emir of Kano, Lamido Sanusi, argues against the notion of the seamless practice of
Shariah across political systems. For Sanusi, despite the fact that Shariah is fundamental to the
fabric of Islam, it has always been understood within a particular political context. Taking a
middle-ground position, Lamido argues that the concept of a universal application of Shariah
across political cultures and systems by Muslims is problematic. Lamido elaborates further:
With the swearing in of elected executives of Nigeria’s fourth (or is it third?)
republic in May 1999 the political system witnessed an explosion of hitherto
repressed tendencies. One of the most dramatic was the decision of the Zamfara
State government to implement the full provisions of Islamic law or Shariah in the
penal code. The decision had a bandwagon (or to use Kissinger’s terminology,
domino) effect on other predominantly Muslim states in the North with governors
following suit with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Professor Ali Mazrui coined
the term “Shariacracy” to describe the phenomenon of implementing shariah in a
presidential democracy.219
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The Shariah debate has been the number one response of Muslims to political
independence in Nigeria. For the Muslim elite in the northern region, the practice of
parliamentary democracy in line with the British political system constitutes another form of
colonial domination. Since Western democracy and education are correlatives, any form of
democracy will always be to the advantage of the Southern regions, which were the most
educated. As such, the concept of Western democracy is seen by many Muslim as suspect. This
suspicion is the reason behind the claim that Islam tends to flourish within forms of government
other than Western democracy. As Saleem Qureshi admits,
An overwhelming majority of Muslim states consequently are military-ruled or
military dominated. The only ideology that seems to be popular and effective in
Islamic countries is the military ideology which, if anything, tends to be promilitary and excludes alternative ideology from gaining grounds. Thus, the trend
of Islamic politics indicates a permanence of the past patterns of military
domination and Islamic ideological support for military government.220
A closer look at the events that transpired during the military era in the Nigerian politics
lends credence to Qureshi’s claim. Evidently, Islam regained its organizational stronghold
through State support in Nigeria during the sixteen years of military rule (1983-1999). For
instance, after the 1976 failed attempt to introduce a Federal Shariah Court of Appeal with
Abubakar Gumi as grand khadi mufti, Muslims redoubled their resolve in 1979 during the
constitutional debate, coming back with the same proposal of a Federal Shariah Court of Appeal.
In 1986 also, under the Ibrahim Babangida military regime, Nigeria—though a secular state—
was registered as member of the Organization to Islamic Conference.
Within the context of Jos Plateau, there was evidence of a Hausa/Fulani ethnic group reorganization and re-strategization, supported by a military regime. During this regime, the
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federal government policy was favorable to the migration of northern farmers and herdsmen
towards the savannah area of the Jos Plateau. Another support ostensibly granted to the
Hausa/Fulani settlers in Jos Plateau by the military decree under the Babangida regime was the
controversial creation of the Jos North Local Government Area. This act by the military junta
was perceived by Christians to favor the Hausa/Fulani Muslims. As observed by Osayande, since
the creation of Jos-North through the State Creation and Transition Provision Decree Number 2
of 1991, the people of the area have known no peace. The once peaceful Jos has become a battle
zone where lives and properties are destroyed at regular intervals. Jos, which was once famous
for its tin mines, is now notorious as a killing field.221
2.7.1. Islamic fundamentalism: The birth of the Izala Sect.
The birth of the JNI in 1962 marked the beginning of Islamic post-independence
organized reformation movements in Nigeria. By design, JNI was founded with the aim to
“transcend divisions among Muslims, to promote Islamic schools and medical work, and to give
a voice to all Nigerian Muslims.”222 From this, we understand that there was an implicit divide
among the Muslim group. This divide is noticeable among the different factions within the Sufi
brotherhood.223
A central figure in the JNI controversy was Abubakar Gumi, whose political dream for
JNI was short-lived after the brutal assassination of the northern premier, Ahmadu Bello, in
1966. Research in the 1970s provided ample support for the assertion that Gumi’s political
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ideology for JNI was sidelined by the traditional Sufi shuyak dominant group.224 Soon after its
formation, there was evidence of fierce conflict, in the form attacks and counter-attacks, between
Gumi and the mallams of the Tijaniyya and the Qadiriyya establishment225 over the authentic
interpretation of the Shariah in relation to the formation of an Islamic polity. The acrimony
between the Izala and Sufi brotherhood was becoming a national nightmare for Muslims. 226
According to Gumi, JNI needed rebirth and re-strategization in line with the original plan
outlined by Sir Ahmadu Bello. The rejuvenation needed by JNI came with the formation of the
Yan Izala movement in 1978. Gumi admitted the link between JNI and Izala in an interview:
“Yan Izala in response to the efforts of the Fityah al-Islam is to bring the JNI under its
control.”227
The formation of the Yan Izala in Jos Plateau was accredited as an act of design and not
an accident. The choice of Jos Plateau was primarily to counteract the Christian radicalization
and evangelism at its source.228 From this account, we can understand why the two fundamental
goals of Yan Izala were geared towards religious proselytism and the re-implementation of the
Shariah. More important, however, is the development of an appropriate strategic response to
Christian Campus outreach evangelism through the formation of the Muslim Students Society of
Nigeria (MSSN). The outcome of the confrontation of the Muslim Students Society and the
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Christian revivalists on campus marks the beginning of political radicalism and religious
fundamentalism.
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CHAPTER THREE
PLURALISM, INCLUSIVISM AND DIFFERENCE: TRADITIONAL
CHRISTOLOGY AND PANIKKAR’S CHRISTOPHANY
3.1. Introduction
It is true that the challenges posed to the Catholic Church and the entire Christian world
by religious pluralism are numerous and insoluble. At present, no one theological position or
school of thought can claim conceptual mastery of the problematics of pluralism. The Catholic
Church’s approaches to the phenomenon of religious pluralism forms one of the most difficult
conundrums for scholars. But the fact remains that, religious pluralism is not peculiar to
postmodern era. In the words of Leuven theologian Terrence Merrigan, “Is it not something of an
exaggeration to describe religious pluralism as the greatest challenge facing the Church of our
day? After all, religious pluralism is nothing new. Christianity itself came into being in a world
that was bubbling with religious diversity, or ‘religious pluralism,’ as we now call it.”1 From this
statement, it can be deduced that religious pluralism, either as a philosophical concept or a
theological category, has been around quite a while; and, with the momentum granted by the
postcolonial critique of postmodern meta-narratives, religious pluralism has taken a different
dimension and has come to stay.
There are countless books and articles on the nature and purpose of religious pluralism.
Most of the works stem from the heart of the theology of religion which emerged shortly before,
during, and after Vatican II.2 An inclusivist theological approach to non-Christian religion is the

Terrence Merrigan, “Religious Pluralism and Dominus Iesus,” in Sacred Heart University Review, 2000,
Vol. 20, Issue 1, Art. 4.
2
For the role of the Vatican II in the shaping of theology of religion as distinctive discipline of study, see
Paul F. Knitter, Introducing Theologies of Religions (Maryknoll, Orbis Books, 2002); Gavin D’Costa, “Theology of
Religions,” in David F. Ford, ed., An Introduction to Theology in the Twentieth Century, 2 nded (Cambridge, MA:
Blackwell,1997), 626-43; Veli-Matti Karkkainen, An Introduction to the Theology of Religions: Biblical, Historical,
and Contemporary Perspectives (Downers Groves: InterVarsity Press, 2003).
1

139

hallmark of the theology of religion that came out of the conciliar documents. However, for
proponents of religious pluralism, either an exclusivist or inclusivist model to the theology of
religions has become grossly inadequate within both postmodern and postcolonial context. As
Panikkar himself acknowledges, “we do not possess so far a theology of religion worth the name
for the geographical and historical coordinates of our times.”3
Subsequently, the opponents of religious pluralism

4

continue to question its

presuppositions as well as its basic assumptions. Foremost is the question of whether pluralists—
like John Hick—have not become the victim of their own criticism. Panikkar, for one, opposes
the idea of pluralism as mega-system.
Pluralism in its ultimate sense is not the tolerance of a diversity of systems under
a larger umbrella. It is not a supersystem.... The problem of pluralism arises when
we are confronted with mutually irreconcilable worldviews or ultimate systems of
thought and life. Pluralism has to do with final, unbridgeable human attitudes....
We speak then of two different, mutually complementary, although apparently
opposite, attitudes, beliefs, or whatever.5
By and large, religious pluralism raises the fundamental problem of difference—the
difference initiated by the otherness of the other. The central question remains: is the existence of
the other religious traditions simply a sociological de facto matter, or is it theological de jure in
nature? In a theological sense, the question remains: how does Christian theology seek to
maintain the universal salvific significance of Jesus while simultaneously professing Jesus’s
particularity? 6 Thus, Jesus Christ’s concreteness and particularity in mediating the divine

3

Panikkar quoted in Camilia Gangasingh MacPherson, Critical Reading of the Development of Raimon
Panikkar’s Thought on the Trinity (New York: University Press of America, 1996), 3.
4
See Gerald J. Lawson, “Contra Pluralism,” in Joseph Prabhu, ed,. The Intercultural Challenge of Raimon
Panikkar (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1996), 78
5
Panikkar, “Invisible Harmony: A Universal Theory or a Cosmic Confidence,” in Leonard Zwidler, ed.,
Toward Universal Theology in Religion (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1987), 125.
6
Rebecca S. Chopp, Reconstructing Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 299.
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presence in salvation history remains the banner of Catholic theological thinking and as well the
subject matter of Dominus Iesus (DI).7
Throughout their history, Christian theologies have approached religious difference
through either rigorous exclusivism, moderate inclusivism, or radical pluralism. 8 Christian
exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism9 models have fallen short in interpreting the reality of
the presence of otherness in the other, in that these positions contain some form of either
exclusivist or inclusivist views, even though implicit, of Christianity as the religion with
universal normativity.10 Thus, the relevant question of the de jure salvific significance of the
other religions is left unanswered.11
Christian theology is faced with a double dilemma; first, the predisposition to totally
ignore the divine manifestations evident in other religions—exclusivism; and second, the
tendency not to subsume the other religious traditions—inclusivism. Besides, for Christian
theology to be relevant, it cannot simply ignore the other religions or claim to speak on their
behalf. As Diane Eck suggests, “the complexity of today’s religious and scholarly worlds

7

Merrigan, 72; Dominus Iesus will be rendered DI henceforth.
Alan Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology of Religions
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1982), 7; Schubert Ogden, Is There Only One True Religion or Are There
Many? (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1992), 4; Perry Schmidt-Leukel, “Exclusivism, Inclusivism,
Pluralism: The Tripolar Typology-Clarified and Reaffirmed,” in Paul F. Knitter, ed., The Myth of Religious
Superiority: A Multifaith Exploration (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2005).
9
Especially John Hick’s version of pluralism.
10
See Kenneth Rose, Pluralism: The Future of Religion (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing Press, 2013),
1; see also Garvin D’Costa’s critique of the “non-tradition specific,” posture of Western liberal pluralism and how
the tripology of exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism can become a dangerous extreme in themselves, D’Garvin,
Meeting of Religions and the Trinity (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2000), 22.
11
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involves every student of religion in multiple conversations, with many voices insistent on being
heard on their own terms.”12
Christian theology has been in a stalemate since the declaration of DI and its critique on
religious pluralism. According to DI, “The Church’s constant missionary proclamation is
endangered today by the relativistic theories which seek to justify religious pluralism, not only
de facto but also de iure (or in principle).13 The deadlock has been between the defendants of
orthodoxy, with renewed commitment to particularity on the one hand, and the urgency for
Christological revisionism on the other. Inarguably, the challenges posed by religious pluralism
did not disappear with the declaration of DI. Rather, the question of religious pluralism, both de
facto and de jure, has stubbornly remained, defying the solutions proposed by various theologies
of religions. 14 Hence, the search for an authentic theological method that draws from the
Christian traditions, and yet, transcends the tripology of “exclusivism, inclusivism, and
monological pluralism”15 leads to an exploration of Panikkar’s mystical approach to Christian
theology.
Instantiating Panikkar’s dialogical pluralism takes seriously the concerns raised by DI on
two levels. First, it responds to the clarion call to theologians to raise “new questions” by
“pursuing new paths of research and advancing proposals” and, second, “to explore” the ways in

Diane L. Eck, “Dialogue and Method: Reconstructing the Study of Religion,” in Kimberley C. Patton and
Benjamin C. Ray, eds., A Magic Still Dwells: Comparative Religion in the Postmodern Age (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 2000), 132.
13
See Dominus Iesus, No.4.
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See Francis X. Clooney’s critique of the theology of religions and his advocacy for the comparative
theology. According to Clooney, “theology of religions reflects from the perspective of one’s own religion on the
meaning of the other religions, often considered merely in general terms. By contrast, Comparative theology
necessarily includes actual learning another religious tradition in significant details. In brief, neither replaces the
other. Neither is merely a prelude to the other; nor is defective because it does not perform the task of the other.”
Clooney, Comparative Theology: Deep Learning Across Religious Borders (Meldon, MA: Wiley/Blackwell, 2010),
chapter 5.
15
Kevin J. Vanhoozer, God Scriptures and Hermeneutics: First Theology (Illinois: InterVersity Press,
2002), 61.
12

142

which “historical figures and positive elements from other religious tradition may fall within the
divine plan of salvation.”16 Furthermore, paragraph number 21 of DI is quite impressive in this
regard:
With respect to the way in which the salvific grace of God—which is always
given by means of Christ in the Spirit and has a mysterious relationship to the
Church—comes to individual non-Christians, the Second Vatican Council limited
itself to the statement that God bestows it “in ways known to himself.”
Theologians are seeking to understand this question more fully. Their work is to
be encouraged, since it is certainly useful for understanding better God’s salvific
plan and the ways in which it is accomplished.17
Although no particular theologian was named as the direct target of DI, there are sound
reasons to believe that the document may have been directed, first, at Jacques Dupuis 18 and
indirectly to Raimon Panikkar and his other Asian counterparts—possibly Peter Phan.
Furthermore, DI speaks about “the eclecticism of those who, in theological research, uncritically
absorb ideas from a variety of philosophical and theological contexts without regard for
consistency, systematic connection, or compatibility with Christian truth.”19
For the most part, under the leadership of Joseph Ratzinger (1992-2002) as the Prefect for
the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith,20 the term “pluralism” has a negative connotation
and its use as a theological tool is almost anathema. 21 In DI, Ratzinger strongly opposed the
hermeneutics of “tolerance and otherness,” as proposed by pluralist theologians, notably Jacques
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Dominus Iesus, paragraphs 3 and 14; quoted in Merrigan, 71.
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Joseph Ratzinger’s War Against Pluralist Theologians (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2014); See also Joseph
Ratzinger, Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2004).
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Dupuis 22 and, more lately, Peter Phan. 23 In a significant contrast, he replaces it with the
hermeneutics of “preparation and rejection.” As Ih-Ren Mong points out, “By preparation
Christianity is linked with other religions in the covenantal relationship, and [Ratzinger] believes
that other religions also speak of God and lead people to him…[, and] as rejection of the other
religions, he believes that faith in Jesus Christ is the only way to salvation….”24 Ratzinger does
not hesitate to elaborate further the position that the teaching of the Church about the unity and
salvific universality of Jesus Christ in relation to the other religions is not a matter of intolerance
but truth.25
As these theologians sought to explore new path of research the ways in which “historical
figures and positive elements from other religious tradition may fall within the divine plan of
salvation, 26 they were censured by the same CDF for propounding theories that advocate
religious pluralism, not only de facto but also de jure (or in principle). Cardinal Ratzinger
disputes the disproportionate theological importance given to the non-Christian religions that
portrays them not as “extraordinary paths of salvation, but precisely ordinary ones.”27 Ratzinger
quotes Scripture: “There is only one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who
gave himself as ransom for all” (1 Tim 2:7).28
Clearly, the document is not coherent in its references to the subject-matter of relativism
as synonymous to the movement described as religious pluralism (#20). Seemingly, DI does not
See Dupuis’ response to the CDF in Jacques Dupuis, Christianity and the Religions: From Confrontation
to Dialogue.
23
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differentiate between the various brands of religious pluralism; rather it simply assumes that
religious pluralism justifies relativism, 29 which equally endangers the Church’s mission to
evangelize.30
Terrence Merrigan’s simplification of the different nuances of religious pluralism
addressed by DI is helpful:
The conviction that there are a variety of equally legitimate ways of relating to
God is at the heart of the so-called pluralist theology of religions. Defenders of
this view of things generally appeal to three major arguments to defend their
position. The first is the so-called historical-cultural argument, namely, that all
our knowledge, including our knowledge of God, is relative. This means that it is
dependent on a particular and limited point of view, a particular and limited
culture, and a particular and limited set of ideas. The second argument is the socalled theological-mystical argument, that given the mysterious character of God,
the fact is that God will always be more than we can say about him. The third
argument is the so-called ethical-practical argument, namely, that the urgent need
to address the problem of injustice in the world takes precedence over any dispute
about doctrinal claims. We can summarize these arguments as (1) relativity, (2)
mystery, and (3) justice.31
DI restates the following uncompromising areas as targets for negative theological
distortions offered by religious pluralism.
As a consequence, it is held that certain truths have been superseded; for example,
the definitive and complete character of the revelation of Jesus Christ, the nature of
Christian faith as compared with that of belief in other religions, the inspired nature
of the books of Sacred Scripture, the personal unity between the Eternal Word and
Jesus of Nazareth, the unity of the economy of the Incarnate Word and the Holy
Spirit, the unicity and salvific universality of the mystery of Jesus Christ, the
universal salvific mediation of the Church, the inseparability—while recognizing the
distinction—of the kingdom of God, the kingdom of Christ, and the Church, and the
subsistence of the one Church of Christ in the Catholic Church.32
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No doubt the dominant concern of DI, first and foremost, revolves around the
Christological question and the implication of such on the doctrines of the Trinity and
ecclesiology. Thus, from the Christological perspective, Panikkar raises the question of whether
a non-relativistic theological investigation can be done without regressing to inclusivist patterns
in the theology of religion? Panikkar advances a claim for a non-inclusivist and nonsupersessionist Christological framework that responds to the challenges of religious pluralism
both de facto and de jure.
Panikkar’s whole theological endeavor mirrors Vatican II Ad gentes, #21, which states
that God bestows salvific grace to non-Christians in ways known to Himself.33 Panikkar will
argue further that the unknowable God cannot be adequately comprehended through human
logic. God is a mystery who is knowable through myths. Panikkar’s philosophical and
theological presuppositions are hinged on his critique of the postmodern monotheistic construct
of the Divine that values “the one” over and against “the many,” in a typical binary oppositional
fashion.34
Panikkar is not alone in this critique of absolute monotheistic systems and its link to the
imperialistic structures that pave the way for colonialism.35 The end of colonialism and the birth
of new contextual theological methods raise the greatest challenge to the development of
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doctrines and the consequent widening of the horizon of Western traditional theologies.
According to Jenny Dagger, “Surely, the project of ‘theology of religion’—Christian exclusivism
and inclusivism and Christian-initiated pluralism—is compromised by Eurocentric imperialistic
attitudes that are resonant with colonial modernity.”36
From the works of frontrunners like Edward Said and Homi Bhabha, it is clear that the
epistemological foundations of postcolonial studies within the social sciences now control the
field and its content.37 This era calls for a radical retrieval and analysis of texts from the reservoir
of cultures and countries once under the shackles of European colonization. Within the context
of the hegemonic use of power as knowledge, postcolonial thinking poses the central question of
the origin, authenticity, and circulation of literary sources between the colonized and the
colonizers. Should the subaltern speak at all? If yes, how should the subaltern speak? In what
language can they speak? And upon what subject matter can they authoritatively speak?
Several disciplines have adjusted their hermeneutics of the “other,” in response to the
challenges raised by postcolonial studies and pluralism. Theological research among the
colonized world is yet to accomplish the level of success recorded by other disciplines with the
social sciences. As rightly pointed out by R. S Siguirtharaja,
While these disciplines are coming to terms with the reality of colonialism, what
is striking about systematic theology is the reluctance of its practitioners to
address the relationship between European colonization and its field. There has
been remarkable hesitancy to critically evaluate the impact of the empire among
systematic theologians, both before and after the European expansion.38
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Previous research on Panikkar’s religious pluralism has dangerously aligned the
philosophical foundations of his pluralism with Kantian epistemology. On the theological front,
critics of the pluralism of John Hick, and in some cases Paul Knitter, have uncritically associated
their position with that of Panikkar. Others have simply merged Panikkar with Jacques Dupuis.
In any case, the above perceptions about Panikkar are partially correct. The truth is that
Panikkar’s religious experience transverses the tripology—exclusivism, 39 inclusivism, 40 and
pluralism—to post-pluralism. The argument is that Panikkar is a pluralist sui generis. His work,
unlike that of the others, provides a corrective to and an exemplar for a contextual theological
endeavor that genuinely seeks to understand Faith in the concrete human experience.
3.2. The Challenge to Traditional Christology
The biblical question41 posed by Jesus Christ to his disciples (Matt. 16:13-16) on the
plains of Caesarea Philippi begins the enigmatic quest about “who” is Jesus Christ and “what”
plans Jesus has for the eventual salvation of the Jew and the whole world. It is interesting to note
that none of the respondents acclaimed Jesus Christ as God. The answers provided by Peter and
the other disciples were derivatives from already known categories borrowed from the Jewish
prophetic and wisdom literatures. The conflict of interpretations demonstrates that early
Christian responses to the question of who is Jesus Christ do not form a consensus. As a result,
scholars like Soares-Prabhu differentiate between New Testament and traditional Christologies.
He notes that
39
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unlike traditional dogmatic Christology, which is exclusivist and works for the
imposition of a single “orthodox” Christological model, New Testament
Christology is inclusive and pluriform. Every community evolves its own
understanding of Jesus responding to its own cry for life. And because life
changes, Christologies change too. The New Testament preserves all these
different Christologies, without opting exclusively for any one among them,
because it does not wish to offer us (as dogmatic theology pretends to do) a
finished product to be accepted unquestionable by all. Rather, its pluralism
indicates a christological open-minded-ness, inviting us to discover our own
particular Christology, that is, the specific significance of Jesus in our situation in
the Third World today. The New Testament then does not offer us a specific
model for our Christology…Instead, [it] gives us our model for christologizing by
mediating an encounter with Jesus and inviting us to articulate his significance for
the world today in our own local languages, just as the New Testament writers did
in their own.42
From the foregoing, it is clear that there exist no ready-made answers to the
Christological crisis. Christians have addressed the question with the available philosophical and
linguistic tools at their disposal. As a result, most positions were based on perspective rather than
on correctness—and no one perspective completely captures both the human and divine natures
of Jesus Christ.
The aim of this historical excursion into the genesis of Christology is to point out
scriptural variations about the person of Jesus Christ. There was no orthodoxy but heterodoxy in
terms of Christians’ responses to the question of who is Jesus during the New Testament era.
Although scholars from various Christian denominations and different theological schools of
thought may disagree on the primacy of model, yet their disagreement and lack of uniformity, in
the words of Galvin, “serve as a warning against facile attempts to reduce Christological
reflection to a single title or a single perspective.”43
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Consequently, the reliance on this passage later by the Catholic Church to create a certain
preference for Christology from “above,” against the Christology from “below,” has been
pointed to as the beginning of the Christological debate. 44 The point is that other forms of
Christology existed before the development of classical dogmatic Christological formulas in
Nicaea (321), Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (451). Helmut Koester, in his work on early
Christian Christologies, outlined four basic models of Christology that existed.
1). An initial type, possibly the most primitive of all, conceived of Jesus as
Son of man and coming Lord. Eschatological in focus, this parousia
Christology continued Jesus’ own future-oriented preaching…. 2). The second
Christological trajectory looks back on the events in Jesus’ public life,
especially his miracles and exorcisms…. 3). A third trajectory, wisdom
Christology, parallels the second in its concentration of Jesus’ public life, but
sees him as a teacher rather than miracle-worker…. 4). Lastly, a fourth
Christological model directed its attention to Jesus as crucified and raised
from the dead.45
From the exegetical point of view, other critics like Edwards Schillebeeckx argue that the
primordial form of Paschal Christology that prefigured Jesus as an eschatological figure
alongside Moses precedes the fourfold model outlined by Koester. 46 Similarly, George MacRea
identifies adoptionist Christology47 as equally primitive in line with Koester and Schillebeeckx’s
proposals.
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Holmes, eds. New Studies in Theology (London: Duckworth, 1980), 1:31-46.
45
See Helmut Koester, “The Structure and Criteria of Early Christian Belief,” in James M. Robinson and
Helmut Koester, Trajectories through Early Christianity (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 205-31; quoted in
Fiorenza and Galvin, 258.
46
See Edward Schillebeeckx, Jesus: An Experiment in Christology, 401-515; quoted in Fiorenza and
Galvin, 259.
47
See George MacRea, “Review: Edward Schillebeeckx Jesus: The Experiment of Christology,” In
Religious Studies Review 5 (1979): 270-73; quoted in Fiorenza and Galvin, 259.
44

150

The words of Galvin best illustrate the current status of the Christological debate and
scholars’ critique of the Catholic Church’s attempt to sustain a classical Christology that is
infallible in construct and final in perspective:
A third position judges the early councils’ doctrine to be a true expression of the
reality of Christ, and usually considers itself still bound by their authoritative
regulation of Christological language. Nonetheless, it finds the development of
dogma marked by a gradual narrowing of the question. While issues concerning
Christ’s divinity and humanity are important, they are not the only significant
question for Christology to address…. Although the patristic period was moved
by stereological concerns; its final formulations do not incorporate an explicit
soteriology. Thus the conciliar teaching, while true, neither exhausts the matter
nor determines the agenda for all future Christological investigation. In my
judgment…Christology is free to develop new terminology and to address issues
that the early councils did not face.48
Similarly, Aloys Grillmeier’s Christ in Christian Tradition attempts to articulate a
systematic presentation of the various philological/philosophical and theological understandings
of God (Father, Son and Holy Spirit) that emerged in the early Church, beginning with the “Jesus
of history,” as recorded in scriptures to the emergence of the “Christ of faith and the creed,” of
post-apostolic and patristic times up to Chalcedon. After a thorough biblical exegesis of
Christological statements in the synoptic Gospels, the Johannine literature, and the Pauline
corpus, Grillmeier strongly opposed the dominant views of some Germans scholars impose
tension and discontinuity between the Jesus of history and Christ of faith. Scriptural evidence
supports the pre-existent Son of God according to the Spirit and also the existent Son of David
according to the flesh. These differences do not harm an essential unity.
Furthermore, rather than a narrowing of the subject matter of Christology, Grillmeier
draws insight on how during the patristic era theological debates are rejuvenated and kept alive
owing to the dynamics of continuity and discontinuity. According to Grillmeier, “the content of
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the kerygma, however, was always the person of Christ and his uniqueness. The theological
struggles of the patristic period was nothing else than an expansion of this central question; this
gives them their continuity.”49 Drawing on the views of Grillmeier and Galvin, we argue that for
the Christological debate to continue in the post-colonial context, other cultural perspectives
must be at liberty to ask and even attempt to answer the question about the person of Christ, and
his uniqueness from their sitz im leben.
Grillmeier also raised the point about the dilemma stemming from Christianity’s double
heritage: that of maintaining the Judaistic monotheism and adjusting to the Hellenistic
philosophy of logos. The question has been how to maintain a balance between the inherited
monotheistic doctrine of Godhead from Judaism and God’s relationship to the Son, the Word
made flesh. In order to make the Christian doctrinal statement of the oneness of God, who was
and who is in Christ, intelligible to Christians, acceptable to the Jews, and attractive to the
pagans and Gnostics, the use of the Greek and Latin languages and philosophy were
indispensable. In this whole process, some apologists like Tatian cautioned about the tendency of
a Hellenized Christianity, whereas the likes of Justin and Origen saw in pagan philosophy valid
ingredients for theological reflection.
In tracing the implications of traditional Christology and its treatment of difference
throughout the history of Christianity, we subscribe to Donald Senior and Carroll Stuhlmeuller’s
position: that there is no concrete, coherent and comprehensive strategy in the Bible to address a
non-Christian religion.
Many of the biblical themes we have discussed, such as the expansive nature of
religious experience, the revelation of God in creation, the recognition of the
Gentiles’ capacity to respond to the Gospel and the awed awareness that God and
49
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his Spirit range far beyond the boundaries of human expectation, are some of the
aspects of Biblical data that suggest positive links with non-Christian religions.50
Gerald O’Collins’51 book Salvation for all: God’s other People is of inestimable value
and is a huge resource in this regard. In Knitter’s view, the fundamental understanding and
“attitudes of the Roman Catholic towards other faiths, from the patristic age to the twentieth
century, as a teeter-tottering between two fundamental beliefs: God’s universal love and desire to
save, and the necessity of the church for salvation.”52 This openness and dialoguing with nonChristians, especially the pagan philosophers, is instrumental to the shaping of the logostheology of the early Church Fathers. Underlying the theology of Justin’s Logos Spermatikos
(sower), Ireneaus’ Logos emphutos (revealer), and Logos protreptikos (conventional) in
Clement, there is the presupposition that God before His incarnation in Jesus 53 was already
manifest in creation and human history and civilizations.54 In his dialogue with Trypho the Jew,
Justin opined that the Jews before Jesus Christ may be saved if they participated in universal,
natural and eternal good.55
The use of the hermeneutics of logos-theology by the Church Fathers as a tool for
dialogue had a positive result in their understanding of non-Christians: (1) It furnishes the early
Church with philosophical terminologies (language) and (2) it facilitates the development of the
concept “of the Logos as a divine ‘pedagogy’ toward things to come or—to use the expression
50
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which Eusebius of Caesarea would illustrate later as a ‘preparation for the gospels’ (praeparatio
evangelica).”56
Notice that the Church at this time was both a persecuted minority, locally situated and
tribally built sui iuris under a bishop; sociologically, a tolerant approach to the non-Christian
majority was necessary for its survival. It must be within this context that one can understand
and apply the controversial axiom of ‘extra ecclesiam nulla salus’ (outside the Church, there is
no salvation), which has been dangerously established and practiced as the Church’s response to
non-Christians up until the twentieth century.57
There is no instance in his writing in which Cyprian explicitly applied his saying “No
salvation outside the Church” to the majority of people, who were still pagan in his day.
According to Sullivan, “We know that he judged Christian heretics and schismatic guilty of their
separation from the Church. Did he also judge all pagans guilty of their failure to accept the
Christian Gospel and enter the Church? We do not know.” 58 However, it is evident that the
historical hermeneutical growth of “No salvation outside the Church” shows that its rigorous and
universal application started shortly after Christianity was made a state religion by Emperor
Theodosius I (379-395).59
The axiom “No salvation outside the Church” in its negative and exclusive format has
had a controversial history right from the beginning. According to Küng, the axiom has resulted
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in more or less serious theological errors and has proved open to misunderstandings and
duplicity especially in its reference to non-Christians:
Does this negative and exclusivist axiom lead to innumerable misunderstandings
which continue to recur in spite of all interpretations both inside and outside the
Catholic Church? Even if it were previously of help to the Church and her
mission, it is certainly a hindrance to her today. And not only because the Church
no longer forces anyone to believe in Christ out of fear of hell. The words are
interpreted more often either as intolerance or duplicity: as intolerance when they
are understood literally and exclusively in accordance with the old tradition; as
duplicity when it means on the one hand that no one would be saved outside the
Catholic Church, and on the other hand does not exclude the fact that people
outside the Catholic Church are saved, in fact in millions and billions of them, the
greater part of humanity.60
From the time of Augustine and his pupil Fulgentius of Ruspe to the Middle Ages and in
papal and official church documents, the exclusivistic approach to non-Christian religions has
been the model for interreligious relations. However, with the discovery of the New World by
the navigators in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, along with millions of people who were
non-Christian, a better balance between God’s universal love and desire to save and the necessity
of salvation outside the church was orchestrated by the Council of Trent. “If pagans could not be
baptized with water (in re), they could ‘through desire’ (in voto). If they follow their conscience
and live morally, they were implicitly expressing their desire to join the church, and could thus
get through the gateway to salvation.”61
This dilemma and challenge to the limit of an inclusive Church continued through the
Middle Ages and through the Reformation and Counter Reformation eras. Central to the debate
at that time was the Church understands of itself as sui iuris in relation to the State and other
religions. This self-understanding of the Church in this era constitutes her “thesis and
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hypothesis” model of approach to non-Christians which, according John Courtney Murray,
would yield different conclusions for Jews, pagans, and heretics.
The thesis asserts two general propositions. First, the state is bound not only on
the natural law but also on the positive divine law whereby the church was
established. Therefore the state has the duty, per se and in principle, to recognize
by constitutional law that the church is a perfect society sui iuris and that it is the
only religious society who has the right iure divino to public existence and action.
Since Catholic Church is, by divine law, the one true religion, it ought to be, by
law constitutional, the one true religion of the state. Whence it follows that no
other religion may have, per se and in principle, a legal right to public existence
and action within society. A religion that has no right to exist iure divino, can
have no right to exist iure humano. Therefore, per se and in principle, all false
religions ought to be “exterminated,” that is, put beyond the bounds of public life
and social action.62
Care for religion, continues Murray, meant limited freedom for the Jews, tolerance for the
pagan, intolerance for the heretic.63 The ideal Catholic church-state under the “thesis” model has
a divine mandate to exist, is the one true religion, and is ipso facto the constitutional religion of
the state, whereas the hypothesis model advocates for religious tolerance and a preference for a
lesser evil in situations and circumstances where the thesis model cannot hold. However, the
historical events of the French Revolution (1789-1799) and the enthronement of reason and the
Bill of Rights in 1791, which were the product of the Enlightenment among other factors, led to
the collapse and downfall of the Papal States in 1859. The various struggles and contributions of
John Courtney Murray and Pope John XXIII 64 that led to the drafting of Vatican II’s most
important documents on interreligious dialogue65 cannot be over emphasized.
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In a critical appraisal of the council, Paul F. Knitter opines that while “Vatican II forms a
watershed in Roman Catholic attitude towards other faiths,” there still remains “a residual
ambiguity in its understanding of just how effective the truth and grace within the religions
are.”66 Rahner pushes the question a step further, “Do non-Christians’ attain salvation outside of
or within the life of their religions as such? Are such religions salvific in some manner or not?
The question is not explicitly answered.”67
Despite the apparent ambiguity, in Nostra Aetate, we see implicitly the Church’s first
officially positive attempt to inclusive dialogue with all religions based on their commonalities
about the origin and destiny of man and their effort to search answers to the most existential
questions and the meaning of life.68 The central doctrinal statement of Nostra Aetate, “that the
Church rejects nothing of what is true and holy in these religions,” 69 is an open-ended one and
can conversely be reframed in a positive way: “The Church accepts things that are true and holy
in these religions.” A question yet remains unanswered: what are the Church’s criteria for
judging what is true in other religions and whether that which is true is in any way either
different or the same essential category with the fullness of the Truth possessed by the Church?
Is it possible to have some values, doctrines, and belief systems as “True” that have possibly
nothing to do with “Truth”? The answer is perhaps No. If that is the case, would the Catholic
Church accept as “true and holy” the de jure salvific doctrine of salvation evident in other
religions?
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The position of DI aggravates this relationship and raises more question than it sets out to
answer. As Anne Clifford observes, DI “sets up walls of demarcation that devalue non-Catholic
churches and support Roman Catholic supremacy over other religious traditions.”70 Similarly,
another author remarks:
These men of whom the Declaration speaks all happen to believe sincerely that
their own religions are the truth. Yet they were addressed by the council fathers as
if they were misguided children who surprisingly manifest on occasion a certain
amount of good sense. The overall impression created by the Document is
certainly, though not intentionally, one of benign condescension.71
In a fundamental way, Panikkar’s critique of traditional Christology rests on two essential
but interconnected factors. First, Panikkar claims that traditional Christology functions within a
mono-cultural context in attempting to answer the questions of the time. The use of a monotheistic system to address issues of ultimate concern in an Indian setting proves ineffective. As a
result, Panikkar advocates for an approach through multiplicity—the Advaita Vedanta
experiencing of the divine. 72 Accordingly, Panikkar’s thought “begins and ends with the
affirmation that advaita is the realization of the fundamental oneness of reality without denying
the plurality.”73
Second, through his cosmotheandric principle, Panikkar reveals the implicit
mystical/spiritual paucity inherent in traditional Christology, its inability to handle “difference.”
This claim portrays Western Christology as saturated with phobia regarding difference and philia
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for uniformity. The goal then is “to move from a tribal Christology into a Christophany less
bound to a single cultural current.”74
To this effect, traditional Christology denotes the developments and formulations about
the person and uniqueness of Jesus Christ in Eurocentric settings that have a claim to finality,
immutability and universal applicability. In a broader sense, traditional Christology denotes the
Christology of the Magisterium. For Panikkar, the philosophy and language of doing Christology
is not immutable to change, especially in multi-cultural settings. The challenge before traditional
Christology remains whether it will accept as genuine the Christological reflections from other
cultural contexts.
In a sense, it is advisable to read Panikkar in light of the intellectual tradition and context
of his time. In addition, differentiating between early and later Panikkar aids the proper
contextualization of his main theological thrust. Early Panikkar battled with the supersessionism
implicit in fulfillment theology, which was championed by Jean Danielou and Romano Guardini.
Christianity, according to fulfillment theology, stands at the end of salvation history with all
other religions historically conditioned as precursors. Thus, “the tragedy of the precursor,”
according to Guardini, “is to wish to persist once revelation has arrived…There is a moment
…when the precursor becomes the enemy.”75 Panikkar’s early theological works seek to address
Christian supersessionism by charting a different path that calls for mutual respect through
dialogical attitude.
In Panikkar’s estimation, the universal salvation promised by Christianity cannot be
attained in other religious traditions without re-visioning traditional Christology to meet the
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contextual demands of non-Christians. Panikkar sees this missing link between Christianity and
the religions (with particular reference to Hinduism) in the nomenclature of Christ. Panikkar
develops his Christology on the axiom “Wherever God’s grace is, Christ is also there, since
God’s activity in the world is always mediated by Christ.”76 Consequently, for Christianity to be
relevant it must experience “the stripping of all external garbs and forms,” all “categories and
formulas,” prejudices and judgments, in order to mystically recognize Christ where he is not
obviously present, in Hinduism. 77 Panikkar argues that the asceticism/Kenosis required by
Christianity towards non-Christian religions is not contradictory to orthodoxy but makes
orthopraxis a reality.78
3.3. The Task of Christophany
At the beginning of his career, Panikkar considered writing a work titled The Unknown
Christ of Christianity, who, he believes, exists in non-Christian religions, though hidden.79 Such
a title suggests that Panikkar might have had in mind an aspect of the life of Jesus Christ that is
yet unknown to Christians. From all indications, such a view would be redundant within the
prevailing context of fulfillment theology, in which it would have been written. Panikkar’s final
title, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism, though, appears to be more palatable at face value.
However, it is Panikkar’s book Christophany: The Fullness of Man 80 that encapsulates his
critique of traditional Christology—namely, its inability to transcend the mono-cultural
formulations that characterize Eurocentric hermeneutics. The hermeneutic key to Panikkar’s text
rests heavily on the understanding of his theological anthropology. For Panikkar, the Western
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anthropological construct of the autonomous man that is separated from spiritual sources has
enormously influenced Christological investigation outside the Trinitarian realm.
Panikkar adheres to the orthodox teaching about Jesus’ divinity and humanity—that he is
true God and true man.81 Like the Fathers at Nicaea and Chalcedon, Panikkar has no qualms with
the identity of Jesus Christ as one person, the Lord, Son of man, Son of God, the Logos—sarkos
and a-sarkos, human and divine. The Christological question has always been about “the how”—
namely, how Jesus’ humanity is related to his divinity and the implication of such a relationship
for the identity of non-Christians. In this regard, Panikkar raises the problems involved in
thinking about Jesus’ natures in the languages and logic of traditional Christology, which are
foreign and incoherent to the context of Indian Christianity. Throughout the early formation of
his Christology, Panikkar struggled to create a balance between the Cosmic Christ and the
historical Jesus Christ. Thus, Panikkar coined the word “Christophany” to argue that from the
context of Adviata mysticism, the conceptualization of Christ—as true God and Jesus the Christ
as true man—has enormous implications for intercultural and interreligious dialogue.
Panikkar distances himself from the presupposition of Western theological anthropology
that separates Man [human] from God and the World. Panikkar’s anthropology forms the
discourse on Man [human] on three levels: (a) man as individual at the perceptive/scientific
level, (b) man as person in the social relational aspect, and (c) man as consciousness, the spiritual
and mystical aspect of man—the adhyatmik level.82 Consequently, Panikkar thinks that the one-
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sided use of man as individual—as an island, as a male, as merely a human being,83 and as the
measure of all things—marks the first reduction of theological anthropology to the realms of the
historical.
In Panikkar’s view, traditional Christology has been solely dependent on the
understanding of Man [human] as an independent entity and, secondly, outside the realm of the
spiritual, the mystical and consciousness. In essence, Panikkar’s “Christophany stands for a
manifestation of Christ to human consciousness and includes both an experience of Christ and a
critical reflection on that experience.”84 By critical reflection, Panikkar means an experience that
is contemplative, trangressive, and transformative—at the mystical level. Thus in the deepest
sense, Christophany is experiencing anew the mystical life of Jesus Christ, to “participate in the
same spiritual experience, the same profound intuition that Jesus Christ had.”85
For Panikkar, the logic of Christology—Christo-logic—is no longer coherent in the
pluralistic context. The task of Christophany, therefore, is to provide an alternative to Western
hermeneutics by looking for new grounds for the universality of Christ and its implications for
non-Christians. In this sense, Christophany continues the Christological discourse from the
purview of Advaita Vedanta. 86 Panikkar begins his Christology by raising the fundamental
question: How do Christians and non-Christians alike understand Christ? How do Indian
Christians conceptualize Jesus Christ outside the framework of classical theology with its Greek,
Hellenistic, and Latin preconceptions? Panikkar’s Christology is an attempt to respond to this
question within the framework of orthodoxy without overlooking the challenges of orthopraxy.
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For a full absorption of these ideas, one would need to read Panikkar against himself: namely, by
touching his entire philosophical and theological corpus. Such an exercise would be outside the
scope of this study.
Thus, it suffices to state that Panikkar’s theological project is anchored in his conviction
that the Abrahamic and Hellenistic foundations and heritage of Catholic doctrines are
problematic to Christian spirituality and mysticism. Panikkar advances his claim further by using
the imagery of the Tiber and Jordan Rivers, which are dependent on the Ganges, to illustrate how
Western theological hermeneutics benefit from the multi-plural reality of the Indian Christian
experience.
In other words, understanding Panikkar, first and foremost, means not losing sight of his
intended audience and dialogical partner. Panikkar’s interest was to think of theology from the
perspective of the Advaita Vedanta, a flourishing philosophical principle in Hinduism and some
forms of Buddhism. Thus, because Panikkar’s theological insights resist any tendency to be
considered as supplanting traditional theology, a parallel reading is recommended. The sole
purpose of this differentiation is a matter of emphasis: Panikkar’s methods of doing theology
from the dialogical presupposition of the “many” versus the dialectical approach of classical
theologians that favors the “one” of monotheistic traditions.87
For Panikkar, traditional theologies have exhausted the resources implicit in the monological system, which he views as spiritually bankrupt. At the source of this spiritual aridity is
the duality at the heart of mono-logical thinking that dichotomizes between God versus humans
and the world. Thus, the search for wholeness and holiness through the mystical experience has
led Panikkar to invest in the cosmotheandric principle derived from Advaita-Vedanta. Rather
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than a separate focus on the immanent dimension of God and its implication for humans and the
world, the non-dualistic cosmotheandric worldview engages the divine in a holistic manner that
involves the entire cosmos as an “organic unity,”88—which is a kind of perichoresis.
The development of the cosmotheandric has necessary implications for thinking, and in a
sense re-thinking, traditional Christology. Fundamentally, Panikkar rules out Christology on
account of its mono-cultural claims. By purpose and design, Christological hermeneutics serve
an exclusivist or inclusivist function that offers a worldview of “we against them.” In a sense,
despite its claims of universal normativity, Christology in Panikkar’s estimation fails the test of
the cosmic unification of God, humans, and the world. It is in the context of the “unity and
wholeness” of the entire universe that Panikkar introduced the Christological concept of
Christophany, which lies at the center of Panikkar’s Trinitarian discourse.
Although Panikkar avoids a classical definition of Christophany in the strict sense,
Cynthia Bourgeault’s comparison between traditional Christology and Christophany drives
Panikkar’s point home.
Christology

Christophany

1. Culturally Embedded
2. Metaphysically Embedded

Interculturally oriented
Open to “homeomorphic equivalence”

3. Intellectual

“pneumatic”—requires “third eye”

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Masculine “aggressively rational”
Implicitly monotheistic
Dualistic (stuck in polarities)
“I-it” perspective
Closed system, historically oriented

“Feminine” (contemplative)
Implicitly Trinitarian
Advaitic (non-dual)
“I-I” perspective
Open-ended, continuously self-revealing and
creating.89
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The understanding from this comparison makes Christianity a dualistic religion that is
culturally and historically situated within the hermeneutics of the Abrahamic monotheistic
traditions, which distinguishes between the Creator and the created, the spiritual and the
mundane. Such a worldview contradicts the non-dual cosmovision emanating from the Advaitic
traditions of Indian and other Asian contexts. Panikkar proposes a pneumatic (subject-to-subject)
inter-abiding approach to the divine. In this cosmovision, the cosmos, the divine, and the human
(cosmotheandric) form an indivisible bond—perichoresis.
Furthermore, Panikkar locates Christophany at the heart of the cosmotheandric vision of
the Christian Trinitarian reality. Ultimately, Panikkar believes that an understanding of the
Trinity grounded in the Western traditions will not suffice. Panikkar constructed his own path
from the cosmotheandric vision to a new thinking based on the apophatic doctrinal perspective.
Panikkar’s new cosmotheandric ways were deeply rooted in mystery, and he teaches a pattern of
kenosis/perichoresis, whereby both unity and difference are preserved through entering into the
dance of self-giving love. 90 The journey from Christology (Christ-logic) to Christophany
necessitates a shift of paradigm from a doctrinal perspective, which views Jesus Christ “from the
outside as the object of faith, adoration or doctrine,” to an inner point of view described by
Panikkar as the “third eye”—the mystical way.
Here is the place for the function of the third eye in the mystical intellect. If an
Aristotelian epistemology offers the basis for empirical and rational knowledge,
the Advaitic vision requires illumination from a superior source of knowledge.
This third degree of knowledge comes into being not when we see or know, but
when we are conscious that we are seen or known. It is neither sense knowledge
nor rational knowledge, yet it is inseparable from both. It is not irrationalism. It
emerges when the dynamism of knowledge inverts its direction, as it were: we are
Cynthia Bourgeault, “Christophany by Raimon Panikkar,” in http://www.contemplative.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/10/Christophany-Overview.pdf
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aware that in touching we are touched, in knowing we are known. It is conscious
that there is an illumination from ‘above’. I know fully a thing not when the thing
is sensible that I may sense it, or intelligible that I may understand it, but when
both subject and object are illumined by a light that comes from neither subject
nor object. Then it produces an ‘understanding’ that is more than sense or rational
experience; it creates a union between subject and object that is of an order other
than a sensuous touch or a rational contact. It is a more holistic participation,
which produces a conviction that is more than physical or rational.91
Approaching reality from the perspective of the “third eye” leads to both the mythical and
mystical realm of experiencing. Panikkar’s dissatisfaction with the one-sidedness of the
logos/ratio epistemology of Western hermeneutics led him to distinguish between logos—the
thought, mythos—the unthought, and pneuma—the unthinkable; these distinctions are the
underlying principle of his philosophy and theology. “A living myth does not allow for
interpretation because it needs no intermediary. The hermeneutic of a myth is no longer the
myth, but its logos. Myth is precisely the horizon over against which any hermeneutic is
possible. Myth is that which we take for granted, that which we do not question; and it is
unquestionable because, de facto, it is not seen as questionable. The myth is transparent like the
light and the mythical story—mythologumenon—is only the form, the garment in which the myth
happens to be expressed, enwrapped, and illumined. Panikkar enforces the issue further:
Myth is not the object of thought, nor does it give food for thought. Rather it
purifies thought, it bypasses thought, so that the unthought may emerge and the
intermediary disappears. Myth is the salutary fasting of thinking; it liberates us
from the burden of having to think out and think through everything and thus it
opens up the realm of freedom of being. When the thinking has not yet landed on
the thought so that it cannot yet know what is being thought in the thinking, we
are still in the domain of the myth.”92

91

Panikkar, The Rhythm of Being: The Unbroken Trinity (New York: Orbis Books, 2010), 23.

92

Panikkar, Myth, Faith, and Hermeneutics (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 4-5; see also 342 where he
refers to the three dimensions as the “Trinitarian triangle.”

166

Myth is the house of logos and its interpretative key. These three modes reciprocally
include each other. Panikkar insists that both logos and myth are mutually inseparable, yet
irreducible; the former is an object of the intellect and the latter, a participatory reality through
rituals and symbols.93 He reminds us that, “The logos must not be abolished, superseded or given
up in favor of irrationalism, emotionalism, fideism or some other rebellions, all one-sided. In
philosophy the logos plays an irreplaceable double role: that of illuminating, clarifying, and that
of critiquing, testing, controlling. If anything contradicts the logos, it cannot be accepted.”94
Thus, any attempt to grasp Panikkar’s Christophany must first internalize the realm of the
mythos and pneuma—the unthought and unthinkable and it relates with logos—thought. The
logic is simple: logos can only rationalize on what is given to thought from the unthought and
unthinkable. Therefore, as reason, logos cannot be its own beginning—arkhe. In a sense, if
traditional Christology is saturated with logos—the thought, Panikkar’s Christophany dwells in
the symbolic realm of—the unthought and the unthinkable. Among other aims, the task of
Christophany is “restoring symbols to life and eventually of letting new symbols to emerge.” 95
As a result, Christ remains for Panikkar the only symbol within the Trinity that shatters the
logos—thought—and opens a new vista for non-Western cultures that were formerly considered
“unthought and unthinkable.”96 This is made possible only through symbols, beyond concepts
and logic. Panikkar himself specifies concerning his method, “My locus philosophicus [and
theologicus]…will not be solely in the domain of concepts that forms the current domain of our
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time, but in the realm of symbols that may more appropriately describe the situation of humanity
over its entire historical period.97
Thus, Panikkar’s use of the symbol of Christ in his Christophany must be understood
within the context of the unthought and unthinkable. By moving away from the logos—the
thought, and embracing the unthought and unthinkable, Panikkar admits of the inherent
ambiguity involved.
Christ is an ambiguous term. It can be the Greek translation of the Hebrew
Messiah, or it can be the name given to Jesus of Nazareth. One may identify it
with the Logos, and with the Son or equate it with Jesus. The nomenclature that I
personally would like to suggest in this connection is as follows: I would propose
using the word Lord for the Principle, being, Logos or Christ that other religious
traditions call by a variety of names and to which they attach a wide range of
ideas. I am not making any claim here to solve the problem, and shall thus
continue to use the name of Christ, for I believe it is important that the figure of
Christ should regain its complete fullness of meaning, but I shall do so in a way
that is devoid either of polemic or apologetic. Each time that I speak of Christ I
am referring (unless it is explicitly state otherwise) to the Lord of whom
Christians can lay claim to no monopoly.98
The foregoing discussion implies Panikkar’s dilemma: namely, the effective balancing of
Missiology and inculturation within the Indian and Asian context. The search for an appropriate
contextual Christology that explains the universal salvific role of Jesus Christ to non-Christians
led Panikkar to develop the Christophany of our times from the symbolic and mythical
experience drawn from Advaita Vendata.
Panikkar’s development of the sutra is intended to move beyond the inclusivist
theological impasse created by the application of traditional Christology in his work The
Unknown Christ of Hinduism. Panikkar’s claim that Christ as the logos was already present in
Hinduism, though incognito, presents an obvious exercise in the theology of religions. He
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asserts, “Christ does not belong to Christianity, he only belongs to God. It is Christianity and
Hinduism as well that belongs to Christ, though in two different levels….” 99 This work
represents the apogee of Panikkar’s Christological theology. Such an erudite theological exposé
indicates Panikkar’s thorough understanding of the Fathers in both Nicaea and Chalcedon, and,
as noted earlier, he subscribes to the Council’s identification of Jesus Christ as one person, the
Lord, son of Man, son of God, the Logos—incarnate and un-incarnate, human and divine.100
To differentiate between Panikkar’s Christophany and traditional Christology will lead us
to the heart of Panikkar’s theology of the orthodox Christian God vis-à-vis the non-orthodox
Hindu Brahman. According to Panikkar,
To modern Hinduism, Brahman is not a person, and in consequence is not looked
upon as a personal God, but as the Absolute, and thus identified with God only in
the transpersonal sense of Godhead…In a word, the conception of Brahman
hardly tallies with the conception of God; both conceptions are almost as opposed
as pure potentiality to pure actuality…Moreover,…the Muslim and the Christian
conceptions of God, for instance, although very similar at many points, yet differ
essentially…If we emphasize the intellectual differences still further we must say
that the Thomistic idea of God, for instance, differs from the Scotistic one, nor is
the conception of God in Leibniz or Descartes the same, nor is it in Malebranche
or Suarez, or in any two thinkers of different metaphysical schools. A fortiori the
idea of Brahman is not the theistic idea of God.”101
Panikkar’s assessment of the inclusivist methods inherent in the theology of religions is
evidence of an implicit critique of the theistic idea of the Western God. Consequently, a revisioning of the Christological hermeneutics from its theistic footing led Panikkar to the
development of the Trinitarian conception of God alongside the non-dualism of Advaita
Vedanta. This marks the beginning of Panikkar’s shift from inclusivism to pluralism.
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Panikkar’s Christophany is situated within the context of the Trinitarian God and
developed from the theological tapestry of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity. While
maintaining the Nirvana experience of the absoluteness of Brahman as Godhead/Father,
Panikkar points out that speaking about the Father is an exercise in absurdity—an attempt
towards impossibility. Whatever there is to be spoken of the Father is already given through the
Son. “Everything that the Father is he transmits to the Son.” 102 With this in mind, Panikkar
develops the concept of Christ—son—as a symbol alongside Isvara—the Lord. In this way, the
Father empties everything He is into the Son (kenosis).
In this sense, Panikkar speaks of the Father through the Son in such a way that it is no
longer the Father, but the Son who Creates, Redeems, and Sanctifies. 103 Panikkar’s silencing of
the Father, in negative theology, constitutes a “devotion to the Father…meets an apophatism of
being; it is a movement towards…no place, a prayer which is always open towards…the infinite
horizon which, like a mirage, always appears in the distance because it is no-where.”104 It is this
mystical and symbolic experiencing of the Father in/through the Son that constitutes Panikkar’s
neologism: Christophany.
Christophany is the mode of existence of the Son—the Christ. Panikkar upholds
traditional Christological datum that no one goes to the Father except through the Son. However,
the Son for Panikkar, that is, the Christ, has multifarious manifestations, of which Jesus of
Nazareth is one. Panikkar argues further that the Christ, whether manifested/incarnated or
hidden/unincarnated, remains the only way to God the Father. In Panikkar’s word, the “unique
link between the created and uncreated, the relative and the absolute, the temporal and the
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eternal, earth and heaven, is Christ, the only mediator.”105 As the only mediator between God
and human, the Son becomes the source of relationship and dialogue, whether interpersonal or
inter-religious.106 In this cosmotheandric vision of reality, “beings, insofar as they participate in
the Son, are from and through him. Every being is a Christophany, a showing forth of Christ.”107
The following nine sutras are the outcome of such an in-depth mystical understanding of
Christophany within the confines of what Panikkar describes as the “homeomorphic
equivalence.”108
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Christ is the Christian symbol for the whole reality.
The Christians recognizes Christ in and through Jesus.
The identity of Christ is not the same as his identification.
Christians do not have a monopoly on the knowledge of Christ.
Christophany transcends tribal and traditional Christologies.
The protological, historical, and eschatological Christ is a unique and self-same reality,
distended in time, extended in space, and intentional in us.
7. The incarnation as historical event is also Inculturation.
8. The Church is considered a Site for the incarnation.
9. Christophany is the Symbol of the Mysterium Communitionis of Divine, Human and
Cosmic realities.109
Through kenosis (self-emptying), God drains God’s self into the Son, thereby initiating
the dance of self-giving love—perichoresis—and preserving both harmony and difference. For
Panikkar, the kenosis of the Father leads to the divinization of the Son, which in turn makes the
condition possible for the divinization of the entire cosmos. At the heart of the dance, the Father
maintains unity and difference.
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Understandably, then, the nomenclature “Christ” maintains a different conceptual
framework in traditional Christology and Panikkar’s Christophany. Panikkar’s approach to the
subject-matter has been eclectic and systematic, always sticking to his original point of
departure, which is to probe the universality of Christ and the search for a valid “universal
methodic” 110 principle toward the Trinitarian in non-Christian religions. For Panikkar, the
particularity or exclusivity of Jesus of Nazareth is a stumbling block to such an endeavor.
3.4. Panikkar’s Religious Pluralism
The nature of Panikkar’s pluralism is complex. In some circles, Panikkar is uncritically
linked, on the one hand, with the relativist pluralism of John Hick and Paul Knitter and, on the
other, with the inclusivist pluralism of Karl Rahner and Jacques Dupuis. Regardless of the views
of critics and supporters on this matter, it suffices to say only that among them, there is a general
consensus 111 that the idea or doctrine of Christianity’s “uniqueness,” “unique definitiveness,”
“absoluteness,” “normativeness,” “superiority,” or “supersessionism” over other religions is at a
crossroads—needing a re-vision and radical re-interpretation. 112 The urgency required, in the
words of Knitter, amounts to crossing “a theological Rubicon…a move away from insistence on
the superiority or finality of Christ and Christianity toward recognition of the independent
validity of other ways.”113
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Panikkar’s understanding of pluralism is beautifully summarized in his Metaphor of the
Window.
We all seeing the world from our particular point of view…we see the world
through window…the cleaner the window is, the less I see the window and the
glass. And the more I am enthused and in Love with what I see. I don’t see my
window, I see through the window. I need my neighbor to tell me… ‘Look here—
you are looking through a window.’ But then I have to tell them, “sorry you also
are looking through a window. And then we compare notes. And they probably
see the same landscape. But perhaps they see a different way, also… I see through
my window, and I cannot say that I do not see what I see through my window. I
don’t see through the window of my neighbor. But if I love my neighbor, then I
will have to hear the description of what my neighbor says. And I say, ‘well, sorry
I don’t see that,’ (I see through my window). But I hear you telling me something
else…I discover that the other doesn’t see the same world that I see. But also, I
discover that I don’t see the whole… Or I haven’t heard him. I hear. And you’ll
remember that St. Paul said that faith comes from hearing. I hear the other telling
me something about the world, or reality—about what he/she sees through the
window, that I don’t. And then…I say, I thought I was seeing the whole, but now
you’re telling me I was seeing very little…And here begins the intra-religious
dialogue. You say what you hear, you say what you believe, you share your
experience, and you are ready at the same time to hear the other telling other
narratives, other beliefs, other experience. And then…we dialogue.114
Thus, the humbling fact that one does not know everything about one’s own myth is for
Panikkar, the epistemological grounds for the practice of pluralism. Since “the experience of
God cannot be monopolized by any religion or system of thought.” it can be argued that “a
plurality of religions is required since one single religion cannot provide enough space for the
multiplicity of human experiences and divine manifestations.”115
Panikkar opens his contribution in the The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a
Pluralistic Theology of Religions in a spectacular manner and with a thought provoking question:
“Does one need to be spiritually a Semite or intellectually a Western in order to be a
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Christian?”116 Panikkar proceeds to explore the role of the Holy Spirit in the admittance of the
Gentiles during the Council of Jerusalem in AD 49. Rather than clamor for a Vatican III Council,
Panikkar advocates for a Second Jerusalem Council, wherein the Holy Spirit will once again
confirm as legitimate the religious experiences of non-western traditions.117 In Panikkar’s view,
Christianity cannot continue the narrative of universality without addressing the de facto
plurality and de jure pluralism of other religious experience.
In his pluralism, Panikkar moves the debate of unitive pluralism beyond the parameters
set by Kantian epistemology.
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threefold approach of

exclusivism, inclusivism, and “monological” pluralism, Panikkar developed a practical program
for pluralism, based on the cosmovision drawn from cosmotheandric experience. 120 In Panikkar,
therefore, we see a paradigmatic shift from a “dialectical pluralism” to what has been recently
describe as “dialogical pluralism.”121 It is dialogical because it is modeled after the Trinitarian
reality and not the mono-logical presupposition of a separated godhead.
Using the geographical metaphor of three great rivers—the Jordan, the Tiber, and the
Ganges, Panikkar introduces the theological debate on religious pluralism that is centered on
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Christ as a non-historical logos.122 Panikkar argues that this analysis goes a long way to show
“that the geography of Christianity cannot be reduced to the Jordan in Palestine, or the Tiber in
Italy or the Ganges in India.”123 Put in more explicit terms, the symbol Christ cannot be reduced
to any one religion—Hinduism, Judaism, or Christianity. Christ is the cosmic and universal
principle of unity and wholeness that binds God, humans, and the world. Most important,
Panikkar speaks of “Christ” in a mysterious way as “the symbol of the divine-human mystery,
which is at work everywhere and elusively present wherever there is reality.”124
While highlighting the various opportunities Christianity has had for dialogue with the
other religious and philosophical traditions of its time, Panikkar does not hesitate to critique the
dangers of the exclusivism and inclusivism, which stem from the Hellenistic and Greco-Roman
legacy, of a dialectical oppositional model to Christianity. In this sense, Panikkar offers the nondaulistic religious experience of Asia and other parts of the non-Western world as a corrective to
the “exclusionary and hierarchical” model of Western hermeneutics.125
According to Panikkar, so far, the spiritual resources inherited from the rivers Jordan and
the Tiber can no longer address the post-colonial exigencies of the New World Order.
Christianity is in dire need of the spiritual and mystical rejuvenation offered by the Ganges nondualistic experience. As Panikkar observes, “until now, Christianity has absorbed syncretistically
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the ‘good things’ of the Mediterranean religions. Why cannot they do something similar with
other religions?”126
Panikkar’s observation raises issues that need constant review, namely Christianity’s
reluctance in letting go of its Eurocentrism and embracing genuine pluralism. He declares that
“either Christianity ‘sticks’ to their ‘Christ’ and becomes exclusive, or they give up the claim,
dilute their belief, and become, at best inclusive…”127 Still, the particularization of the Christ to
Judea-Christian settings and the sundry discriminations witnessed during the ages raises more
questions about the Biblical provision of Christ as the second Adam—humanity. In this sense,
Christ, argues Panikkar “stands for all humanity and in a certain sense for the whole cosmos.”128
The mystery that is at the beginning and will be at the end, the alpha and the
omega, by and through which all that come into being, the light that enlightens
every creature, the word that is in every authentic word, the reality that is totally
material, completely human, and simply divine, which is at work everywhere, and
elusively present where there is reality, the meeting place at the crossroad of
reality where all realms meet, that which does not come with fanfare, and about
which one should not believe, that there is here or there, that which we do not
know, when we perform a good or evil action, and yet is “there,” that which we
are—and shall be—and which we were, that symbol of all reality, not only as it
was or is, bit as it shall freely be, also through our synergy, is what I believe to be
the Christ.129
This tells us that for Panikkar, only in the appropriation of the Christic experience—the
perspective of Christ as the universal sacrament/symbol of salvation—can Christianity lay claim
to its universality without diluting its concreteness or subsuming the differences of other
religions into its Jordan or Tiber. From the perspective of the Ganges’ non-dualism, Panikkar
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offers a general framework for his understanding of pluralism; here, these are summed up in
seven propositional formulae for lack of space.
1) Pluralism does not mean plurality or a reduction of plurality to unity. It is a fact
that there is a plurality of religions. It is also a fact that these religions have not
been reduced to any sort of unity…Pluralism means more than sheer
acknowledgment of plurality and the mere wishful thinking of unity…2)
Pluralism does not consider unity as an indispensable ideal; even allowance is
made for variation within that unity. Pluralism accepts the irreconcilable aspect of
religion without been blind to their common aspects. Pluralism is not the
eschatological expectation that in the end all shall be one…. 3) Pluralism affirms
neither that the truth is one or that it is many. If truth were one, we would not
accept the positive tolerance of a pluralistic attitude, and would have to consider
pluralism a connivance with error. If truth were many, we will fall into the plain
of contradiction…. 4) Pluralism does not allow for a universal system. A
pluralistic system would be a contradiction in terms. The incommensurability of
ultimate systems is unbridgeable…. 5) Pluralism makes us aware of our own
contingency/limitations and the non-transparency of reality. It is incompatible
with monotheistic assumption of a totally intelligible being…Yet pluralism does
not shun intelligibility…. 6) Pluralism, then, is not a mere symbol. It expresses an
attitude of cosmic confidence (in the Spirit which is not subordinate to the logos)
which allows for a polar and tensile coexistence between ultimate human value,
cosmologies, and religions…. 7) Pluralism does not deny the logos and its
inalienable rights. The principle of non-contradiction, for instance, cannot be
eliminated. But pluralism belongs also to the order of myth. It incorporates myth,
not, of course, as an object of thinking, but as the horizon that makes thinking
possible. The myth is the locus of belief.130
Based on his radical pluralism, which is deep and multi-dimensional, Panikkar strongly
criticizes the absolute posturing of monotheism. Accordingly, he contends that pluralism is more
than mere plurality.
Pluralism, therefore, does not mean many ways (plurality) but that we detect
many forms which we cannot recognize as ways leading to the goal. Pluralism
does not mean just tolerance of the many ways. It is rather that human attitude
which faces intolerance without being broken.131
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Thus, Panikkar distances himself from any system—be it scientific, philosophical, or
theological—that leans towards absolutism. “This means that even the monotheistic concept of
God has come under very critical scrutiny. Due to this change, traditional theological concepts
such as “Absolute,” and “God” are not to be found easily in Panikkar’s later work.” 132 By
rejecting the absoluteness of monologism, Panikkar argues for a pluralism that is dialogical and
principally premised on praxis. This means that pluralism is simply not possible within a closed
monotheistic framework that delights in “unicity, fixity or stasis” to the detriment of
“multiplicity, fluidity, relationality and motion.”133
A cautionary note is necessary with reference to Panikkar’s use of the word “praxis.” For
“praxis in Panikkar does not primarily mean the emancipating praxis of liberation theology but
refers to a new spirituality,”134 one that is rooted in the cosmotheandric reality: the cosmic, God,
and the human are both irreducible and constitutive of both consciousness and reality. 135 An
implication of the cosmotheandric principle in Panikkar’s view of pluralism is that because of the
perichoresis—interrelatedness 136 —that exists among the triad structures, the human spirit is
opened to infinite conditions of becoming and possibilities. This inherent and universal tendency
of the human to transcendence can no longer be tamed under monotheistic absolutism. Under the
cosmotheandric principle, dialogue is no longer at the dispensation or discretion of particular
132
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religions. Because “the experience of God cannot be monopolized by any religion or system of
thought,”137 it can be argued that “a plurality of religions is required since one single religion
cannot provide enough space for the multiplicity of human experiences and divine
manifestations.”138
In the post-pluralism critique 139 offered to The Myth of Christian Uniqueness, critics’
responses seem to overlook Panikkar’s description of pluralism, especially his critique of
pluralistic meta-narratives and its potency, to obfuscate the difference within the confines of
theistic universal systems. There is a dimension to the responses that appears to have put all
pluralist theologians onto one bandwagon. Respondents like Gavin D’Costa, J. A DiNoia, John
Milbank, Paul Griffin, and Kenneth Surin specifically labeled pluralism, especially its Western
construct, as a mere rhetorical exercise, lacking the substance of any commitment to praxis.140
Likewise, Mark Heim’s criticism led to his call for a post-pluralism theology of religion
that takes the living faith of the believing community seriously. 141 While the above scholars’
responses on pluralism represent a critique from the heart of Western hermeneutics and methods,
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there is a need to highlight the structural thought pattern of Panikkar’s advaitic hermeneutics142
and ways of thinking, which prove as a corrective to the methodological imperatives that
undergirds Western thought.
3.4.1. Panikkar and Kant
A robust analysis of Panikkar’s critique of Kant and the Enlightenment philosophy of the
Western tradition is a gateway to engaging Panikkar’s entire philosophical and theological
project. At the core of Panikkar’s critique lies the claim that Western metaphysics have created a
gulf between “the knowing subject and an object to be known.”143 The chaos created by this
demarcation cannot be remedied by the “monochromatic vision” of reality centered on the logos
as the interpreter and measurer of reality. Panikkar argues that “man cannot be reduced to the
logos,” nor consciousness to reflective knowledge; rather, the human being is open to the
(cosmotheandric) reality in which he participates, precisely within a “three-fold veil.”144
In Myth, Faith, and Hermeneutics, Panikkar joins the post-modern scholars who have
punctured the ego and arrogance that emanates from the Western metaphysics claim of
absoluteness and meta-narratives. In this sense, Panikkar’s critique of Enlightenment philosophy
as a system that harbors metaphysical absolutes and a totalitarian agenda is similar to its Western
philosophical forebears and reminiscent of Paschal and Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Kant,
Heidegger to Derrida, Levinas, Buber, and Marion. These philosophical traditions in Panikkar’s
estimation are still locked in the impasse created by the dualistic approach to the philosophical
problem of the “One and the Many.”
According to Panikkar, “Hermeneutics is the art and science of interpretation, of bringing forth
significance, of conveying meaning, of restoring symbols to life and eventually letting new symbols emerge.
Hermeneutics is the method of overcoming the distance between a knowing subject and an object to be known, once
the two have become estranged.” Panikkar, Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics, 8
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The crux of the matter, according to Panikkar, “is the problem of mediation which stems
from the strenuous effort of the Enlightenment to solve by means of an autonomous
epistemology the older ontological question of relationship—i.e., the one and the many.” 145
Panikkar is perhaps different in his approach. Indeed, Panikkar argues that the insight from the
non-dualistic Advaitic Vedanta of Hinduism and Buddhism is the required antidote to the
Western monochromatic response to the problem of reality. Non-dualism moves the debate of
the “one and the many” beyond the binary oppositional formula.
Rather than a one-dimensional dependence of philosophy on the logos, Panikkar
advocates an ecosophy that builds on cosmotheandric non-dualism. Wisdom146 and listening to
the sayings/ways of the cosmos are the integral elements of the cosmotheandric spirituality.
Thus, for Panikkar, the classical definition of Philosophy as the love of wisdom needs further
clarification. He says: “I understand wisdom (Sophia) as the art and science of Life…Philosophy
(philo-sophia) would then be the love of the art and science of Life, viz., of the praxis and theory
of living—and not human life alone: the wisdom of [comostheandric] love. Panikkar continues,
but “Wisdom does not consist of a monochromatic vision of the world, nor of an amorphous
atomization ad infinitum, but rather it is a combination of the valuable colors in a universe rich
with polarity because it is full of life.”147 The dualism created between epistemology/ontology,
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subject/object, mind/body reduces thinking to “scientific know-how, and intelligibility to
rational, almost spatial encapsulation.”148
One might ask whether western philosophy—metaphysics—while shying from any
mythical or mystical form of mediation has not reduced “thinking to mere calculus: induction
and deduction?”149 Consequently, Panikkar argues that
…the alleged dilemma of the “One and Many,” which translate into the option
monism/dualism (plurality) is methodologically an uncritical dilemma because it
erects discursive reason (ratiocination) as the ultimate judge of reality. The
advaita position I am going to defend is critically aware that the very question
which creates the mentioned dilemma begs what it questions.150
Thus, understanding Panikkar’s critique of the Western notion of mediation and his
proposal of symbolic awareness—as the epistemological solution to mediation151 requires a brief
history of Western philosophy in general and the particular application of Immanuel Kant’s
philosophy of religion to John Hick’s liberal pluralism.
Our focus will be on the interface between philosophy as metaphysics and the creation of
a post-modern God of onto-theology as the rational mediation of the ontological difference. In
this project of the secularization of God, human knowledge assumed total autonomy, becoming
the subject, while the God of faith is relieved of His divinity and stripped of mystery. The turn to
human subjectivity became the philosophical goal of metaphysics in which being as things
ceased to exist in themselves, and are rather viewed to exist in relation to me, for me, and from
me.152
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The anthropological turn to the subject had numerous implications for the post-modern
cultural perspectives on the human autonomy as distanced from the realm of the divine. The
individualistic and atheistic twist toward human-divine relations that lies in the heart of Western
liberal pluralism is responsible for the ferocious attack against post-modern discourse.
A perusal of the history of Western philosophy and a merger of metaphysics and theology
is recommended for an in-depth understanding of Aristotle, Aquinas, Suarez, Descartes,
Heidegger, Kant, Levinas, Buber, Hick, Marion and Panikkar. On the one hand, the encounter
indeed has been over-exaggerated, and on the other, the unification has led to the birth of ontotheology. So far, the outcome has been an inherited metaphysics that is synonymous to both
philosophy and theology, which now has become the sole epistemological ground for the
Ultimate, the Real, Being, God. As Panikkar insists from his study of western philosophies, the
reduction of philosophy to religion, metaphysics, epistemology, and the pragmatic/historical
constitutes the greatest error in the Western thinking pattern.153
An evaluation of Panikkar’s mythic structure of experience and the epistemological
ground of the possibility of such experience necessitates a comparison of Panikkar and
Immanuel Kant. Panikkar’s indebtedness to Kant’s critical method is fundamental in the
transcendental and phenomenological reduction of human experience. However, unlike the
phenomenology of Kant and Husserl, Panikkar’s view of experience does not originate in the
speculative realm of consciousness; rather, experience is a lived reality within the
cosmotheandric world.
The distinction in Kant’s epistemology between the ultimate reality in the phenomena
and the noumena has ontological implications for the self, the cosmos, and God. In his Critique
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of Pure Reason, Kant bluntly rules out any knowledge of the noumena through sense experience.
For Kant, although the notion of an Ideal being—God—falls outside the purview of pure reason,
such an idea, nonetheless, because of its moral value is indispensable and inescapable. 154
Borrowing from Kant, therefore, Panikkar develops an epistemological ground for his
philosophy and theology that is anchored on the experiencing of God in the concreteness of
reality. The intention is to conceive a God that is intrinsically connected to the human and
cosmic dimension of reality.
In Panikkar’s estimation, Kant’s critique of the impossibility of making synthetic a priori
propositions about self, cosmos and God makes sense within the dualistic context of Western
hermeneutics. At the heart of Panikkar’s advaitic philosophical tradition is the outright rejection
of the Enlightenment and the Kantian dichotomy between the knowledge of things that are—
phenomena—and that of things themselves—noumenal—not observable by sense perception.
Through the mythical experience of reality, Panikkar bridges the phenomenal and noumenal
perspective of experience in such a way that the absolute God—though transcendent—is
experienced in the concreteness of the self and the cosmos.
This experience embodies the cosmotheandric vision of reality in which God becomes
properly immersed/incarnated in human experience. The harmonious balance among the three
dimensions of the cosmotheandric principle is maintained through authentic “individuality,
irreducibility, and reciprocity,” shared by all. Thus, the cosmotheandric experience initiates the
non-dualistic hermeneutics that saturates the logical, scientific, or historical decoding of Western
dualism. According to Panikkar,
The cosmotheandric principle could be stated differently, namely, that the divine,
the human and the earthly—however we may prefer to call them—are the three
154
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irreducible dimensions which constitute the real, i.e., any reality inasmuch as it is
real…What this intuition emphasizes is that the three dimensions of reality are
neither three modes of a monolithic undifferentiated reality, nor are they three
elements of a pluralistic system. There is rather one, though intrinsically
threefold, relation which expresses the ultimate constitution of reality. Everything
that exists, any real being, presents this triune constitution expressed in three
dimensions. I am not only saying that everything is directly or indirectly related to
everything else: the radical relativity or pratitya-samutpada of the Buddhist
tradition. I am also stressing that this relationship is not only constitutive of the
whole, but that it flashes forth, ever new and vital, in every spark of the real.155
3.4.2. Panikkar and John Hick
John Hick endorses the major point of consideration in Panikkar’s critique of the Western
hermeneutics. Both share in the recognition that the problems of mediation are irresolvable
within a metaphysics that arrogates universal applicability to categories and properties that have
no foundation in history.156 Hick attempted an alternative ideology by restating a neo-Kantian
distinction between the “Real” as it is known in itself, the noumenal, and the real that is known
by its manifestations—the phenomenal. The reduction of metaphysics to mere calculus—
deduction and induction—led Kant to a fundamental way of mediated epistemological claims
between critical empiricism and rationalism.
In what is vigorously described as the Copernican revolution in Kant’s epistemology,
Kant argues that for reality to be, it must conform to the mind. In such a way, the world/sense
perception conforms to the mind as it restructures the categories received from sense
perception.157 In this regard, the mind becomes the mediating principle towards certainty—Real
is then an isolated use of sensory perception. This shift in Kantian epistemology signals the
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intention to bridge the transcendental and factual “Real,” necessitating the philosophical task of
reconciling Empiricism with Rationalism.158
The use of Kant’s critique of metaphysical knowledge through pure reason led to the
pluralistic trend in Hick’s philosophy of religions. Hick, for one, makes the argument that “what
the traditions regard severally as ultimates are different and therefore cannot all be truly
ultimate... [for] there cannot be a plurality of ultimates.”159 Reviewing the observable facts of
experience—of the plurality of religions—Hick seeks to clarify: “How can we understand the
situation of a plurality of great religious traditions that conceive and experience the Ultimate, the
Real, in such different ways with such different and incompatible belief systems, but which
nevertheless seem to be more or less equally effective context of human salvation/liberation?”160
Hick’s query in a sense calls into question the traditional claim of Christian uniqueness.161
Hick’s emergent image of the “Real” is not totally Kantian. In the body of his
argumentation on pluralism as a philosophical explanation of religious phenomena, Hick quotes
Thomas Aquinas—“Things known are in the knower according to the mode of the knower,”162—
to underscore the critical mindset of realist epistemology: namely that, the mind is not a tabula
Kant arising from his “dogmatic slumber” intends to merge the Empiricism of Francis Bacon, Thomas
Hobbes, John Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume, with the Rationalism of Rene Descartes, Baruch Spinoza,
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priori judgments based on reason and the a posteriori based on experience. Next he distinguished between analytic
judgments (predicates contained in subject, drawn from the principle of non-contradiction e.g. all bachelors are
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analytic a priori; d). synthetic a priori. Kant argues that while, all analytic and synthetic a posteriori judgments are
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possible. However, synthetic a prior judgment are possible because they lay foundation for Mathematics and natural
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rasa in the process of knowing. Thus combining Aquinas and Kant, Hick presents his thesis for
the reason for plurality, difference, and relationality among religions.
To apply Aquinas’ insight, the ultimate Reality is known in accordance with the
cognitive mode/nature/state of the knower; and this varies, in the case of religious
awareness, from one religio-cultutral totality to another. If, then, we distinguish
between the Real/Ultimate/Divine in itself and that Reality as humanly perceived,
recognizing that there is a range of modes of human cognition, we can at once see
how there is a plurality of religious traditions constituting different, but apparently
more or less equally salvific, human responses to the Ultimate. These are the great
world faiths.163
Furthermore, Hick provides a theological backing for Kant’s category of the Real—
known in itself—noumenal. Thus, by aligning himself to the classical apophatic theological
traditions, 164 Hick interprets the Kantian in itself—noumenal, alongside the hermeneutical
variables of the Unknown God of negative theology. Since the noumenal is known only in itself,
no concept can be applied to the noumenal Real.165 That is to say, the real ansinh cannot be
spoken about in human terms. 166 As such, then, our language can have no purchase on the
postulated noumenal, the Real. 167 Hick stylistically introduced the concept of ineffability by
referencing Gregory of Nyssa and Nicholas of Cusa to make this connection.
Gregory: The simplicity of the True Faith assumes God to be that which He is,
namely, incapable of being grasp by any term, or any idea, or any other device of
our apprehension, remaining beyond the reach not only of human but of angelic
and all supramundane intelligence, unthinkable, unutterable, above all expression
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in words, having but one name that can represent His proper nature, the single
name being “Above Every Name.”
Nicholas: As creator, God is three and one; as infinite, he is neither three nor one
nor any of the things which can be spoken. For the names which are attributed to
God are taken from creatures, since he is himself is ineffable and beyond
everything that can be named or spoken.”168
Hick’s encounter with the relativistic position of Troeltsch, “the father of historical
relativism,” shaped his view about the Real referent of the Absolute and its manifestation in the
respective historical contexts. Accordingly, the Absolute is present to and manifest in history,
yet, no historical manifestation of the Absolute can be regarded as the Absolute. Christianity is
absolute for Christians, and other world faiths are likewise absolute for their own adherents.
Christianity, then, must be viewed as “a purely historical, individualized, relative
phenomenon.”
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Thus, endorsing Troeltsch’s historical relativism, Hick develops two

fundamental thought patterns that run through his entire philosophy of religion. These are the
need for Christianity to cross the Rubicon of Christo-centrism and move toward a Theo-centric
view of reality and the view that Christ’s incarnation into history can at best be understood at the
mythological level.170
Right from the dawn of his theological endeavor, although Hick aligns himself to the
apophatic traditions of the great Christian mystics, he still maintains an extremely exclusivist
Christological commitment that leans strongly towards fulfillment theology. He admits, “I shared
the general Christian assumption that it was God’s will that the whole world be evangelized and
168
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that humanity was in fact slowly but surely becoming Christian.”171 Hick’s pluralism and interest
in world religions was transformed by the Birmingham experience of collaboration with
Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Sikhs, Marxists, humanists and other Christian denominations. At the
heart of these religions is the claim of an absolute, which is the ultimate source and fountain of
the beliefs’ systems and practices. From a theistic perspective, Hick raises the question of the
possibility of singular or similar religious experience.
God is known in the synagogues as Adonai, the Lord of Abraham, Isaac, and
Jacob; in the Mosque as Allah rahman rahim, God beneficent and merciful; in the
Sikh guru gwaras as God, who is Father, Lover, Master, and the Great Giver,
referred to as war guru; and in the Hindus temples Vishnu, Krishna (an incarnate
of Vishnu), Rama, Shiva, and many other gods and goddesses, all of whom,
however, are seen as manifestations of the ultimate reality of Brahman; and in the
Christian churches as the triune God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. And yet all
these communities agree that there can ultimately only be one God.172
Hick concludes by evoking the Kantian postulated category of the “Real” and the
structure of religious consciousness.
If there is indeed only one God, maker of heaven and earth, two obvious
possibilities presents themselves. One is that God as known within one particular
religion, namely one’s own, is the real God and that all the others are unreal. The
other is that God as known to Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and
others represent different manifestations in relation to humanity, different “faces”
or “masks” or personae of God, the Ultimate Reality. But there is also a third,
intermediate position, adopted today by the majority of mainline theologians, that
God as known in Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Sikhism are partial or distorted
glimpses of the real God, who is fully known within Christianity.173
Hick adopted a methodology borrowed from Kant that rejects in totality all a priori
propositions of the Ultimate Real that have no basis in reality—as lived experience. Thus
through encountering non-Christian religions, Hick draws from a wide range of practical
postulations from adherents and concludes, for both the moral and salvation point of view, “that
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one cannot establish the unique moral superiority of any of the great world religions…It
therefore seems logical to me to conclude that not only Christianity, but also these other world
faiths, are human responses to the Ultimate.174
On the philosophical level, Hick and Panikkar maintained a certain level of metaphysical
commitment in their critique of Christian uniqueness and absolutism. Whereas the former deals
with the problem of plurality from the ambience of Western theism, the latter applies the
knowledge of Western metaphysics as a prelude to advaitic philosophy. Nevertheless, both
thinkers uphold the position that the experience of plurality is not regulated by dialectical apriori
postulations but rather by observable a posteriori verities. Trends in the stark reality of plurality
are numerous in writings that point to the undeniable de facto existence of non-Christian
religions.
From the perspective of the philosophy of religions, Panikkar and Hick concur—one
from monotheistic and the other from advaitic perspectives—that non-Christian religions possess
an intrinsic religious value that regulates the moral and leads to salvation/liberation. Finally,
from their personal religious experience, Panikkar and Hick share a similar lived experience and
a taste of religious exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. Both, in their own peculiar way,
were against the intellectual tradition of their era—in this instance, the rejection of Orthodox
fulfillment theology.
In spite of the above similarities, Panikkar’s pluralism distinctively differs from that of
Hick. At the heart of this distinction is the issue of context and worldview. While it is true that
pluralism has become a universal problem, it is equally evident that it has no univocal solution
that is applicable for all peoples, places, times and context. Bearing this in mind, Panikkar’s
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pluralism developed from a worldview of non-dualism, where the Ultimate Real is neither the
“One or the Many.”
Though neither Hick nor the entire Enlightenment philosophical tradition he represents
solve the enigmatic philosophical issue of the “One and the Many,” Panikkar’s advocacy for a
relational ontology stems from his cosmotheandric vision of reality. Through the inner structural
principles of the cosmovison—irreducibility, reciprocity, and individuality, Panikkar addresses
the problem of mediation by offering an alternative to Western dualism that is rooted in the
mythical and symbolic perspectives. From the standpoint of cosmotheandrism, therefore,
Panikkar punctures the central claims of Hick’s pluralism, characterizing them as having “a
claim to objectivity, a reduction of actual difference, and a marginalization of religious
perspectives.”175
The summary of this long historical excursus is that an exclusive absolute claim by
Christianity to the truth and means of salvation could be a huge hindrance for interreligious
dialogue. In John Hick’s opinion, “Christian absolutism, in collaboration with acquisitive and
violent human nature, has done much to poison the relationship between the Christian minority
and non-Christian majority of our world’s population by sanctifying exploitation and oppression
on a gigantic scale.”176
3.4.3. Panikkar, Paul F. Knitter and S. Mark Heim
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Hick, “The Non-Absoluteness of Christianity,” 17. This book contains a series of essays that sets to
debunk the traditional Christian attitudes of exclusivism and inclusivism. In general, these essays refute
Christianity’s claim as the only way to truth and salvation and also the notion that Christianity is the most
“authentic,” and thus “normative,” religion. The authors agreed that the exclusivist and inclusivist model of
interreligious dialogue can no longer stand the pluralistic trend and quest of the postmodern era. For this reason, the
essays each in their different ways endorse religious pluralism as the hermeneutical key to understanding
interreligious dialogue.
175
176

191

In recent studies, John Hick and Paul F. Knitter together have characterized the face of
the debate on religious pluralism. The mutual collaboration of Hick and Knitter as editors in their
work The Myth of Christian Uniqueness 177 testifies to their hold on the scholarship for this
matter. The book was intended to raise the fundamental question about the nature and purpose of
Christ’s uniqueness and the practicality of such uniqueness in light of religious plurality. The
publication galvanizes critics and sympathizers from both the philosophy of religion and the
theology of religion.
At the initial stage of his pluralism, Knitter answered uncritically Hick’s call of crossing
the Rubicon of theological exclusivism and inclusivism to the shores of pluralism. This crossover entails Knitter’s advocating “a new model of truth”—pluralism—which moves away from
the insistence of the “finality of Christ,” recognizing many other “teachers,” “liberators,” and
“Saviors” with Jesus and “many other religious paths with Christianity.” 178 Even the title of
Knitter’s fullest articulation of this idea—Towards a Liberation Theology of Religions—is
suggestive. It points to the general purpose of the publication, which is to liberate Christian
theology as a whole from the shackles of an Orthodox/traditional theology of religions—the
general attitude of armchair theologizing about other religions from the comfort zone of the
Christian traditions. According to Knitter, this tradition is constituted by a “cliquish monologue
of First World white males who have been patriarchs of interreligious dialogue.”179
The following five theses encapsulate Knitter’s initial stance on pluralism.
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1) Given the nature and history of Christology, previous understandings of the
uniqueness of Jesus can be reinterpreted.2) Given the ethical imperative of
dialogue, previous understandings of the uniqueness of Jesus must be
reinterpreted. 3) The uniqueness of Jesus’ salvific role can be reinterpreted in
terms of “truly” but not “only.” 4) The content of Jesus’ uniqueness must be made
clear in Christian life and witness. This content, however, will be understood and
proclaimed differently in different contexts and periods of history. Today, the
uniqueness of Jesus can be found in his insistence that salvation or the Reign of
God must be realized in this world through human actions of love and justice.
5) The orthodoxy of this pluralistic reinterpretation of the uniqueness of Jesus
must be grounded primarily in the ability of such a reinterpretation to nurture a
holistic Christian spirituality that is, a devotion to and a following of Jesus. The
proposed understanding of Jesus as God’s truly but not only saving word does
meet this criterion.180
As suggested by Peter De Mey, a candid analysis of Knitter’s initial stance on religious
pluralism outside the entire framework of his appropriation of Ernst Troeltsch’s
Religionsgeschichte is both uncritical and non-contextual. 181 Troeltsch’s work on the critical
historical studies, as articulated mainly in his essays,182 is foundational for appreciating Knitter’s
view on Christianity as one among the historical religions of the world. On account of historical
limitations, Knitter contends that Christianity as one of the religions in the world must submit to
the critical historical method of studies that is applicable to other religious traditions.
The historical preoccupation of Knitter’s hermeneutics led to the pronouncement of his
first thesis about the need to reinterpret Christianity’s uniqueness. Strict applications of
Troeltsch’s view on historical reality led Knitter to assert “the possibility that other religions may
be ways of salvation just as much as is Christianity.”183 Knitter’s call for the reinterpretation of
Christian absoluteness is based on the historical fact: namely, that there was a time in history
when Christianity did not exist.
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Consequently, and in accordance with the methodologies of the Religionsgeschichte, such
an absolute claim from a religion that once upon a time did not exist, needs critical scrutiny. In
this sense, Knitter submits that “in so far as every existing reality is historical, it is limited”; thus,
he reasons, Christianity as part of the religious consciousness is, by the same standard, limited.
Thus as a limited entity within the larger historical framework, the claim to absoluteness and
uniqueness can only be demonstrated by a posteriori postulations that must consider not only the
de facto but also the de jure of the existence of other religions. Knitter proposed an identity for
Christianity based on its distinctiveness among other religions:
In the view of Jesus’ uniqueness we have been discussing, he has to stand with
others. We’ve been talking about a relational uniqueness, not a solitary
uniqueness that pushes others out of the picture. To affirm Jesus as truly God's
Word is to award him a distinctiveness that is his own; to add that he is not solely
God’s Word is also to see that distinctiveness as one that has to be brought into
relationship with other possible Words. Jesus is a Word that can be understood
only in conversation with other Words.184
Therefore, as a limited entity, Knitter insists, Christianity has no monopoly of religious
truth as a limited religion, an assertion that led to his affirmation of “the plurality of religious
truth.185 As a result of the reality of the plurality of religious truth, Knitter contends the need of a
“dialogical imperative” among religions. This, accordingly will assure that “we expand or correct
the truth that we have,” and move religions beyond the “limitations of our own viewpoint.”186
In this dissertation we will limit our discussion to three issues emerging from Knitter’s
critique of Christian uniqueness: 1) an exclusive biblical statement; 2) the necessity of
correlative dialogue; and 3) Jesus as both Savior and divine.
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In sharp contrast to the inclusivist exegetical tradition, Knitter calls for a new way of
reading the “One and Only” statement about Jesus Christ as it relates to Jesus as Savior and Son
of God, the reign of God, missions, and the Spirit.187 Under the influence of the historical-critical
approach to the scriptures, Knitter draws insight from the conclusions derived from literary
criticism to argue that the “One and Only” texts in scriptural must be read in the “Con-Text” in
which they evolve. Knitter suggests reading these statements from the purview of the
“hermeneutics of discipleship,” rather than from a distinctive definitive philosophical
definition.188 On a cautionary note, Knitter advocates for a careful reading of Christianity’s “No
other Name” exclusivist mantra as it relates to the uniqueness and absoluteness of Jesus Christ:
“No other name” as performative, action language, is really a positive statement
in its negative couching; it tells us that all peoples must listen to this Jesus; it does
not tell us that no one else should be listened to or learned from. The stress, then,
is on the saving power mediated by the name of Jesus, not on the exclusivity of
the name: If in our dialogue we find that this power of liberation is experienced
through other names then the spirit of this passage in Acts would call us to be
open to them.189
Furthermore, an approach to Christianity from the purview of Religionsgeschichte puts
Christianity in a necessary and unavoidable relation with the other religions. This relationship is
not regulated by dogmatic formulations or a priori postulations. For Knitter, Christianity is
intrinsically bound by the historical fact of its co-existence with other religions. This existence of
other religions prior to Christianity is a prima facie condition for what Knitter refers to as
correlative dialogue:
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A correlational model for interfaith dialogue calls upon all to view and approach
other religious believers in such a way that an authentic co-relation can exist
among them. The goal is to maintain real relationship, to do all one can to keep
from cutting off the relationship or maintaining it by subordinating one participant
to another. This means that while I will speak my convictions and my mind
clearly and strongly, I will do so in such a way that allows you to do the same.
This reflects…making absolute claims in a relative manner. In such a
correlational model, all religions are viewed from the beginning of the
conversation, not as necessarily being equal or the same in their truth claims
(whether that is so can be known only in dialogue) but as having equal rights.
Thus if I feel impelled to make normative or absolute truth claims in the
conversation, I will do so in a way that still recognizes and allows for my partner
to do likewise. This means that I am open to the possibility that my normative
claim may be corrected or “normed” by what my partner has to say. So even
though…we don’t begin a correlational dialogue with pre-established claims of
“superiority,” through the dialogue participants may come to the conclusion that a
particular Christian truth claim is superior to a Hindu claim - or vice versa.190
Knitter differentiates between the dialogue that arises from an understanding of
Christianity in mutual existence with other religions and one that exists within the exclusive and
inclusive context. Mission, proclamation, and evangelization are ad gentes within the inclusivism
model, whereas under the correlational model, mission, proclamation, and evangelization are
cum gentibus.191 Under the latter, evangelization is one-dimensional, whereas in the correlational
model, Knitter argues for the possibility of the Christian being evangelized. He says, “In calling
upon Christians to evangelize in the dialogue, I am also calling upon them to be evangelized. If
there is a hidden inclusivism in what I am proposing, it cuts both ways…. This, I think, is a
determining difference between a correlational and an inclusivist model for dialogue; the
traditional inclusivist would find it difficult to allow for this effect.”192
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Finally, in an attempt to explain the Christian concept of Jesus as Son and Divine, Knitter
adjusts his view of the Chalcedonean formulation of traditional Christology. The problem for
Knitter is not the doctrinal conceptualization of creedal formulations. It is not whether Jesus is
human or Divine—but how? How precisely can the union be explained using a posteriori
experiential logic that accounts for the other religions? For Knitter, a representational
Christology answers this question. “Jesus’ life-death-resurrection saves, not by constituting or
causing God’s saving love, but rather, insofar as he re-presents for us the re-creative love of God
that is inherent in the divine nature and is poured out on all creation.” 193 While upholding
Chalcedon on Jesus’ divinity, Knitter advocates for a representational concept of the uniqueness
of Christ that “is open to the possibilities of other representations or revelations of the love of
God.”194 Here, Knitter detects a fundamental difference between traditional portrayals of Jesus
and the representational perspectives that have been offered.
When Christians announce Jesus as divine they are attempting to articulate two
realities, one functional and the other ontological: (a) Functionally or personally,
Jesus is for them the perfect sacrament of God—to meet Jesus is to meet the
Divine; in the way he mediates God to them, he is God for them. (b)
Ontologically in order to explain the way Jesus functions as such a sacrament, he
must have been, and must be, “oned” with God in a manner beyond full human
comprehension, his very being must participate in the being of God. If such an
understanding of Jesus’ divinity…is valid, then I believe it allows for the
possibility that what happened in Jesus in order to enable him to function the way
he did (as God’s sacrament) can happen, analogously in other, very different
instances or persons.195
Knitter’s Christology, in some ways, is identical to Hick’s historical consciousness of
Jesus. Hick proposes a rethinking for Christian Christology—the doctrine of the Incarnation and
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the Divinity of Jesus—in line with the historical “Copernican Revolution.” 196 Although the
Second Council of Constantinople (AD 553) declares Jesus is the second person of the Trinity, in
proposing a linguistic identification between God and Jesus—to say of God whatever can be said
of Jesus—the council’s language lacks the theological precision required for current debate. The
debate over the identification of the second person of the Trinity with Jesus in traditional
theology was defended by orthodoxy in spite of historical inconsistency and rational illogicality.
Knitter capitalizes on the lacuna evident in the traditional understanding of the immanent Trinity
vis-à-vis the economic Trinity and proposes that “the second person of the Trinity is not
identified with the person of Jesus, in which case that Person or the Word of God is free to
operate and take seminal form elsewhere.”197
The litmus test for the depth of Knitter’s religious pluralism came first from Hick’s
criticism that points to the ambiguity in Knitter’s fourth thesis: “The content of Jesus’ uniqueness
must be made clear in Christian life and witness.” According Hick, the ambiguity of this thesis
lies in the fact that beneath Knitter’s supposed pluralism is a niche for religious commitment, and
such a disposition is “capable of being understood in both pluralist and inclusivist ways.”198 On
account of this loose proposition about the possibility of a Christian commitment that guarantees
Christianity’s uniqueness, Hick refutes the authenticity of Knitter’s pluralistic claims.
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Hick’s critique of Knitter’s shallow perspective on pluralism leads to the critical analysis
in Heim’s Christian theology of religious ends, Knitter’s pluralism having become the target of
both Hick’s and Heim’s criticism. Basically, in Hick’s judgment, Knitter’s disposition towards
the possibility of religious commitment to the claims of pluralism is at best a betrayal of the
central tenets of pluralism. On the other hand, Heim expresses his displeasure of Knitter’s
position, describing it still as ambitious without specifics about the necessity of religious
commitment as the starting point of interreligious dialogue.
Heim addresses the fundamental issue at the center of interreligious dialogue, namely the
problem of salvation or religious ends. He concretely affirms the conditions and grounds of
possibility for a Christian theology for such religious ends. Heim endorses a Christian theology
of interreligious dialogue that is grounded in the triune God as communion. The Trinitarian
concept of distinctiveness and relationality gives meaning to and creates added value for the
various religious ends sought by other religious traditions. The Christian Trinitarian economy
provides enough resources for thinking about difference, otherness, and the particularities of
other religious traditions.199
Heim enters the conversation with a fundamental question that will guide his entire work:
namely, “Can religions recognize other ways to religious fulfillment than their own, and if so,
how?” In this wise, Heim argues that the theological resources mustered over the ages to address
this problem have been dangerously one-sided, tending either towards “exclusivist, inclusivist
and pluralist—presuming there is and could be only one religious fulfillment or ‘salvation.’”200
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Knitter’s proposal that “one sublets the Christocentric approach to other believers with a
theocentric one”201 has not been well received from scholars of the inclusivist school. Knitter
puts forward a theology of God that is both a mystery and surpasses Christocentric claims.
Knitter argues,
As the Divine Mystery we know in Jesus and call theos or God, is greater than
Jesus, we have to be open to the possibility that other religions may have their
own valid views of and responses to this mystery. Other faiths would not have to
be unilaterally “included” in Christianity; rather all faiths need to be included in
each other as all of them continue their efforts to be faithful to the inexhaustible
Mystery or Truth.202
According to Heim, Knitter’s theocentricism is anchorless and lacks the norm for
creating communities and belief practices. To put it simply, theocentricism without an authentic
faith community is problematic in that it “amounts to playing a game without rules.”203 In other
words, an unmediated theocentricism is tantamount to a flatus vocis—“empty” and “naked.” As
Heim states in his work, “To say you want God to be at the center, or that you want to know and
follow God, does not take you very far unless you have some definitive way of locating or
describing this God.”204 As Carl Breaten observes, “Christocentrism is simply the Christian part
of being theocentric.”205 Thus, without Christ, theocentrism has a baseless claim with lesser or
no salvific significance.
According Heim, a theocentric foundational claim for dialogue as proposed by Knitter
forces other religions to accept the theistic worldview implicit within the theocentric
perspectives. Such a view sounds cryptic and imperialistic. Thus for Heim, the search for a
201
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“common ground or goal” for all religious ends, will lead to “theocentric fundamentalism.”206
Heim argues for an inclusivism that maintains the essence of Christian particularity while still
affirming—though partially—the salvific authenticity of the other religions:
I am a convinced inclusivist.... This book affirms the legitimacy of the Christian
confession of Christ as the one decisive savior of the world. But it does so by
means that will no doubt seem unusual and perhaps paradoxical to many
Christians: Affirming that other religious traditions truthfully hold our religious
ends which their adherents might realize as alternatives to communion with God
in Christ. These are not salvation, the end Christians long for. But they are
real.207
In an attempt to differentiate between the theocentric views of Knitter that support a
common religious end for all religions and his inclusivist Christocentric visions, Heim
differentiates between the terms “salvation” and “religious ends”:
I will use salvation to refer to the human fulfillment that Christians believe is
offered to us by God through Christ. This is the characteristic use of the word in
Christian theology. It is rarely used in other religious traditions to describe their
ends. When speaking of those ends, or sometimes when speaking collectively or
comparatively of the Christian end and others, I will use terms like, “religious
aim” or “religious fulfillment” or “religious end.208
The distinction above clearly identifies Heim’s central proposal, which is a total rejection
of exclusivism and the acceptance of some form of inclusivism that seriously emphasizes the
centrality, uniqueness and distinctiveness of the salvation offered by Christianity. In the context
of the Christian salvation as envisaged by Heim, God is fully presented in its Triune nature—a
dimension that is intrinsically absent in the non-Christian religion. “For each of these ends, some
dimension or dimensions of God remain hidden. In those aspects, relation with God remains
broken and sin thus remains determinative.”209
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In response to Heim’s criticism, Knitter appealed to the two sources of his theological
revelation: namely human experience and the Christian fact—“our own lives in this world and
the person and message of Jesus Christ.”210 Knitter agrees with Heim on the normativity of Jesus
Christ, but argues further that the norms derived from the ‘Jesus encounter’ must be based on
human experience—that is, a posteriori postulations that do not belong to Christians alone.
As a result, Knitter’s question for Heim is appropriate in this context: “Just why does
Heim…proclaim Jesus as God’s normative revelation? Certainly, it is not simply because ‘the
Bible tells me so.’ Jesus Christ is their normative revelation because he so speaks to their lives,
to their human experience.”211 While re-emphasizing the central role of Jesus Christ as the norm
and center of the Christian faith, Knitter continues to uphold the theocentric foundations of his
pluralism but in a new light. To quote: “With theocentricism, however, I hoped to propose a
theological vision of nonfoundationalism; theocentricism poses the sobering possibility that there
are no final, absolute norms—that all norms are open to the challenge and ongoing scrutiny of
experience.212
In the wake of the criticism from exclusivist and inclusivist theologians, Knitter decided
to re-consider his theocentric theological presupposition to include issues of ethics and
liberational concerns of suffering. To quote: “Today, instead of starting as I did in No Other
Name? that dialogue must be ‘grounded in the hypothesis of a common ground and goal for all
religions,’ I would rather say that it must be ‘grounded in the common trust in and search for that
which makes dialogue possible and worthwhile.’”213 This new position leaves Knitter vulnerable
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to the multiple interpretations that can be derived from such an open-ended statement by both
moderate inclusivists and exclusivists, on the one hand, and to distancing by pluralists, on the
other hand, who consider Knitter’s revision as a capitulation.
On the whole, Knitter maintains the central tenets of his theocentricism—redefining it
anew in the context of the criticisms. He insists, “I was already aware of the dangers inherent in
theocentrism. In holding up theos as the new center for interreligious dialogue, I did not have in
mind the ‘God of theism’—not the well-defined personal creator, or ipsum esse subsistens, but
rather the Divine Mystery or Truth…seen in certain ways by Christians, yet open to utterly
different perceptions by others.”214 Thus, in the general framework, Knitter never gives up the
claim of Christianity’s uniqueness; rather, his question is whether Christian Christocentrism
exhausts the Divine Mystery?
Panikkar’s pluralism shares both a fundamental resemblance with Knitter’s and much
difference from Heim’s. Reading the philosophical, scriptural, and theological foundations of
Panikkar alongside Knitter and Heim reveals some similarities though some essential
differences. The fundamental difference, to begin with, is the issue of cultural variations.
Whereas Panikkar operates from the Asian/Indian cultural worldview with non-daulistic
presuppositions, Knitter and Heim function within the Western context of monotheistic
traditions.
In all, the trio acknowledges the ineffectiveness that characterizes Christological
exclusivism as a method for addressing Christianity’s uniqueness in a pluralistic context. Heim’s
Trinitarian theology of salvation as the basis for interreligious dialogue, although parallel in
objective, is similar to Panikkar’s understanding of the Trinity. Methodologically, both Heim and
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Panikkar share a common idea about relationality, individuality, and difference. Heim maintains
that a solution can be found within Christianity. For Knitter, however, theocentric commitment
among God’s people is not antithetical to Christianity’s uniqueness and Christian identity,
whereas in Panikkar’s view, the concept of uniqueness is contradictory to any claim of
universality.215 Panikkar elaborates further:
We face a dilemma. Either we defend the universality of Christ above, behind, or
through all cultures, or we bestow universal and absolute value to one single
culture or group of cultures, namely, that doctrinal world for which the statement
makes sense. In the first case we should fall into utter silence and cannot speak of
uniqueness, because the moment we utter a word we do it within a particular
culture. A Kenotic Christ is neither unique nor not unique, because “it” does not
admit any qualification. In the second case the uniqueness has been transferred to
an entire cultural set. And this, in fact, was a common belief during many
centuries. It is the very nature of colonialism: Cultural monism. Indeed, we may
find a transcendental relationship between what Christians call Christ and what
other cultures and religions may express with a set of homeomorphic equivalents.
But in this case the uniqueness of Christ has been relativized and brought into the
field where it has an accepted meaning. Christ is then the logotype, as it were, of
the Christian language. May I recall that the relativity I am espousing has nothing
to do with relativisim?216
3.5. Panikkar, Peter Phan, Jacques Dupuis, and Logos Theology
Panikkar’s approach to naming the reality of God from a cultural standpoint differs
considerably from that of Kant, Hick, Knitter, and Heim. Unlike the Western scholars listed,
Panikkar shares a similar worldview with Jacque Dupuis and Peter Phan. Thus, conducting an indepth case study of religious pluralism in India in particular, and the entire Asian continent in
general, draws the attention of this study to new perspectives developed by Dupuis and Phan.
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The new attitude towards the other and the world, especially as initiated by the
sacramentology of Karl Rahner,217 who was later followed by Dupuis and Phan, centers on a new
resolve to see goodness and grace in the world—hitherto mundane reality. With the searchlight
of grace turned on the World, the peoples, religions, and cultures of the world begin to be viewed
anew within the context. This new context, as Dupuis will argue, demands new hermeneutics
that promote “dialogical openness and mutual enrichment through conversation.”218
Dupuis’ theology of religious pluralism drastically moves away from the Church’s fuga
mundi approach, which emphasizes the impossibility of “salvation outside the Church,” to more
relational hermeneutics that “search more deeply, in the light of Christian faith, for the meaning
in God’s design for humankind of the plurality of living faiths and religious traditions with
which we are surrounded.”219 This perspective was championed by the statement published by
the Thirteenth Annual Meeting (December 1989) of the Indian Theological Association, entitled
Towards an Indian Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism: Our Ongoing Search:
We want to express what the plurality of the religions we meet every day of our
lives in India means to us as believers, as people who experience themselves as
touched and strengthened by the ineffable mystery of existence. As we perceive
the signs of the Absolute Presence also in the lives of our sisters and brothers
around us professing various religions, we ask in the light of the Divine Truth
revealing itself what we shall affirm about these religions, and how we (should)
understand the purpose and meaning of their wonderful religious variety around
us and its role and function in attainment of salvation....As Christians, we
approach these questions from our faith.220
It was the context and experiences of the diversity and plurality faced by Indian
Christians that led Dupuis to the position revealed in his Toward a Christian Theology of
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Religious Pluralism, which offers a theological response to the problem of Christianity’s
uniqueness, identity and religious pluralism. He contends that deep within Christian theology,
there are resources to construct a robust theology of religious pluralism that creates room for
other salvific figures within the divine plan of salvation. With this in mind, Dupuis, in the first
part of the book, affirms the traditional theology of the dejure salvific role of Jesus Christ: his
universality and uniqueness. However, he further maintains that the particularity of the Christevent in Nazareth does not empty the divine will to save through figures and traditions found
outside of Christianity. This opportunity of salvation is not outside the economy of the Holy
Spirit.
Relying on the Kantian tradition—the grounding of knowledge on a posteriori reality, on
the one hand, and Rahner’s radical embrace of the world, on the other, Dupuis expands a
theology of pluralism that takes into account the historical consciousness of the non-Christians.
The epistemological presuppositions are that a priori and dialectical hermeneutics principles
negate genuine efforts towards interreligious dialogue. Like the dogmatic methodology of doing
theology, “the more deductions are drawn from abstract principles, the more real is the risk of
being cut off from reality.”221 Gerard Hall describes Dupuis’s methodology as follows:
Dupuis proposes an inductive, contextual and hermeneutic theology. He speaks
not of the “hermeneutical circle” but the “hermeneutical triangle” consisting of
the mutual interaction between text, context and interpreter. These are interpreted
broadly: text includes everything contained in “Christian memory”; context is
both a concrete place and time in human history and its theoretical complexities;
the interpreter is less the individual theologian than the community of faith to
which the theologian belongs. Dupuis is, then, indebted to the hermeneutical
theology of mutual and critical correlation, as well as to the Anselmian insistence
that theology arises from Christian faith.222
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The application of Dupuis’ pluralism has an adverse effect on traditional theology. The
issues involved have a range of implications for Jesus’ relationship to the God, the Son, and the
Spirit. The first part of Dupuis’ work demonstrates a firm understanding of the Church’s
dogmatic theology. Dupuis wrestles with the Church’s methodological posture in fulfillment
theology, which insists that the other religious traditions exist “only in a secondary and
provisional sense.”223
It is all but immediately evident that “fulfillment theology” empowers the theological
vision of Christology that is deeply rooted in the narrative of the uniqueness and the universality
of Jesus Christ. Consequently, a rejection of “fulfillment theology” has a domino effect on the
other articles of faith that so rest upon that foundation. Dupuis’ search for the replacement of
fulfillment theology led to an overhaul of the traditional understanding of a low Christology that
reduces the role of Christ, putting Christ on a par with the parochial salvific figures in other
religious traditions. Against this claim, Dupuis makes the argument that though Christ is the
local savior of Christians, He is the universal Savior of the world. To quote Dupuis: “Faith in
Jesus Christ does not merely consist in trusting that he is ‘for me’ [for us] the path to salvation; it
means to believe that the world and humankind find salvation in and through him.”224
The embrace of a radical historical consciousness of reality forces Dupuis to address the
issue of the historical Jesus as defined and upheld since Chalcedon (AD 451) and Constantinople
(AD 513) declared Jesus Christ to be “true God and true Man.” The apparent theological
inconsistency concerning the classical application of “true God and true Man,” vis-à-vis the

Dupuis though indebted to Rahner in many ways, rejects Rahner’s adoption of fulfillment theology. See
Karl Rahner, “Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions,” in Theological Investigations 5 (London: Darton,
Longman & Todd, 1966), 115-134. Dupuis fingered, Jean Danielou, Henri de Lubac and Hans Urs von Balthasaar as
equally product of the “fulfillment theory.” Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 130-57.
224
Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 293ff.
223

207

biblical representation of God as fully in Christ (cf. Col 2:9: “For in him the whole fullness of
deity dwells bodily),” led Dupuis to analyze fully the particularity of Jesus of Nazareth.
Therefore, as fully Man, Dupuis presents a picture of Jesus of Nazareth that is limited by the
historical consciousness of being fully human. The immersing of Jesus Christ into history is real.
Hall puts it even more clearly:
Neither the mystery of God nor God’s saving power can be exhausted by even
such a sublime revelation as the Christ-event. This means that, while Jesus Christ
is “the universal sacrament of God’s saving action,” he is not thereby the only
expression of the divine will to save. Making it clear that the mystery of the
incarnation is unique in Jesus, there is room for “other saving figures” to be
enlightened by the Word and inspired by the Holy Spirit.225
Despite Dupuis’ sincere attempt to give a credible orthodox account of the problem of
religious pluralism, his early work Towards a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism was
cited for notable theological ambiguities by the Roman Curia. Cardinal Ratzinger maintains that
the pluralistic twist evidenced in Dupuis’ work contradicts Christian tradition. In response, while
Dupuis admitted that his position was slightly different from that of Ratzinger, he maintained
that it is not altogether foreign to the Christian faith. Relying on the rich Pneumatological
Christian tradition, Dupuis develops a theology that moves beyond the typology of exclusivism,
inclusivism, and pluralism. By so doing, Dupuis deflates the exclusivist and inclusivist claims
that Christianity cannot learn truth and grace from other religions and somehow refutes the
pluralist position of other parallel salvific figures besides Christ.226
In light of the current debate, Peter Phan’s contribution, which is based on the patristic
logos-theology of the logos asarkos (unincarnated) adds a new vista to the debate. For Phan,
Panikkar’s question about the methodological presuppositions of Western hermeneutics stands at
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the beginning of any genuine intercultural studies: “Does one need to be spiritually a Semite or
intellectually a Westerner in order to be a Christian?”227 Within the Asian context, Phan argues
that the theological conceptualization of theology using the framework of Western hermeneutics
must give way to a genuine inculturation theology that prioritizes the needs and concerns of the
local contexts.
According to Phan, “since Christian mission in Asia was intimately bound with Western
imperialism, the imported portrait of Jesus was what has been called the ‘colonial Christ,’ that is,
Jesus as the white, male, all-powerful lord conquering souls and empires for God and implanting
his own Church.”228 In Phan’s estimation, the status of the question of Jesus Christ, “Who do
people say that the Son of Man is?” and “Who do you say that I am?” is still relevant and open,
calling for a response from Christians and non-Christians alike.
Jesus is reported to have asked two distinct questions: “Who do people say that
the Son of Man is?” and “Who do you say that I am?” (Mt 16:14-16).
Interestingly, in Asia the first persons to reflect on who Jesus is from the
perspective of Asia’s religious traditions were not Christians but Indian Hindus
such as Ram Mohun Roy (Jesus as Supreme Guide to happiness), Keshub
Chunder Sen (Jesus as true Yogi), Swami Vive-kananda (Jesus as Jivanmukta, i.e.
one who has achieved liberation while alive), Rabin-dranath Tagore (Jesus as the
Son of Man seeking the “poor” of the earth), and Mahatma Gandhi (Jesus as the
Supreme Satyagrahi, i.e. lover and fighter for truth). They are the “people” of
Jesus’ first question. In this article I will rescind from these attempts by nonChristians to find the meaning of Jesus Christ for them.229
Here we see Phan’s intention to situate his Christology within orthodoxy, speaking from
a Christian faith perspective. This claim to Christian commitment puts Phan in the same tradition
with Dupuis. In a similar fashion, Phan summarizes the challenges faced by Asian Christians
under three categories: 1) poverty and oppression, 2) cosmic and meta cosmic religiousness, and
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3) communism and socialism. According to Phan, for theology to be relevant and prophetic in
Asia, theologians need to address the exigencies of these challenges. Consequently, Phan
proposes a solution that will build on the concept of a “Jesus Christ with an Asian face” 230—that
is, incarnated in the sitz im leben of the Asian people. Thus, the categories for the article are
appropriate and methodologically suited.
An appreciation of Phan’s theology means a deeper reflection on the central questions
raised: What can Christian theologians who are not poor say to billions of Asian poor who are
not theologians? How can Christianity help these people become “subjects” of their future and
destiny and facilitate their struggle for liberation from the aftermath of colonization, political
oppression, economic exploitation, communist regime, patriarchal domination, and racial
discrimination?231
Any attempt to answer the above questions must provide further elucidation of the issue
of Christ’s uniqueness and universality, on the one hand, and Christianity’s uniqueness and
universality, on the other. Phan insists on the distinction between the concept of the uniqueness
and universality of Christ and that of Christianity’s uniqueness and universality on the other. 232
This distinction demonstrates Phan’s rejection of the pluralist claim that such lays the foundation
for participants in a dialogue to make unique or universal doctrinal claims of faith about the
founders of their various religions without necessarily either exclusivist or inclusivist claims.233
Phan agrees with Panikkar on the impossibility of applying the principle of the
“phenomenological epoche”—suspension of one’s faith—within the dialogic process. In this
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situation, Paul Ricoeur’s popular dictum is applicable here: “No one speaks from nowhere.”234
Commitment to faith is an indispensable factor for dialogue. However, Phan argues further that
commitment to one’s faith is not a license for exclusive or aggressive inclusivism. For the goal
of interreligious dialogue, which is for theologians to engage in the “dialogue of theological
exchange is not to construe a universal theology of religion.”235
Phan’s discourse on Jesus as the universal Savior begins with a startling reminder of the
notion “that God’s redemptive power is still at work in and through Judaism.” 236 From the
context

of

historical

consciousness

evidenced

in

Jewish-Christian

relations,

this

acknowledgement constitutes the first obstacle to the notion of Christianity’s absolutism and
raises further doubt on the Church’s doctrine of “outside the Church, there is no Salvation.”237
The point is that there is something to learn from the Christian perspective of Christ as
the universal Savior that also acknowledges Judaism as another valid track of salvation. The
Second Vatican Council added four more groups in which exists “elements of truth and grace”:
“Muslims; those seeking the unknown God in shadows and images through their religions; those
who do not practice any specific religion but sincerely seek God; and those who, without any
fault on their part, have not yet arrived at an explicit knowledge of God (atheists).” All these
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people, the council says, “may achieve eternal salvation,” though of course not without the grace
of Christ.238
The continuation of God redemptive work among the Jews has numerous Christological
challenges, especially for Christians in Asia who, from the depth of their religious experience as
Christians, have proposed a different kind of Christology from the context of religious plurality.
Phan elaborates on the root of this challenge:
Christians meet God in the saving power of the person of Jesus Christ and believe
that this power is available to people in him. Christians have therefore taught that
salvation is available only through Jesus Christ. With their recent realization that
God’s covenant with the Jewish people is eternal, Christians can now recognize in
the Jewish tradition the redemptive power of God at work. If Jews, who do not
share our faith in Christ, are in a saving covenant with God, then Christians need
new ways of understanding the universal significance of Christ in the light of
God’s eternal covenant with the Jewish people.239
One major conclusion is evident with regard to the findings above: namely, if Judaism is
still within the purview of the redemptive work of God, therefore the Jews will be saved outside
of and without the works of “Christ and Christianity.” If this is so, the prima facie evidence of
the salvific validity of Judaism falsifies and denies the major thesis of Christ and Christianity’s
uniqueness and universality. To allege otherwise without clarifying the historical condition and
origin of such a claim will result in some form of supersessionism.240
By way of rectifying the above problem of affirming Christ as universal Savior while not
denying the redemptive work of God in Judaism, Phan identifies ten elements of a postsupersessionist theology that will lead to an entire overhaul of the Church’s Christology,
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replacing or rather balancing it with pneumatology.241 Phan’s argument reveals that the activity
of the Logos and the Spirit that is manifest in other religion is far beyond the ecclesiacentric and
Christocentric activities of Jesus of Nazareth, thus rejecting the age-old idea of viewing the other
religions as preparation envangelica.242 According to Peter Phan,
Religious pluralism…is not just a matter of fact but also a matter of principle.
That is, non-Christian religions may be seen as part of the plan of divine
providence and endowed with a particular role in the history of salvation. They
are not merely a “preparation” for, “stepping stones” toward, or “seeds” of
Christianity and destined to be “fulfilled” by it. Rather, they have their own
autonomy and their proper roles as ways of salvation, at least for their
243
adherents.
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CHAPTER FOUR
RAIMON PANIKKAR’S THEOLOGY OF DIALOGICAL DIALOGUE
4.1. Introduction
The previous chapter demonstrated the claim that Panikkar’s pluralism, although similar
to the proposals of John Hick and Paul Knitter, nonetheless differs considerably. In a
fundamental sense and as a middle way, Panikkar redeems pluralism from the bad name it has
inherited from its association with ideological super-structuralism and systematic discrimination.
He insists “that true pluralism is neither an unrelated plurality nor a new ideological
superstructure designed to keep everybody in their assigned cultural slots.”1 An isolated concept
of pluralism that is radically unrelated to praxis tends towards ideological exclusivism. Thus, for
Panikkar, authentic pluralism is measured by whether it is inherently dialogical.
This chapter expands the discussion of Panikkar’s dialogical dialogue, its rootedness in
the cosmotheandric experience, and its application to the “Problem of the One and the Many.”
Panikkar begins his cosmotheandric discourse with a disclaimer that delimits the scope of his
claim: “I am offering a synthesis which not only remains open but which allows and even calls
for differing interpretations.”2 The cosmotheandric perspective is defined by theo-praxis which
ultimately leads to orthopraxis. Fundamentally, Panikkar’s cosmotheandrism evokes two types of
dialogues: 1) an intra-dialogue of multi-dimensional spiritual experiences deeply rooted in all
religious traditions and 2) an inter-dialogue between those committed to integral spirituality. For
Panikkar, dialogue though a spiritual exercise must incorporate the anthropological and cosmic
dimension.
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Most disciplines use basic ideas and theoretical frameworks, which develop over time
into stable concepts. These concepts are shared by scholars, and as such, they form a body of
knowledge, research, findings, arguments, settled disputes, and major contentions—both proven
and unproven. Modern studies of religion follow the conventions of these conceptual
frameworks, often split into varying literatures, arguments, and unsettled propositions. Interreligious conflicts and conflict resolutions also have a “conceptual framework.” For Panikkar,
this is rooted in the cosmotheandric vision.
Thus, any attempt to understand Panikkar from the purview of the “conceptual
framework” developed within the context of monotheistic/polytheistic traditions will be an
exercise in futility. This means that the starting point to understanding his religious experience
and his theology must be measured by his suspicion of Western hermeneutics. Panikkar’s
suspicion has led to his methodic “bracketing” of Western ideologies. Bracketing is never an act
of condescension, but rather a simple awareness of the fact that Western dualistic hermeneutics
have been the major source of religious and cultural isolation. For Panikkar, such a worldview
possesses a grave danger and stifles any genuine effort for dialogue among religions and culture.
He states that “[t]he error [of such a system] lies in two extremes: uniformism, singularism, and
narrow-mindedness with its dangers of fanaticism and intolerance, on the one hand and
eclecticism, vagueness, and inefficacy with its temptations of irreality, irreligiousity,
indifference, and spiritual death on the other.”3
Panikkar’s dialogical dialogue critiques the dialectical models found in modern Western
philosophy. Thus, leaning more on Heidegger and Gadamer as much as Derrida and Levinas,
Panikkar argues that for dialogue to be dialogical, it must move beyond the realm of the
3
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comfortability of self-consciousness and move towards alterity—openness towards unknown
horizons.4 Within the sphere of interreligious dialogue, Panikkar is leery about an impositional
stance of conceptual frameworks under the disguise of beliefs, doctrine, philosophy, and ethics.
Indeed, hermeneutical tools absorbed in self-consciousness subsume the dialogical partner under
dialectical categories developed through the arrogance of absoluteness. In a question-and-answer
formula, the dialogic partner is isolated and silenced.5
In the context of critiquing the absolute posture of Western philosophical hermeneutics,
Panikkar shares the following characteristics of modern Western hermeneutics as identified by
David Tracy:
1) A strong acknowledgement of the finitude and historicality of all human
understanding; 2) the all-important fact that the focus of hermeneutical
philosophy must be on the other as an alterity, not as a projected other of the
self; 3) the hermeneutical self-experiences an excess to its ordinary selfunderstanding that it cannot control through conscious intentionality or
through desire for the same. Therefore each self must “let go” to the dialogue
itself; 4) the dialogue works as dialogue (and not an exercise in selfaggrandizement) only if the other is allowed—through the dynamic of the
to—and—from movement of questioning—to become in dialogue itself a
genuine other, not a projected other. A projected other is an unreal “other”
projected upon some real other by the ego’s needs or desire to define itself.6
In light of the above characteristics, Panikkar’s mystical/mythical approach adds a
dimension that has been somewhat absent in the conceptual binary thinking of Western
hermeneutics: namely, the radical “irreducibility, reciprocity and individuality” of the other in
the dialogic process. No form of dialogical dialogue can escape the above trilogy without falling
back to the former temptations of the Western hermeneutic—that is, the obfuscation of horizon
and subsuming of alterity—rendering it invisible. The understanding and use of symbols remains
4
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paramount in Panikkar’s hermeneutics. It is through symbolic hermeneutics that Panikkar’s
dialogical dialogue can be employed as a corrective to Western hermeneutics.
4.2. Panikkar’s Relational Trilogy
Panikkar, it must be said, had a fondness for triadic thinking. The triad Trinitarian
structure that Panikkar proposes is bounded by perichoresis—interrelatedness. 7 In fact, he
believes that relationality is the hermeneutical key to dialogue. By definition, therefore, his entire
hermeneutics is woven into a threefold approach to reality that involves the mapping out of
Reality as a whole in a separated but irreducible harmony: (a) reality, as it appears to us—the
phenomenological; (b) reality, as getting past appearances to reach the core of problems—the
metaphysical and (c) reality, as remaining attentive to the very manifestation of the whole—the
sophianic method.8
Panikkar’s Trinitarian cosmology also relies heavily upon his perception of “the
Threefold Structure of Human Time Consciousness.”9 The theological anthropology stemming
from this structure identifies three trajectories of history: the economic or nonhistorical; the
economic or historical, and the catholic [universal] or transhistorical.10 Reality as divine mystery
although visibly immanent in history remains infinitely transcendent, irreducible, and absolutely
ineffable.11 As such, the Divine mystery cannot be reduced to the conceptual framework of any
or all of the historical epochs combined.
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Panikkar is not alone in applying the triad structure of the Trinity12 to explain the human
religious experience of the divine. Dupuis, for example, similarly opines that “[t]he affirmation
of Christian identity is compatible with a genuine recognition of the identity of other faith
communities representing in their own right distinct facets of the self-disclosure of the Absolute
Mystery in a single but complex and articulated divine economy.” 13 For Panikkar as well as for
Dupuis, the Christian experience of the Trinity must extend beyond its dogmatic and ontological
understanding of God’s inner self and confront the diversity of the world religions within the
larger context of creation and salvation history. Panikkar writes:
I prefer the term theandric to the term trinitarian to describe this synthesis and the
whole catholic (kath’holon) spirituality in which it culminates. The first reason for
this is that current theology has too often relegate the Trinitarian mystery to the
exclusive sphere of the Divinity, “theology” in the Greek use of the word i.e., the
study of God-in-himself totally or almost independent of the “economy” or study
of God in his “temporal manifestation” i.e., creation and incarnation. A
Trinitarian spirituality in the strict sense of the word might run the risk of not
conceding, or at least of not sufficiently manifesting, the necessity of the
dimension of incarnation, of humanity, without which every synthesis remains
inevitably impoverished. Another reason for avoiding this term is that, since the
Trinity is the central dogma of Christianity, it is in Christian faith where this
essential mystery of the divine life, even of the whole of reality is thematically
developed, whatever the “adumbrations” of it that may be discerned elsewhere,
while I would prefer a term without such direct Christian connotations.14
It is important to note that Panikkar’s distinction between theandric and Trinitarian in the
above quotation serves a heuristic purpose. Although Panikkar’s religious experience draws
inspirations from the Hindu and Buddhist tradition,15 the assumption that his cosmotheandrism is
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neither Christian nor Indic nor Buddhist can be misleading. 16 To some extent, such a postulation
glosses over Panikkar’s indebtedness to the Christian apophatic tradition. On hermeneutical
grounds, the foundation of his Trinitarian theology is nonetheless different from that of
Tertullian 17 or the formulations of Karl Rahner, 18 Karl Barth, 19 and Jürgen Moltmann. 20 All
thinkers attempted to develop an “open theology” that places the revelation of God—selfdisclosure within the context of the entire oikonomia—beyond the confines of the particular
theological systems that represent orthodoxy.
As Faber describes it, Panikkar’s “trinity of the nameless beyond all names (apophatic
divine), the named in many names (kataphatic divine), and the immanence of these movements
in the khoric space of their reflection (connex), indeed, reflects modes of multiplicity.”21Panikkar
has generally defended his theandric approach to the Trinity as “authentically orthodox” because
it “gives to God true right (orthos) honor and glory (doxa),” but this approach to God-talk “goes
beyond the traditional idea given by Christianity.”22
Cosmotheandric vision is Panikkar’s tool for the critique of the Western imprisonment of
the Trinity within ontological Trinitarian perspectives. According to MacPherson, “theandrism
for Panikkar incorporates the full language and the teachings of Christianity; moreover, its
foundational use in his thought serves as a special groundwork for what will follow—the non-
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dualism of advaitic Vedanta.” 23 Panikkar’s cosmotheandric vision is an exemplar of the
possibility of comparative theological dialogue between the West and the East. In this vision of
reality, the looming question is posed by Thatamanil: “Is a Christian nondualism possible?”24
The idea that the Christian doctrines…and Eastern notions of nonduality are
absolutely incompatible becomes far less plausible once appreciation for the vital
diversity within Christian tradition grows. This is not to say that difference will
vanish and homogeneity reign. More likely is a new and growing appreciation for
the importance of subtle difference, difference discovered by way of careful
comparison rather than posited before comparison begins.25
Obviously, and for methodological reasons too, Panikkar’s distinction between
theandrism and Trinitarianism serves the purpose of a careful and non-banal comparison
between traditional theological positions and the new cultural amendments from nondualism.
Fundamental to Panikkar’s analysis remains the fact that for Panikkar, the ontological
presuppositions underlying the Trinitarian dogma of the Western tradition render its
hermeneutical foundations inadequate for a pluralistic theology of religions. Yet, Christian
theology is deemed relevant (especially) in the pluralist context of India, if it is rooted in the
reality of the economic Trinitarian divine life of the absolute, a reality far more encompassing
than the rigid immanent trinity-logical paradigms of Western theologies. Consequently, the
argument against Western hermeneutics rests in Panikkar’s insistence on the mystery of the
Trinity as the Christian’s ultimate foundation for pluralism.26
Panikkar further contends that the triad structure of cosmotheandric vision lies within the
Trinitarian reality. By uniting divine, human, and ecological concerns, he developed a Trinitarian
theology drawing from the advaitic Vedanta that proves a corrective to the Western dualistic
MacPherson, A Critical Reading of the Development of Raimon Panikkar’s Thought on the Trinity, 14.
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solutions to the problem of Divine mystery. In line with traditional Trinitarian discourse, he also
approaches the subject matter of the divine mystery from a triadic structure of reality which he
considered as the “human invariants” 27 —the cosmotheandric reality. Thus, for him, the
cosmotheandric vision remains the sine qua non for approaching the divine—for theologizing.
He says,
Chief among these is the triadic (or Trinitarian or non-dualistic) patterns of the
“three worlds,” at its simplest perhaps, a below, an above and an in-between;
traditionally, the domains of the Gods, the Humans, and Nature; in personalistic
terms, the mystery, the noetic and the aesthetic; and in the terminology of these
essays, theos, anthropos and cosmos. In short the “cosmosthendric” reality.28
Panikkar’s account intends to promote and transcend the Western philosophical and
theological traditions. It must be stressed that Western hermeneutics had on various occasions
reduced the triad dimensions of the “human variants” to the oneness, the monist dimension, or
inadvertently, applied the triadic dimensions in a rather isolated and unrelated manner. He states,
“To oversimplify, or rather to eliminate or ignore what we cannot easily assimilate, is a universal
human temptation—and reductionism a common philosophical sin.” 29 This dualistic approach
necessarily leads to the fragmentation of reality into isolated modes and a tendency to reduce
reality to either substance or existence monism. Panikkar argues that the establishment of
philosophical monism and its rigorous pursuit of absoluteness, especially among religions,
necessarily inclines to exclusivism, wherein, “intelligibility demands a reduction to unity.”30
Addressing the issue of religious pluralism, Panikkar suggests that it must first begin with
the retrieval of lost fragmented perspectives from other religious traditions that have been
Perfectly construed as the human existential condition…“universal conditions of what all human beings
embody. We sleep and wake up and structure our days in a certain rhythm. Human rhythm in turn mirrors and
adjusts itself to cosmic rhythm: the rhythm of the day and night, the rhythm of the seasons, the rhythm of music and
dance, the harmony of the universe.” Panikkar, The Rhythm of Being.
28
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submerged either under monistic categories of “oneness” or the pluralistic dimension of “many.”
In his comparison of the dualist worldview with non-dualistic perspectives, he notes, “We cannot
allow any religion, culture or fragment of reality—even if it is labeled a “leftover” by a
subsequent civilization, or a broken shard by some higher level of consciousness—to be
forgotten, neglected or thrown away, if we were to achieve that total reconstruction of reality
which has today become imperative.”31
4.2.1. Trinitarian discourse: Father—apophatism, Son—theism, Spirit—monism
The doctrine of the Trinity presents a challenge to Christians and non-Christians alike.
Contrary to the Western handling of the Trinitarian debate, Panikkar begins his discourse on the
Trinity with a caution: “Let us emphasize here that we are not speaking about conceptions of
divinity but of the more concrete problem of the relation of God to the world, for it is in the
world that the Christian event will make its appearance.”32 What would be of the Incarnation
without a world and Humans? Thus, for Panikkar, the experience of God as the Real is
obtainable within the cosmotheandric relativity of the radical Trinity. Radical Trinity means,
therefore, that all Reality is Trinitarian. This means that Trinitarian discourse is not confined to a
divine reality situated outside the world in an insurmountable dualism; rather, it embraces all
existing reality, which comes to be a cosmotheandric reality. 33 In a nutshell, Trinitarianism for
Panikkar is synonymous to cosmotheandrism.34
For Panikkar, the concept of “radical” Trinity is essential and remarkable. He argues that
“the Trinity is not the prerogative of a God (Substance, Supreme Being), but rather the defining
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characteristic of the Real.”35 Before the word ‘Trinity’ was coined by Tertulia (using the Greek
philosophical concept of Substance), the world and the entire reality was Trinitarian. The
foundation of Panikkar’s Trinitarian structure is rooted in Reality, wherein everything is
intimately related and thus Trinitarian. He holds that “the question about God is not first a
question about Being but rather a question about reality.”36
On these grounds, Panikkar submits that it is not only God, the Father-God, the Son-God,
the Holy Spirit that are in a constitutive relationship, but also God-Man-Cosmos
(cosmotheandrism) and Heaven-Earth-Man that are in eternal perichoresis.37 The radical Trinity
complements the Christian Trinitarian insight of the immanent Trinity, whereas, the
cosmotheandrism vision of God-Man-Cosmos relates to the economic Trinity, the perichoresis of
God with the world and with man.38 Panikkar is acutely aware that the doctrine of the Trinity
emphasizes both unity and otherness.
On the basis of the cosmotheandric vision, Panikkar argues further that the mystery of the
Trinity as conceived in its isolated ontology and devoid of relations poses a grave challenge to
theology in general and interreligious dialogue in particular. In other words, he outlines the three
historical approaches to God-talk and their implications:
In the dualist vision, in which God is the “absolutely Other” there is an infinite
distance between Creator and creature…The monist vision, which in theological
terms would be pantheism. Everything is God, and we all experience God insofar
as we all experience things…The non-dualist vision (advaita), in which divinity is
neither individually separated from the rest of reality nor totally identical with it.39
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Panikkar’s critique of dualist and monist perspective does suggest that Trinitarian
discourse does not thrive in a worldview that conceptualizes God in binary oppositions. The
cosmotheandric vision of Reality shows itself to be incompatible with the theistic40 dualism that
reduces reality into ad unum. As a result, he asserts:
...that the trinity is not a simple, accidental modification of monotheism…To say
that God is not one means that the rationalizing human mind cannot reduce reality
ad unum, and at the same time cannot make unity an abstraction. If, in the
monotheistic perspective, there is one absolutely omniscient being who embraces
and understands all of reality, that is not the case for the Trinity.41
A crucial point of Panikkar’s critique of the Christian dogmatic understanding and
application of the immanent Trinity rests in its monistic and dualistic compositions.
Consequently, he proposes non-dualism as a corrective to monism and dualism. He states,
…In the simplest terms, a great part of the wisdom the East offers to the West is
the non-dualist vision of reality. Yet this vision also suggests a more complete
image of the trinity…God is neither the Same (monism) nor the Other (dualism).
God is one pole of reality, a constitutive pole…this pole is nothing in itself. It
exists only in its polarity, in its relationship. God is relationship, intimate internal
relationship with all.42
The non-dualism vision addresses the ontological relations within the Trinity while at the
same time not abandoning the implications of such relationality on the cosmos. Karl Rahner
holds a similar opinion: namely, that the study of the ontological relationship in the Trinity
cannot be done independent of God’s revelatory actions in creation. This view led to the popular
maxim on the Trinity that is attributed to Rahner: “The immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity
and the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity.” 43 Similarly, Rahner posits (like Panikkar)
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that therefore any claim of the knowledge of God outside what God has done in creation can
only be sustained in monistic and dualistic contexts.
Panikkar’s cosmotheandrism significantly identifies the “immanent and economic”
Trinity in ways that preserve and solidify the connection between, God, creation, and salvation
history. In such a profound way, cosmotheandrism encompasses all dimensions of reality, thus
serving as an experiential value for dialogue with the religions of the world. Rather than situating
dialogue in the ontological realm of the Trinity, Panikkar introduces the Trinity within the
cosmotheandric vision. In view of this, the relationality of the triune God extends beyond mere
theoretical formulation, embracing the entire cosmos and its inhabitants—peoples, cultures, and
religions—in a holistic way.
As a principle for dialogue within God-self and with the cosmos, Panikkar argues that the
Trinity is a sine qua non for intra and inter-religious dialogue. On logical grounds, he makes a
case for the existence of the universal Trinitarian principle in world religions, since human life
does not exist only in Christian form. 44 Thus, in dialogue with Hinduism and Buddhism
respectively, he employs the Advaitic Vedanta and Nirvana principles to enhance his Trinitarian
theology. From his experience in belonging to multiple religions, Panikkar develops three
spiritualities corresponding to the main doctrinal principles of these religions. For instance, from
Buddhism, Panikkar appropriates the concept of Nirvana in relation to his Father-spirituality;
from Christianity, a Son-oriented spirituality; and from Hinduism the Advaita is linked to a
Spirit-oriented spirituality.45 It is crucial at this point to note that although Panikkar undoubtedly
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agrees that “Trinity” is a Christian term, he argues that the trinitarian structure—that is, the
threefold pattern, Theos-anthropos-cosmos—are invariants of all religions and cultures.46
Panikkar’s Trinitarian discourse is apophatic. It is deeply rooted in the experience of God
that transcends the Western philosophical categorization, which equates God to Being—ontotheology. In this sense, apophatic silence before an iconic representation of the Divine threatens
the foundation of onto-theology and the absoluteness of Reason. Panikkar shares similar
convictions with Martin Heidegger, 47 Emmanuel Levinas, 48 Jacques Derrida, 49 Jean-Luc
Marion,50 and a host of other philosophers and theologians who have wrestled in the words of
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Panikkar, “to liberate the Divine from the burden of being God….”51 It is not unusual that the
assertion of apophatism goes hand-in-hand with a non-dualistic theological approach. For
according to Panikkar, the “discourse about God is radically different from every other discourse
on every other subject because God is not an object. Were God to be spoken of as object, God
would become nothing more than an idol.” 52 Thus, speaking about God requires a certain
preliminary interior silence that is recommended by apophatic spirituality and also the
phenomenological perspectives of God as icon, “for divinity is perceived here as a metaontological reality. Every thought on its subject would be idolatry.”53
Liberating God from the grasp of Being would mean for Panikkar a return to the
fundamentals of the Trinitarian discourse within the confines of his cosmotheandric vision,
which is rooted first in the Christian traditions and then in the advaitic Vedanta. Panikkar
reiterates that his idea of non-dualism is rooted in the Christian tradition. He argues, “In itself,
the Christian event constitutes a challenge to both monism and dualism. The principal dogmas of
Christianity are non-dualist: Christ is neither uniquely God nor uniquely human; at the same time
he is not half-God and half-human. Neither an absolutely “Other” God, any more than a God
who is All, fits into the conception of Christ’s divinity.”54 This endeavor is aimed at keeping
theology within the realm of the symbolic, the mythical, and the mystical—where even the most
intellectual articulation of cataphatic discourse remains thoroughly inadequate. For as Panikkar
observes, “it is quite obvious that reason [Being] cannot have the last word in a matter where, as
part of reality, its own position is itself under question.”55
51
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As a symbol of the divine, therefore, Panikkar argues that the Trinity is not entirely an
exclusively Christian phenomenon. Christianity cannot lay an absolute claim to the Trinity in the
sense that it does not own God, whose symbol is re-presented to humans as the Trinity. In effect,
he boldly asserts that: “the Trinitarian vision of reality is nothing less than the human variant that
is found, implicitly or explicitly, in practically all the traditions of humanity…[thus] to pretend to
situate God on our side, against others, is quite simply a blasphemy.”56 This analysis shows that
no one instrument, culture, religion, ideology, and civilization can confine the Trinitarian reality
as its solely God-given principle. In this form, therefore, the Trinity as Divine reality is said to be
present in all authentic religious traditions where the Divine is experienced as such.57
Panikkar’s approach to the Trinity is holistic and mystical. Accordingly, he distinguishes
between the “conceptual and symbolic” discourse about God. In view of this distinction, he
offers as the parameters for God-talk, should it ever occur, that it:
ought to be as a symbol of another order, a symbol that serves to uproot the
absolute of every human activity, a symbol that expresses the contingency of all
human enterprise, thus a symbol that makes impossible every totalitarianism of
whatever type there may be…The word God is a symbol that both reveals and
veils itself in the very symbol of which we speak. Every symbol is such because it
is, and not because it is interpreted within an objective context of knowledge.
There is no possible hermeneutics of the symbol, because its proper interpretation
is found in itself. The symbol is sym-bole (“to throw together” in Greek) when it
establishes a relationship with us—that is, when we recognize it is as such. Unlike
concepts, which are univocal, at least in intention, symbols bear several meanings.
The symbol is eminently relative, not in the sense of relativism, but in the sense of
relativity, of the relation between a subject and an object.58
As sym-bole, the relational God in Panikkar’s Trinitarian discourse is the Divine that
manifests, reveals God’s self in the context of non-dualism that evades the interpretation of
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Western conceptual frameworks. Because “every symbol is such because it is, and not because it
is interpreted within an objective context of knowledge,” Panikkar’s Trinitarian theology remains
a conundrum for the Western mind. In other words, the reality of the Divine in its symbolic
equivocal sense is beyond the traditional Christian theoretical dogma of the Trinity which
conceptualizes God as Father, Son and the Spirit. As Panikkar illustrates:
The Trinity is as much a challenge to monism as to dualism. If there is one and
only one God, the Trinity is either superfluous or no more than a simple modality.
If there are three gods, the Trinity is an aberration. And if God is neither “one”
nor “three,” what does the Trinity mean? Precisely that: God is neither one nor
three. God does not allow himself to be enclosed in any number. Qui incipit
numerare incipit errare (Who begins to count begins with a mistake), says Saint
Augustine. Hence it is inaccurate to say that God is three persons. The concept of
person applied to the Trinity, to Father, Son, and Spirit, is not univocal (three
absolutely equal persons would be three Gods), nor is it analogical. As Saint
Thomas says, speaking of three persons is a concession to current language and
nothing can be called “three” in the Trinity.59
His Trinitarian achievement moves the debate of the Trinity from its conceptual
monotheistic and dualism framework into the realm of what Panikkar describes as “the neti neti
[not this, not that] of apophatic mysticism.”60 A special feature of his Trinitarian theology is the
enrichment and harmonization of insights from the apophatism—silence—of the Father, and the
kataphatic tradition—how to speak—of the Son.61 Richard Kearney’s intriguing analysis of the
anatheism movement as the meeting point of the apophatic and kataphatic traditions is an
excellent example of the critique of meta-narratives. Therefore, “if apophasis…tends to place
God too far beyond being…” writes Kearney, “the kataphatic is sometimes tempted to reduce
59
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God to being.”62 Panikkar’s cosmotheandric approach to the apophatic and kataphatic dichotomy
is enriched by his embrace of the Christian Trinitarian insights. This merger of thought patterns
accounts for Panikkar’s holistic Trinity, where the “Father-Son-Spirit [category] would
correspond to what Christian theology calls the immanent Trinity, divine interiority; [whereas]
God-Man-Cosmos would correspond to what that theology calls the economic Trinity, the
relationship of God with the world and with man.”63 As an equivocal reality, the Trinity lends
itself to new ways of understanding the relationality of the Father, Son, and Spirit in a nondualistic context.
In line with the Christian tradition of apophatic theology and the specifications in the
Nirguna Brahman of Hinduism and Nirvana of Buddhism, Panikkar develops a distinctive
theology of the person of the Father as the divine absolute, without name, uncreated,
transcendent and unknowable.64 For even when all is observed with regard to the person of the
Father, “nothing can be said of the Father ‘in himself,’ of the ‘self’ of the Father. Certainly he is
the Father of the Son and Jesus addresses him as Father, but even ‘Father’ is not his proper name,
though he has no name.”65
In other words, all attempts at conceptual and intelligible discourse of the immanent
Trinity end in silence. Any comparison will result in sheer impossibility, for the Father, “is not.”
Panikkar’s negation of the Father is not the product of philosophical nihilism, which either
upholds the nonexistence of a monstrous God or proclaims the death of such God. In short, as far
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as Panikkar is concerned, the Father ‘is not’ and ‘does not’ give Himself to thought, to
conceptual mastery. All that is to be known of the Father is revealed in and through the Son.
In order to gain more understanding of Panikkar’s theology of God the Father, it is
necessary to revisit the importance of kenosis. According to him,
…the absolute of the father, is not. He has no ek-sistence, not even that of Being.
In the generating of the Son he has, so to speak, given everything. In the Father’s
apophatism (the kenosis or emptying) of Being is real and actual…In begetting
the Son he gives up everything, even, if we dare to say so, the possibility of being
expressed in a name that would speak of him alone, outside any reference to the
generation of the Son.66
Kenosis entails the complete and unreserved outpouring of the Father into the Son to the
extent that the Father ceases to be an object of thought and conceptuality. Panikkar refers to this
divine self-emptying of the Father into the Son as the “cross in the Trinity,” or the “immolation
of God of which the Cross of Christ and his immolations are only the images and revelations.” 67
Hence the Son is the Christ in which the fullness of the Spirit of the Father is both revealed and
made manifest. Panikkar calls this epiphany of the Christ in Christianity as well as the other
world religions a Christophany.68
Panikkar’s rejection of the univocal understanding of the “biological anthropology” that
constitutes the traditional Christian Trinitarian structure of Father, Son, and Spirit has
implications for the particularity and historicity of Jesus Christ and his identification as the
second person of the Trinity.69 In the cosmotheandric Trinitarian perspective, the question about
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the identity of the second person of Trinity is raised within the context of what Panikkar
describes as the “radical relativity” of the Trinity.
Radical relativity, an irreducible connection between the Source of what is, that
which Is, and its very Dynamism; Father, Son, and Spirit; Sat, Cit and Ananda;
the Divine, the Human, the Cosmic; Liberty, Consciousness, and Matter; or
however we might name this triad that constitutes the real. Reality is Trinitarian,
not dualist, neither one nor two. Only by denying duality (advaita), without
reducing everything to unity, are we able consciously to approach it.70
It is within the perspective of the complete kenosis of the Father that he develops the
identity of the Son. Because it is not possible to go to the Father except through the Son, he
affirms, “It is the Son who acts, who creates. Through him everything was made. In him
everything exists. He is the beginning and the end, the alpha and omega. It is the Son, properly
speaking—and the Son was manifested in Christ—who is the Divine Person, the Lord.”71 Thus,
the Christ, as either manifest or hidden, remains the absolute and only mediator of God the
Father.72
On the basis of these insights, Panikkar argues that the revelation of the Father through
kenosis constitutes the Christ—the Christic principle—that is discernable in the religions of the
world. This Christ, the Son, becomes the dialogical principle within the cosmotheandric vision—
and source of personal relations, dialogue, and communion.73 For this reason, “[b]eings in so far
as they participate in the Son, are from, with, and through him. Every being is a Christophany—a
showing forth of Christ.”74
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Furthermore, Panikkar roots the theology of the second person of the Trinity within the
cosmotheandric Trinitarian structure.

75

First, it is important to note that Panikkar’s

cosmotheandric vision departs considerably from the traditional Christian conception of the
divine which emphasizes the “biological and anthropological” structuring of the Trinity into
strict “Father, Son, and Spirit” categories. 76 Panikkar’s point that “the Trinity is not the
prerogative of a God (Substance, Supreme Being), but rather the defining characteristic of the
Real”77 can be easily forgotten. In his own words, “It is all Reality that has a Trinitarian structure
in which everything is intimately related. It is not only God the Father-God the Son-God the
Holy Spirit that are in constitutive relationship, but also God-Man-Cosmos, Heaven-EarthMan.” 78 As a consequence, he discusses the Trinity within the wider horizon of the
cosmotheandric awareness that predates Christianity.79
In the attempt to create a complementarity in the Trinity that strikes a balance between
Christianity and the world religions, Panikkar proposes a change in the theological debate,
centering on application of the biological anthropology to the Trinity. In his view, the greatest
conundrum facing the Trinity lies in its nomenclature and the understanding of the relationality
of persons. A reduction of the Trinity to its univocal perspective—that is, either “one” or
“three”—is at the heart of this misunderstanding. He illustrates further:
But we have to know for a long time and under almost all latitudes that One is not
a number; it is rather the symbol of intelligibility. That is the challenge of the
Trinity and non-dualism. The concept of the person in the Trinity, therefore, is
equivocal. The difference between the “persons” is infinite. There is no divine
nature apart from the persons. It is not without reason that the Greeks in the early
75

Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Consciousness of Man.
For Panikkar’s of the notion of person as it applies to the Trinity, see, Panikkar, The Experience of God:
Icons of the Mastery, 64-65.
77
Panikkar, “Dios en las religions,” Misión Abierta, Madrid, 5-6, 1985.
78
Panikkar, “A Self-Critical Dialogue,” in Joseph Prabhu, ed. The Intercultural Challenge of Raimon
Panikkar, 238f.
79
See Panikkar, The Cosmotheandric Intuition.
76

233

church controversies preferred the concept of hypostasis. The One is neither three
nor persons. We just as well could say sun, person, and wind.80
In sum, Panikkar’s theological discourse of the Son hinges on making a distinction
between the Christ and Jesus Christ. This distinction is further illustrated by his analysis of the
“identity and identification” of the Christic principle. He states, “Christ is the Christian
parameter for speaking about God. God has pronounced one and only one word: Christ. This
parameter, given to us two thousand years ago, permits us to speak about God—on condition, of
course, that we always remain conscious of the cultural and historical burden this parameter
entails.”81 Panikkar depicts the question of the identity of Christ as a question that is deeply
rooted in the kenosis of the God—the Father. Here it becomes clear that Panikkar’s apophatism
of the Father relates to Christ—Son—that has universal theistic characterizations beyond one of
its manifested in Jesus of Nazareth.82
Epistemologically and historically, Panikkar’s distinction between the identity of Christ
and the various identifications of the Christ in the various historical contexts of its manifestation
is central to the cosmotheandric vision of reality:
To approach the theme of the experience of Jesus, we must distinguish between
the identification and identity. Many Christians are satisfied with the
identification of Jesus as a man, the son of Mary, who lived in Nazareth and died
on a cross under Pontius Pilate, who rose again, and whose existence contains all
the other data that tradition has handed down to identify him…. The identification
of Jesus of Nazareth, which permits us not to confuse him with anyone else, is not
the same as his identity, the identity that would allow us to know him.83
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Panikkar approaches the identity of the Son within the context of the kenosis of the
Father; since the Father cannot be spoken about except through Son, and no one can come to the
Father except through the Son. Thus, the transcendent, invisible, and ineffable God as Father
becomes immanent, visible, and effable in God the Son—the Christ. Panikkar acknowledges the
identification of Jesus as Christ, but clearly states that the Christ is not identical to Jesus.84 Put in
a different way, the identification of Jesus as Christ does not completely exhaust the identity of
the Christ.
Panikkar also underlines the dynamics of understanding the Spirit in the context of the
transcendence of the Father and the revelation of the Father in the Son and Spirit. For Panikkar,
the Spirit is the immanence of God in the person of Christ. In order to escape the traditional
Christian heresy of the subordination of the Spirit to the Son as the latter to the Father, 85 he
develops a pneumatology that locates the immanence of the Spirit within the divine life itself.
However, according to Panikkar, “the Spirit cannot be separated from the spirit of Christ, but …
the Spirit is not subordinate to the logos.” 86 The transcendent God and the immanent Spirit
cannot be revealed except through the Son—Logos, which means that “Transcendence ceases to
be when it reveals itself; immanence is incapable of revealing itself.”87 Taken together, Panikkar
affirms, “The Spirit is the communion between the Father and the Son. The Spirit is immanent to
the Father and the Son jointly. In the same manner the Spirit passes from the Father to the Son
and from the Son to the Father in the same procession.”88
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While divine transcendence and immanence present a challenge for the Trinitarian
debate, it can be addressed through the use of sym-bole. For this reason, Panikkar insists that
God’s transcendence (Father) and God’s immanence (Spirit) can become the subject-matter of
the hermeneutic of Love through the revelation offered in Christ (Son). If the Logos is given to
thought and conceptual mastery, the transcendent Father and the immanent Spirit are what
saturates human rationality. In the words of Panikkar, “We are not able to rationalize or
rationally justify the spiritual field. The Spirit is not constrained by rationality, for the Spirit
manifests itself as freedom, and we cannot rationalize freedom. The Spirit is unpredictable; we
need to be carried away by it.”89
4.2.2. Spiritualities: Iconolatry, Personalism, Mysticism
Panikkar identifies three irreducible spiritualities—iconolatry, personalism, and
mysticism—as foundational to the cosmotheandric vision of reality.90 Ultimately, for Panikkar,
these spiritualities are grounded in all religious traditions in that they exist to alleviate the human
condition of —fear, hope, and finality. For this reason, he believes there is a need to distinguish
between religion and spirituality.
One of the features that differentiates a spirituality from an established religion is
that the former is far more flexible, for it is disconnected from the mass of rites,
structures, etc. that are indispensable to all religions. One religion, in fact, may
include several spiritualities, because spirituality is not directly bound up with any
dogma or institution. It is rather an attitude of mind one may ascribe to different
religions.91
In significant contrast to the dogmatic claims that are characteristic of theological
positions in traditional studies, Panikkar proposes cosmotheandric spiritualities as an exercise
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outside the realm of dogmatism. He claims that his “schema is authentically anthropological
inasmuch as it is in correspondence with the actual constitution of man as man.” 92 In other
words, cosmotheandric spirituality, like the concept of the Trinity itself, is not the prerogative of
any particular religion. Rather, it is constitutive of Reality, which of itself is Trinitarian.
Hence, Panikkar speaks of iconolatry, personalism, and mysticism as distinctive parts of
the religious experience so much so that iconolatry-Action, personalism-Love and, mysticismKnowledge become the genuine path to devotion, to spiritualities, and to authentic religious
experience. For this reason, Panikkar holds that the three forms of spiritualities together
constitute an integral part of the cosmotheandric reality. In this vision, the basic attitude of
humans toward divine transcendence and immanence is re-defined with a great emphasis on
“relativity—not relativism—of the concept of God. God is only God for the creature and with
reference to it. God is not God for himself…He never says ‘I am my God!’ but I am your God.
God is our God.”93
Panikkar defines iconolatry as a euphemism for idolatry. Iconolatry is not discussed in a
derogative sense, but rather in the context of the unavoidable meeting of the divine and human
and the false worship or religiosity—idolatry—that results from such an encounter. Iconolatry
denotes the “primary and primordial attitude of man in front of the divinity or the mystery.”94
For Panikkar, iconolatry has a divine origin, in that man was created in the image and likeness of
God. This divine attribute in human beings is necessary for divinization.
In this sense, Panikkar argues that for theosis to occur, some form of iconolatry is needed.
Yet, iconolatry remains problematic in that instead of being formed in God’s own image, the
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reverse becomes the case: man creates God in his own image and likeness. 95 In this sense,
Panikkar critiques biological anthropomorphism—Father-Son, within the Trinity—as an
exemplar of conceptual idolatry.
Iconolatry has deep roots in the Ancient Near Eastern religions. This also obtains for the
religions of Israel and that of the surroundings nations. Panikkar asserts that:
Jahweh exists in the Ark and dwells in his Temple just as Ashtaroth, Baal and
Dagon do in theirs. The Hebrews speak of, behave towards, and pray to Jahweh in
the same very manner as the Canaanites speak of, behave towards, and pray to
their gods. They worship him just as an idol is worshipped, the essence of
iconolatry not consisting…in the material character of the idol but in the act of
attributing to God creaturely qualities and attributes which are refined to a greater
or lesser extent and can be ascertained by various procedures.96
One of the most enigmatic theological questions in the entire Old Testament is the
theophany of Exodus 3:14 (the burning bush episode). God escaped the conceptual mastery
evident in the other gods—namely, that of nomenclature. God shields God-self from the arrow of
being—any characterization or classification that results from naming. 97 As Richard Kearney
suggests, “We might do better to interpret the God of the Exodus 3 neither as ‘I who am,’ nor as
‘I who am not,’ but rather as ‘I am who may be’—that is, as the possibility, which obviates the
extreme of being and non-being.”98
Regardless of theological opinion, for the Jew, the tetragrammaton is an attempt to shield
YHWH from conceptual idolatry. The second commandment—Thou shall not take the name of
the Lord in vain (Deut. 5:11)—is well intended in this situation. Iconolatry, strictly speaking for
Panikkar, consists of the “projection of God under some form, his objectivation, his
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personification in an object which may be mental or material, visible or invisible, but always
reducible, to our human ‘representation.”99
The relationship between Yahweh and the Israelites was defined by a constant struggle as
evinced in the first four commandments (Deut. 5:1-15). Still, the stipulation in the Decalogue
does not prevent Israel from the temptation of iconolatry. Panikkar does not hesitate to state “that
the spirituality of Israel [is] based on the conception of a God who speaks, punishes, pardons, is
jealous, ordains laws, can be offended and also appeased, who commands, promises and
concludes pact with men.”100 It is important to realize that in spite of Israel’s acknowledgment of
Yahweh as the principal idol/icon among the others, as Elohim, Yahweh still refuses to be named
or known and worshipped like the other gods. For to be named is to be mastered through either
mental category or gender construct. Although Yahweh is not an image in the material sense,
nevertheless, he is cast in a mental image constructed in the image and likeliness of the human
male—Adam, Father, He and Him.
Morphologically, Panikkar sees no difference between the iconolatry of Israel and those
obtainable among the Canaanite religions.101 However, his distinction between idolatry102 and
iconolatry103 forces a break in Israel’s identity as worshippers of the one and true idol—Yahweh.
There exists a causal relationship between idol and icon. The former is the condition of
possibility of the latter. In this sense, Panikkar submits that, “idolatry is not false qua latria
(worship) but it is false qua objectification of this adoration. All latria presupposes an idol, icon,
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image…”104 The denial of false latria by Israel is constitutive of their identity as the chosen
people over against the goim (nations) whose latria is considered to be false idolatry (Is. 44:9ff; I
Cor. 8:4ff). The identity of Yahweh as the “true and only” God is derived by difference. From
the perspective of God-Icon spirituality, the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim identity means the
identification of God with ethical monotheism. The Jewish root of such ethnic and ethical
monotheism has an adverse effect on the Trinitarian debate.
Panikkar’s second spirituality is Personalism. It offers the greatest challenge to the
Trinitarian understanding of God. In his opinion, Christian Personalism grows out of “the ancient
Old Testament concept of Jahweh, the God-Idol of Israel.”

105

Nevertheless, Panikkar

acknowledges the contributions of philosophical personalism to the development of Western
theology and the comprehension of the Christian faith. However, he focuses his criticism on the
form of personalism that is attached to the genre of biblical theism. Panikkar even compares the
application of the Jewish God-icon traditions to the theological events that led to the death of
Jesus Christ. In this regard, it seems the controversy surrounds the interplay between the
concepts of the Jewish God-icon and the personalism of the divine sonship of Jesus. Panikkar
writes:
Whatever were the reasons for which Jesus was condemned, it was not for calling
himself divine—this idea of the divinization of man is neither so new nor so
scandalous—but for proclaiming himself the Son of God (in the Trinitarian, as it
was later called, meaning of the phrase), viz., begotten by God, equal to Him,
coming from Him; in other words, for having dared to present himself to the
people of Jahweh like the divine icon itself…. The crime of Jesus…was that he
dared to oust Jahweh, the icon of Israel…. If the “people of God” had refused to
adore “other gods” they must certainly cast out from their midst even more
vigorously one who presumed to assert that the Messiah was not a king in the

104
105

Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man, 17.
Ibid.,19.

240

“line” of David but the true icon of the Divinity, the perfect image of Jahweh,
begotten directly by Him.106
Panikkar suspects that Christians in the early centuries, for whatever reasons, departed
from the theological challenge to offer an explanation about the identity of Jesus Christ within
the Jewish (Yahweh-icon-idol) theological framework. Put in a different way, how possible was
it for Jesus to reflect the image of Yahweh, when according to the Jewish religious traditions, “it
is impossible to make images of God on earth because there are no archetypes in heaven to
which they may correspond.”107 In Panikkar’s view, the claim of Jesus Christ to Divine-icon
status—the Trinitarian scandal—offered Christians in the first century the opportunity to break
away from the God-icon spirituality. A defense of the divinity of Jesus Christ and of its
appropriation presumes a certain corrective to the inherent monolithic monotheism of the Jewish
tradition.
Over against the God-icon spirituality of Orthodox Judaism, Panikkar proposes
continuing the Trinitarian debate alongside the Trinitarian scandal of Jesus’ claim to be the icon
of Yahweh. From both a historical and doctrinal point of view, thinking of Jesus as the icon of
Yahweh is ultimately a stable approach toward the Trinity and divine mystery. The fact that
Christianity yielded to the temptations of iconolatry affirms Panikkar’s criticism of early
Christianity: namely, its inability to defend the divinity of Jesus within the Trinitarian discourse.
For a great number of Christians the Trinity became simply a highly abstract
notion and for them God remained the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the
great Idol whom it behooves us to worship, to appease, to please, and to obey. He
was still the Judge, Creator, Preserver, Revealer, in fact, the Other. There was,
besides, a very good and real excuse for this viz., the simple recognition of the
qualities of the Divine in the person of Jesus…. This development leads to a
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parallel and complementary development in Christian consciousness, resulting in
what we may call in our day personalism.108
The most common perception of Christian personalism relates to the fundamental
principle of love. For this reason, “God so loved the world that he gave his only Son as
ransom…” (cf. Jn 3:16). God’s love for the Son and the world becomes the source of the
religious exercise that personalizes the projection of God as the basis of personhood. In religious
personalism, thus, “Love is no longer the outburst of spontaneous affection or unconscious
ecstasy but mutual giving.”109 The personalization of divine love through the human act of love
has been acknowledged as a veritable substitute for the apophatism of the Jewish God-icon
spirituality. This question of love implies not only the self-annihilation of the lover but is also
necessary for the principle of non-violence. In the sight of the problems of evil and in an
unanswerable way, love is either silenced or becomes egoistic. In either case, love creates a
tendency toward re-othering which, in Panikkar’s view, “leads to an identification, that seems to
destroy [the] reciprocity.”110
Personalism attempts to overcome transcendence by arguing for the necessity of the
divine immanence-incarnation of the Divine in person. In personalism, God reveals Himself as a
person on account of love; a somebody, a “someone who loves, judges, pardons, punishes,
rewards—in short, does everything a person does. Remove the imperfections of the created
being, cause what remains to proceed by stages upward along the path of eminence and you will
find the divine person at the end of the process. We call God a personal being because we
ourselves are person. We consider God a Being because we ourselves are beings.”111
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Personalism in its narrow and subjective sense poses grave danger to interreligious
dialogue, especially when applied as the only form of Divine manifestation. To this end,
Panikkar disputes the identification of Christianity in the West with personalism. In his words,
“it has been concluded that Christian faith cannot take root where the concept and the experience
of what is meant by a person are unknown or insufficiently developed, since it is impossible, so
it is claimed, to enter into a filial relationship with God when he has not been discovered as
person.” 112 There are other forms of divine manifestation. Hence, according to Panikkar,
personalism “has no more right…to identify itself with religion, since it is incapable by itself of
exhausting the variety and richness of the experience of the Absolute.”113 Since the absolute is
neither One nor many, to reduce the Divine to the axis of any will is for Panikkar “the highest
point of idolatry… [for] if the desire for incarnation characterizes the first dimension of
spirituality and its temptation is false idolatry, the thirst for immanence is the driving forces
behind personalism and its greatest temptation is anthropomorphism.”114
To curb the excesses of iconolatry and personalism, Panikkar proposes a third way. This
form of spirituality called the advaita—the way of the spirit.115 Advaita abhors the temptations of
both the exclusivist and the universalist that are found in iconolatry and personalism. For
Panikkar, the events preceding the first council of Jerusalem in 49 AD indicates that the early
Church never severed its link with iconolatry and personalism. This assertion led to the question,
“Has not Christianity remained morphologically a Semitic religion? 116 On theological grounds,
an affirmative answer is implied, for Christianity itself is of Semitic genesis.
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Evidently, for Panikkar, Israel remain the chosen and privileged people of God. He
equally holds the Old Testament as revealed literature. However, he insists that the primacy of
Israel does not represent the finality of God’s dealing with the world. Israel constitutes “only a
part” of the entire creation; thus, God cannot be reduced to the metaphysical axis—the
expression in the One—and neither is God equal to the plurality of gods, as conquered by the
One—Elohim.117 Hence, neither monotheism nor polytheism adequately expresses the notion of
the Absolute.
4.2.3. Cosmotheandrism: Cosmos, God and Humans
In The Cosmotheandric Experience, Panikkar begins his inquiry with this question: “Is it
possible for our epoch to have a unified vision of reality?”118 Underlying Panikkar’s question is
the assumption that under the tutelage of the disciplines of philosophy, science, and technology,
humanity has drifted from its original source and has become more estranged from the Divine
and the world. In a way, science and technology have been identified as obstacles to the way of
peace.119 In this regard, Panikkar cites W. B. Yeats: “Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;
mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.”120 The danger remains that the dualism proposed by the
scientific culture provides an account that celebrates specificity and individualism. This view
nonetheless, obfuscates and alters the correlation that exists within the primordial conception of
space—“that not only are things in Space, but Space is also equally within things.”121
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Subsequently, Panikkar critiques the division of space by modern science into ‘inner and
outer’ space, with the latter representing the spiritual realm and the former material reality. This
dichotomy of reality produces a twofold cosmology: the spiritual and transcendent realm with
God above, and the mundane and immanent world with humans below. Thus, reality is separated
along cosmic, human, and divine dimensions. Panikkar’s cosmotheandrism attempts to balance
this spatial differentiation between God, Humans, and the World. In his words,
The Cosmotheandric principle could be formulated by saying that the divine, the
human and the earthly—however we may prefer to call them—are the three
irreducible dimensions which constitute the real, i.e., any reality inasmuch as it
real. It does not deny that the abstracting capacity of our mind can, for particular
and limited purposes, consider parts of reality independently; it does not deny the
complexity of the real and its many degrees. But this principle reminds us that the
parts are parts and that they are not just accidentally juxtaposed, but essentially
related to the whole. In other words, the parts are real participations and are to be
understood not according to a merely spatial model, as books are part of a library
or a carburetor and a differential gear are parts of an automobile, but rather
according to an organic unity, as body and soul, or mind and will belong to a
human being; they are parts because they are not the whole, but they are not parts
which can be “parted” from the whole without thereby ceasing to exist…They are
constitutive dimensions of the whole, which permeates everything that is and is
not reducible to any of its constitutes.122
In the cosmotheandric vision of reality, Panikkar places limits on the modern
interpretation of space and time. The central insight of cosmotheandrism is its critique of the
excesses of modern science, especially its objectification and localization of space as an
extension of the physical realm.123 Space itself is a mystery and “for practically all traditions,
space is a fundamental symbol.”124 Here, the dichotomization of space into “inner and outer”
realities is at the heart of the modern malaise.

122

Panikkar, The Cosmotheandric Experience, 60.
Panikkar, “No Outer Space without Inner Space,” in Kapila Vatsyayan, ed., Concept of Space Ancient
and Modern (New Delhi, India: Abhinau Publications, 1991), 9-10.
124
Ibid., 11,
123

245

Panikkar points out that a genuine effort to distinguish between physical and
metaphysical space is possible without separation. The alternative notion of an understanding of
reality drawn from non-advaitic relations makes this relation possible. In the words of Panikkar:
“We neither identify inner and outer Space, nor differentiate the two in such a way so as to make
only one of them the real Space and the other a subordinate concept.”125
Any interpreter can learn anew the implications of the doctrine of the Trinity for the
World and Humans. Panikkar’s cosmotheandric spirituality emanates from what is vividly
described as the theanthropocosmic invariant, which is located at the heart of the human
consciousness. The West African Igbo name “Som-adina” translates Panikkar’s approach to
reality: “I am not alone in the world—calling “world” everything that is around me.”126 At the
heart of the cosmotheandric vision is the call for a renewed anthropology, which ceases to think
of man in isolation from God and the World. He elucidates further:
All of us are aware that we have to eat, that we speak, love, and the like.
Furthermore, we are aware that we do not know everything, that there is a
Mystery in life. We are aware that the mystery embraces everything we call
World, something we call Man, and something that many cultures call the Divine.
The awareness of this triad belongs to our very nature, though the names and
conception of the three differ widely.127
Panikkar’s cosmotheandrism belongs properly to the order of the “Rhythm of Being.”128
The Divine dimension encapsulated by this reality can be understood only within the context of
mystery and the language of symbols. It follows that the understanding of the three dimensions
of reality—God (theos), Man (anthropos) and Cosmos—is not in accordance with the modern
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usage of the terms. Panikkar appeals further to the triadic structure of Nicholas of Cusa: “We
may agree that the world is threefold; a small [world, which is] Man, the greatest [world, which
is] God [and], the great [world which] is called the universe.”129 Thus, cosmotheandrism is not so
much a term as it is a symbol.130 Because of the perichoresis that exists between the three poles
of the cosmotheandric reality, Panikkar affirms that, “There can be no God without Man and
World. There is no man without God and World. There is no World without God and Man.”131 In
any case, an isolated reality outside the cosmotheandric vision constitutes an absurdity.
Panikkar’s cosmotheandrism reexamines the western hierarchical cosmology, which
harbors the dualist and monist vision that conceives God in isolation from the Cosmos and
Humans. It calls for a new relational cosmology. The notion of God and the cosmology of the
dualist and monist (although scientific in nature) have produced an incomplete picture of reality.
As a result, Man has exploited the Earth and de-enthroned God.132 Rightly so, Panikkar states,
“the modern world has undertaken a thoroughgoing de-anthropomorphization of the meaning of
the word God. It has also tried to de-ontologize God. In the same process, Man has equally
devitalized the Earth. The Earth has been left for dead by the same token that Heaven has been
deserted.”133
The theological approach resulting from this view produces either a God that is
outwardly transcendent or inwardly immanent in nature. In addition, as Panikkar points out, such
“a transcendence without its corresponding immanence would be contradictory and
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irrational…All this amounts to saying that an absolutely single Being does not exist. Being is
relation.”134 Panikkar agrees with Jules Monchanin that the Being of God—if it is to be known—
is a ‘Being with,’ for God’s esse is a co-esse, an esse ad alterum, a being for and towards the
other as other.”135
Furthermore, on the one hand, the cosmotheandric vision rejects the notion that Humans
are superior to the rest of reality. Hence, the purpose of Human existence cannot be achieved in
isolation from the rest of reality. The human task of creating meaning and salvation is achievable
through interdependence and interconnectedness with the divine and cosmic realities. On the
other hand, the “divine dimension is not an umbrella superimposed over beings, nor a merely
extrinsic foundation for them….” 136 Thus, simply to ignore the order imposed by the triadic
reality represented in the cosmotheandric intuition leads to the stifling of the divine dimension—
the beginning of violence. In other words, cosmotheandrism means “both the cosmic and the
divine are irreducible dimensions of the real which cannot be co-opted by Man, although they
meet in Man, just as Man meets in them.”137
By saying this, Panikkar points out that cosmotheandric spirituality forms the summation
of the three spiritualities—iconolatry, personalism, and adviata. Against the undercurrent of a
misbalanced notion of Divine transcendence and immanence, Panikkar’s approach to the Trinity
provides a “trans-historical consciousness,” which moves beyond the Western binary opposition
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that formulates the “either” “or” superiority categories. The essays in Rhythm of Being
demonstrate Panikkar’s resolve “to liberate the Divine from the burden of being God.”138
To sum up, the cosmotheandric God cannot be equated to pure transcendence nor reduced
to immanence—in whatever historical or incarnational form.139 Such a cosmotheandric approach
acknowledges the fundamental relationality between the Divine, Human, and the Cosmos. As
Panikkar explains, “If I climb the highest mountain, I’ll find God there, but likewise if I
penetrate the depths of an apophatic Godhead I shall find the World there…. In neither case have
I left the heart of Man.”140 It may seem that Panikkar’s view relates closely to “pansyntheism—
everything with God,”141 and suggests a worldview that is panentheistic and is sometimes overtly
conceived to be pantheistic. Yet, Panikkar is unambiguously clear in his description of the
cosmotheandric intuition:
In this vision, the World is not a habitat or an external part of the whole or even
myself…. My relationship with the World is ultimately no different from my
relationship with myself…[for] God is not an absolute Other…. Nor is God the
same as us…[for] God is not only the God of Man, but also the God of the World.
A God with no cosmological and therefore no cosmogonic functions would not be
God at all, but a mere phantom…,[for] Man here is ultimately more than an
individual. Man is a person, a knot in the net of relationships not limited to the
spiritual “thous,” but reaching out to the very antipodes of the real. An isolated
individual is incomprehensible and also unviable…so isolating Man from God
and the World equally strangulates him. There is no Man without God or without
the World.142
4.3. Panikkar’s Christophany and Interreligious Dialogue
Panikkar’s approach to the subject-matter of interreligious dialogue revolves around the
cosmotheandric principle that promotes “individuality, irreducibility and reciprocity,” between
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the divine, human, and the cosmos. Within the cosmotheandric cosmology, reality consists of the
relationality that exists between God, humans, and the world, making dialogue as such
unavoidable. 143 In the theological sense, Panikkar’s cosmotheandrism is anchored on his
understanding of Cosmotheandric Christ144—the Christian symbol of the whole reality. Thus,
this Cosmotheandric Christ which is present at all times and everywhere holds all things together
(Col: 1:17).145
Panikkar’s hermeneutics is inspired by his desire to make Christ the cosmological
principle and ontological link between the human and divine.146 Here it becomes obvious that for
Panikkar, the Christic principle is the measure of reality. In Panikkar’s view, reality is known in
and through its dialogic relationality involving the Divine, the Human and the Cosmos. This
cosmotheandric revelation of Mystery finds its fullness in Christ. For Panikkar, “[Christ] is not
only the historical redeemer, but also the unique Son of God, the Second Person of the Trinity,
the only ontological—temporal and eternal link between God and the World.”147
Panikkar did not always have a developed theory of Christophany. 148 He has always
argued that Christ refers to Christians’ ultimate reality, beginning with The Unknown Christ of
Hinduism through its later revision, Christophany: The Fullness of Man.149 Yet for Panikkar, the
reality of Christ is not the monopoly of Christians.150 His popular axiom, “Jesus is the Christ, but
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the Christ is not only Jesus,”151 explains this reality. Panikkar substantiated the problem further
in his 1991 lectures, where he states, “From the Christian perspective the entire modern
problematic concerning inter-cultural and interreligious questions hinges upon the vision of
Christ.”152 Although Panikkar acknowledges the doctrinal importance of traditional Christology,
yet in continuation with his distinction between the “Historical Jesus-Christ event,” and “Cosmic
Christ-Christ reality,” he points to the limit of the historical Jesus as straightforward
hermeneutical key for interreligious dialogue.
Panikkar also admits that difficulties and problems ensuing from distinguishing between
the historical consciousness of the “Christ Event” and the trans-historical universality of the
“Christ Reality.”153 This distinction, though confusing, is paramount for a proper understanding
of the meaning of “Christ” as applied in the symbols—theandrism and Cosmotheandrism—and
the implication of such in Panikkar grand scheme for intra-religious dialogue.
In his early works, Panikkar employs the symbol of theandrism to explicate his
understanding of the God-Man, God-Christ, God-Holy Spirit, and Nature-Culture relationships.
By theandrism, therefore, Panikkar means “the classical and traditional term for that intimate and
complete unity which is realized paradigmatically in Christ between the divine and the human
and which is the goal towards which everything here below tends—in Christ and the Spirit.”154
However, in Panikkar’s later work, the cosmos as a pole of reality was added to the theandric
symbols; hence the beginning of the cosmotheandric principle.
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The cosmotheandric vision of reality was introduced by Panikkar to show, on the one
hand, that the transcendence of the Divine is not compromised by the immanence of the Christ,
and on the other, that Christ through the Christic principle is accessible to all humanity. Thus, if
all beings are a manifestation of Christ, dialogue becomes an ontological category of being: an
inescapable imperative. The question remains for the pluralist: Does the Christic principle
amount to many Christs or simply to different manifestations evident in other religions? Panikkar
responds:
The Christian pluralist will not affirm that there are many saviors. This is a
nonpluralistic assertion. The pluralistic Christological assertion will begin—as
with the Trinity (Qui incipit numerare, incipit errare, “[who begins to count,
begins to err,]” said Augustine) by denying the meaningfulness of any
quantitative individualization in the Mystery of Christ. The saving power which
Christian calls Christ—is neither one nor many.155
In other words, Panikkar does not waver in his claim that “Christ stands for that centre of
reality, that crystallization point around which the divine, the human, and the material can
grow.” 156 For Panikkar then, Christ is the source of the dialogue within the cosmotheandric
reality. Therefore, Christ remains the unquantifiable divine mystery, broken into, but not reduced
to the pre-historical, the historical Jesus and Christ of Faith. Panikkar has been eclectic and
systematic in this regard; always sticking to his original point of departure, which is to probe the
universality of Christ and the search for a valid “universal methodic,” 157 which he thinks is
needed for an authentic interreligious dialogue among religions and across cultures.
4.4. Panikkar and the Problem of “the One and the Many”
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Even though the concept of the “One and the Many” refers primarily to the philosophical
problem158 of what constitutes the “Real,” it may also be used to define the current theological
impasse occasioned by religious pluralism—the interpretation of one’s own religion as the “real”
in relation to the others. For Panikkar, the problem of the “One and Many” remains, to a large
extent, unresolved today in the West because the Western hermeneutic is stuck in an ontology
that conceptualizes reality in “binary opposites.” This ordering of reality yields a worldview that
is “hierarchical and exclusionary.”159 Thus, rejecting the Western hermeneutical tool of “binary
opposites” as the underlying hermeneutics of relativity, Panikkar points to the adviata nondualistic principle as a necessary solution to the problem of the “one and many.”
The most common conception in scholarly circles of interreligious dialogue relates to the
challenge of finding a common ground. The questions remains: What constitutes “common
ground”—is it found in the “one” or obtainable through the “many”? The pluralistic nature of
today’s society and the de facto reality of the many religious traditions and cultures makes the
problem of “the one and the many” even more relevant. This time, it raises a central theological
question for Christianity in the post-colonial conversation on religious pluralism: namely, how
can the other religious tradition contribute to the self-understanding of Christianity, without the
risk of being reduced to “sameness or oneness”? On the other hand, how can Christianity
maintain its identity in the process of dialogue?
Panikkar’s advaita principle transcends the pitfalls inherent in monistic and dualistic
thinking. He rejects in its entirety the binary oppositional model of the “monistic and dualistic”
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solution proffered by the West to addressing the problem of the “One and the Many.” He
advocates instead
for an advaitic or non dualistic approach. Its theological horizon is the
philosophical dilemma that takes the form of a God who cannot be totally
different from or totally identical with man and/or World without disappearing.
Ultimately, it is a challenge to monotheism and to polytheism alike. At this level
atheism belongs morphologically to monotheism. I am here making the plea that
God is neither the Other nor the Same but the One: the one pole in a
cosmotheandric insight.160
By the same token, Panikkar argues that advaitic thinking provides a much needed
alternative to the dialectical logical systems of Western philosophy. In and of themselves, the
strategies and solutions provided by Western dialectical hermeneutics are not only insufficient
but also “unconvincing”161 in grasping the mystery embedded in the other religious traditions.
Evidently, the need for an alternative dialogical principle led to the relevance of Panikkar’s
“Christic principle.”
Within the context of interreligious dialogue, Panikkar proposes the “Christic principle”
as the solution to the conundrum of pluralism. In this regard, the common ground for
interreligious dialogue is situated at the transcendental level. At this level, he makes distinctions
in the meta-ontological character of religions on three levels.
a) The social-cultural level—r1: denoting all equivalent and historical facts about
religion. Particular religions like Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and the African
traditional religions (ATR) belong to this category.
b) The sacramental level—r2: based on the shared characteristics in r1, religions are
complimentary but not necessarily the same on this level.
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c) The r3 is based on both r1 and r2. Panikkar speaks on the mystical advantages that are
obvious on this level of religious experience: He says:
My approach to religion 3 is always limited depending on r1 and r2. So that I
cannot say regarding religion 3 that it is one or many; there is neither one nor
many. I see it in and through r1 and r2 reaching as far as I can r3…I am not saying
that we are saying the same thing with different names. First, because r3 cannot be
properly described; and secondly, because I am not a nominalist, so that the name
I give belongs to the thing in a certain way…the name is fundamental. Because
this name is the way in which religion 3 reveals itself to me.162
Panikkar describes the relation further:
I think that here a radical humility is called for. I cannot have access to r 2 and r3 if
not through r1. I do not come from Mars nor from the moon to go straight into the
heart of the matter. I have my parents, my education, my language, etc… And
those who reject r1… and get out of the church, they should also get out of the
planet.163
In establishing a relationship between the three levels religious consciousness, Panikkar
manifestly solves the problem of the “one and the many” at the transcendental level of r3. Yet, he
reiterates the importance of r1—commitment to particularity. Panikkar names this level Faith,
which in his work is similar to T. W. Willy’s description of faith as a transcendental category of
the divine that is a given.164 It is integral to all humans, irrespective of religious affiliations and
cultural differences. To establish the difference even further, Panikkar distinguishes Faith from
belief—for even though Faith exists through belief, it cannot be reduced to it. Faith transcends
belief.165 In the same way, belief denotes “an intellectual, emotional and cultural embodiment of
that Faith within the framework of a particular tradition.”166
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Hence, it follows that for Panikkar, the essence of religious pluralism cannot be found in
the historical particularities of the r1 and r2. Still, an isolated application of r3 is not only
simplistic but also unrealistic. Pluralism rests on the mystical realm. As Panikkar reminds us,
“The mystery towards which the religious experience of humankind tends is neither the same nor
different, neither one nor many; it is non-dualistic; it allows for pluralism.”167
4.5. Panikkar’s Religious Pluralism: Multiple Belonging or Multiple Participation?
In the postcolonial context, the debate on religious pluralism has raised the question of
identity and the commitment of the interlocutors to a particular religious community. 168
Panikkar’s insistence on the need of multiple religious belonging is based on lived experience.169
He says about himself, “I ‘left’ as a Christian, I ‘found’ myself a Hindu and I ‘return’ a Buddhist,
without having ceased to be a Christian.” 170 Panikkar upholds this form of transcendental
identity171 elsewhere: “I am at the confluence (sangam) of the four rivers: the Hindu, Christian,
Buddhist and Secular traditions.”172 Panikkar states that, this spiritual journey is made possible
“by living religion as an experience rather than as an ideology.”173
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Thus, understanding his multiple religious belonging must always depend on the
appreciation of his Christophany and its implications for Christian identity. In his contextual
definition of Christian identity, he identifies five ways of being Christian.
a) The ontic Christian, in whom the divine spirit is a living principle. In this
sense, any human being or any being is Christophany…. b) The ontological
Christian, in which there is a certain consciousness of the immanenttranscendent mystery that enlivens one’s life. That person does not need to use
the Christian vocabulary, not even a theistic one…. c) The historical Christian,
for whom the Christian language makes sense and who has appropriated it
while retaining the freedom to finding a more and more acceptable
interpretation. Christ becomes then the name for that Symbol…. d) The
sociological Christian, which could also be called the ecclesia one who owes
allegiance to one of the existing Christian groups or churches…. e) The
Catholic Christian, who embodies in a very particular way that mysterious
consciousness. I would like to retain the scandal and concreteness of the
geohistorical symbol of Rome at least for those first two millennia and in spite
of the possible arrogance of the word “catholic” if interpreted as universal and
not as the call to concrete wholeness—of everyone. A Roman Catholic would
in fact mean, for me at least, not the fan of the pope (whoever he may be) or
the spiritual citizen of the Vatican (without criticizing this loyalty), but the
person whose spiritual pedigree passes through those two millennia of Roman
history, not to get entangled in it, or glorify it, as the historical springboard
from which the Catholic tradition may still jump into the tranhistorical
Unknown.174
Panikkar raised and addressed the question of Christian identity within a pluralistic
setting, wherein the question of “[w]ho and what is Christian is answered neither by a personal
subjective feeling, nor by an impersonal objective doctrine.”175 In other words, as far as he is
concerned, “there is no single answer as to who a Christian is or what a Christian identity may
be.”176 This is so because “Christian identity expresses itself differently at different times and
different places, according precisely to the peculiar self-understanding of both individual and
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community.”177 Because of the relative component of the term Christian identity, any univocal,
or equivocal, and even analogous understanding of this concept is delusional.
For Panikkar, the acceptance of multiple religious belonging is always difficult within
Western dualistic thought patterns, where the divine is conceivable only on bi-polar grounds—
either as “one” or the “many” as understood through the lens of the “one.” From the perspective
of Western dialectics, multiple religious belonging constitutes an impediment to alterity in the
dialogic process. Theologically, it constitutes a threat to mission and evangelization. There is the
fear that openness to the religious other may lead to conversion. As Panikkar observes, “The
religious person enters this arena without prejudice or preconceived solutions, knowing fully
well that he may in fact lose a particular belief or a particular religion altogether. He trusts in the
truth. He enters unarmed and ready to be converted himself. He may lose his life—he may also
be born again.” 178 Subsequently, Panikkar argues that because Christians have reduced the
horizon of Christianity’s identity to its historical and sociological perspectives among the
organized religions, the fight over one’s religious belonging is not unconnected to the “will to
power.” For this reason, Panikkar submits that “the worry about identity may turn
pathological…”179
Several contemporary theologians like Jacques Dupuis,180 Peter Phan,181 and Catherine
Cornille, 182 to mention but three, agree on the complementarity of Christianity with other

177

Ibid., 123.
Panikkar, “The Rules of the Game,” in Gerald H. Anderson and Thomas Stransky, eds. Faith Meets
Faith, Mission Trends (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eardmans, 1981), 5:13.
179
Panikkar, “On Christian Identity: Who is a Christian,” 139.
180
Dupuis cautions: “while it may be true that there exist a mutual complementarity between Christianity
and the other religions, it cannot be said that this mutual complementarity is a symmetric one.” Dupuis, Towards a
Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 61; quoted in Terrence W. Tilley, Religious Diversity and the American
Experience: A Theological Approach, 173.
181
Phan observes the educational disparity between pioneers of multiple religious belonging and later
followers. These pioneers, “were highly competent in the classical languages of these religions, and intimately
178

258

religions. Yet there is a caution against the religious hybridity and superficiality that
characterizes New Age syncretism. 183 The question remains: what is the Christian attitude
towards identity and alterity in the process of interreligious dialogue?184 Or wider still, what is
dialogue for the Christian in the context of God’s revelation in other religions? 185 Panikkar
concept of multiple belonging will be understood in the context of the universality of God’s
revelation wherein all effort at religious encounter ends in ecumenical ecumenism.186
Panikkar acknowledges the position of Christian inclusivists in the sense that authentic
dialogue is premised upon the pre-condition that its “interlocutors …remain rooted in the
particular religious community from which and for which they speak.” 187 The question for
Panikkar is whether interlocutors can make more than one commitment to various religious
communities? For Panikkar, the question of authentic dialogue is not measured solely by one’s
participation in a particular faith community but on openness to the truth of the transcendence
evidence in other religions. Whereas the historical particularities (r1 and r2) of faith communities
present an important dimension of identity—a sine qua non for religious encounter—a fuller
understanding of identity is not reduced to the subjectivity of a faith confession.188 Reasoning
from the cosmotheandric vision of reality, Panikkar situates multiple religious belonging at the
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transcendental of level (r3) called Faith. This Faith is the basis for the complementarity of
religions.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE IN JOS, NIGERIA
5.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, we argued that Panikkar’s religious pluralism differs significantly
from the Western perspectives built on Enlightenment philosophical traditions, in which the urge
to universalize the “one” over the “many” remains the prevalent dialectical solution to difference.
Christianity in the West as a product of Western civilization has, on numerous occasions,
identified itself as the “one”—the source and the finality of reality over and against non-Western
traditions and cultures. Panikkar’s Unknown Christ of Hinduism is a classical response to
Christianity’s claim to universalism and to fulfillment theology. It critiques Christian
supersessionism and emphasizes the importance of rethinking Christian identity in ways that
enhance the dignity and truth that abounds in the other religious traditions.1
Rethinking Christianity within India’s religious heterology calls for a radical pluralism.
For Panikkar this entails the total rejection of the “Western Syndrome,” which he characterizes
as “any thought form with monistic or imperialistic taint.”2 Unarguably, Panikkar’s dialogical
dialogue draws insight and inspiration from the experiential situation of religious plurality, as
practiced in India. This experience of plurality, Panikkar contends, calls for a cosmotheandric
approach to the particular problems arising from the context of religious difference and
otherness. In this sense, pluralism contradicts principles that support universality and
exclusivism. Panikkar writes,
My thesis is clear: a universal theory of whatever kind denies pluralism. Any
alleged universal theory is one particular theory, besides many others, that claims
universal validity, thus trespassing the limits of its own legitimacy. Further, no
theory can be absolutely universal, because theory, the contemplation of truth, is
1
2
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neither a universal contemplation, nor is (theoretical) “truth is all that there is to
Reality.3
While paying greater attention to the rudiments of orthodox doctrines, Panikkar’s
contextualized studies dwell fundamentally on the implications of transcendence on the demands
of orthopraxis. He begins his theology, as it were, from the known (experiential) and proceeds to
the unknown (mysterium). The dialogue between transcendence and orthopraxis results in the
cosmotheandric vision of reality, wherein the Divine, the Human, and the Cosmos constitute a
web of mutuality and are “wrapped in radical relativity.”4 Panikkar’s cosmotheandric vision of
reality has serious implications for Christology. For one, it calls into question the universal
validity of Christology and the legitimacy of supersessionism. This way of viewing reality is
totally foreign to Western orthodoxy. In all its ramifications, Panikkar’s theology not only differs
from, but also dis-identifies5 with Western Christological patterns and construct.
5.2. Supersessionism and Dialectical Christology
The root of supersessionism is always traceable to the historical consciousness and within
the religious context of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity. From the biblical
point of view, Rm. 11:29 “for the gifts and the calling of God are irrevocable,” 6 possesses a
serious exegetical challenge for supersessionism, namely, it raises anew the question of whether
God’s redemptive power is continually at work in and through Judaism. The question then
remains: if God’s “gifts and calling [of the Jew] are irrevocable,” how does one explain the
universal claim of Christian salvation in Jesus Christ? This question highlights an apparent
dilemma. Panikkar sees a serious flaw in approaching religious pluralism de jure from a purely
3
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Christological viewpoint. In its inclusive posture, the logic of Christology is not open to the
cross-cultural perspectives of non-monotheistic traditions. In situations where Christian dialogue
has prevailed, it has done so by supersessionist Christological dispositions.
In “A Self Critical Dialogue,” Panikkar identifies pluralism first as an attitude and then as
an indispensable method for cross-cultural encounter and dialogue.7 Panikkar raises the question
of religious supersessionism within the context of the distinction made between dialectical and
dialogical dialogue. Both forms of dialogue presuppose the understanding of relationality and
alterity of the other. However, as Panikkar observes, the temptation to supersessionism remains:
To be sure, each tradition, seeing itself from within, considers that it is capable of
giving a full answer to the religious urge of its members and, seeing other
traditions from outside, tends to judge them as partial. It is only when we take the
other seriously as ourselves that a new vision may dawn. For this we have to
break the self-sufficiency of any human group. But this requires that we should
somehow have jumped outside our own respective traditions. Herein lies the
destiny of our time.8
The backbone of Panikkar’s theology is set within the critique of the totalizing tendencies
inherent in Western culture9 and, by extension, Christian supersessionism. The question remains:
What does it mean to take the other religion seriously? To what extent can one go? Are there
limits to be reached or boundaries to be respected? Clearly, while these questions entail for
Panikkar the issue of taking one’s religious identity seriously and yet not subsuming the other
under the categories of one’s religious belief, it also means, as he maintains, “a deep human
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honesty in searching for the truth wherever it can be found; a great intellectual openness in this
search, without conscious preconceptions or willingly entertained prejudices; and finally a
profound loyalty towards one’s own tradition.”10 The critical point is that while Christianity has
its identity to protect, it can no longer trust an all-powerful reason as the measure of the
intelligibility and reasonableness of the other in the dialogic process. Clearly, the other cannot be
reduced to mere principle that can be used or discarded. The development of religious
hermeneutics in the West goes hand in hand with enthronement of the dialectics of the logos.
For Panikkar, the success of dialectical hermeneutics relies upon its historical foundations
and the cultural consciousness of the Western world. In this regard, dialectical hermeneutics
yields to a particular perspective that is not open to all. So too, were earlier Christological
formulations, in that “all Christology is a reflection on Christ…rooted in human experience.”11
In Panikkar’s view, history as such is always a perspective of reality, not the sum total of it.12 It
is in view of this redaction of history—namely, the impossibility of having history outside
experience—that Panikkar speaks of dialectical Christology as a one-sided portrayal of the story
of Jesus Christ from the Western perspective that has no relevance for the Indian context.
Panikkar adds that “no culture, tradition, ideology or religion can today speak for the whole of
humankind”13 without resorting to indifferentism or supersessionism.
In the context of the dialogue between religions, supersessionism poses clear
hermeneutical question in that it assumes that religions are closed and parallel to each other. To
this end, when supersessionist thinking is employed, it promotes alienation and indifferentism at
10
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the center of its theory and practice. Panikkar indicates further that indifferentism, in turn, breeds
parallelism14 and its ripple effects, exclusivism or inclusivism.15 This explains why Panikkar in
addressing the need for radical relativity and interconnection among religions in dialogue,
disapproves of the tendency of Christianity to be subversive, reducing the other through
conquering and conversion. Panikkar writes,
(It is an) almost self-evident fact that the Western Christian tradition seems to be
exhausted, I might almost say effete, when it tries to express the Christian
message in a meaningful way for our times. Only by cross-fertilization and
mutual fecundation may the present state of affairs be overcome; only by stepping
over present cultural and philosophical boundaries can Christian life again
become creative and dynamic. Obviously this applies to the other religions as
well: It is a two-way traffic...The meeting point is neither my house nor the
mansion of my neighbour, but the crossroads outside the walls, where we may
eventually decide to put up a tent—for the time being.16
To this end, Panikkar once again re-echoes the urgency of dialogical dialogue among
religions:
Alone and isolated, Hinduism is threatened, Christianity is impotent, Islam is in
ferment, Buddhism is dissolving, Marxism is bankrupt, secularism is selfdestructing. It is not unthinkable that cross-fertilization among the traditions could
reconcile the original insights of the various cultures and make the stilled voices
of the sages audible once more over the abysses of time.17
All through the ages, Christianity has struggled with questions rising from its self-identity
to exclusive and inclusive soteriological claims with particular reference to Judaism, on the one
hand, and in a wider perspective with the other world religions, on the other. An assertion of the
universal normativity of the Christian revelation in Christ—his person and works—has been the
14
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center of this claim. Throughout its formative history, Christian Christology in its various forms
has maintained the superiority of its truth claims through supersessionism or has, at best,
replaced one form of supersessionism with another. As observed above, in the colonial and postcolonial setting, Christian supersessionism has been mimetically co-joined with Whiteness and
power.18
Panikkar’s critique of Christian supersessionism responds to the question of theological
legitimacy and authenticity: namely, whether people of color can still think about Christ outside
the hermeneutical perimeters of whiteness defined by Western theology. Christology today, he
states, “is a tribal Christology of the last two thousand years which is centered almost exclusively
on its own concerns, with almost total neglect of the other human religious experience, a
Christology for the internal purposes of Christians, perhaps even to conquer the world.”19 It is
not by accident that Panikkar’s stance on Christian supersessionism is critical of European
cultural imperialism and the dialectic Christology of a Christ that is not rooted in human
experience.20 In the words of Ilia Delio, “with such a ready-made Christ image, other peoples of
the world have found Christ either an exotic figure or a suspicious construct.”21
Panikkar’s refusal to endorse dialectical hermeneutics indicates awareness that the
analogy between Western Christology and dialectics must be eradicated. He understands that
analogies drawn from this association creates a dialectical Christology which lays the grounds
for the “duo-logue, a duet or two set of ideas” among organized religions with the intention that
truth can be reached through the juxtapositions of ideas, through the pure reason of Western
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philosophy. In this sense, truth is accessible and obtainable through the one-way hermeneutics of
the ideas/logos. The legitimacy of dialectical thinking rests on the logos-structure reality in
which things are considered to exist as separate and independent monads.
This view gave rise to the self-righteousness of dialectical Christology that creates a
sense of uniqueness with an exaggerated claim to universalism. Panikkar describes this
universalization of the “one” by the West as the Western Syndrome: “Universal means catholic,
and catholic means true. What is true and good (for us) is (also) true and good for everybody.”22
Here Panikkar’s coined motto for pluralism is most evident: “There is no ‘One’ that can be
imposed on the Many…and there are no Many that will be reduced to the One.”23
Contrary to other views of dialectics, Panikkar argues for the hermeneutics of dialogos—a piercing through the logos to arrive at the truth that transcends it.24 He distinguishes
between dialectical and dialogical dialogue as follows:
Dialogical dialogue, which differs from the dialectical one, stands on the
assumption that nobody has access to the universal horizon of human experience,
and that only by not postulating the rules of the encounter from a single side can
Man proceed towards a deeper and more universal understanding of himself and
thus come closer to his own realization.25
Thus, by rejecting the dialectical worldview, Panikkar proposes a dialogical dialogue that
builds on the idea of mutual reciprocity. Participants of dialogue are once again reminded “that
we all share in a reality that does not exist independently and outside our own sharing in it, and
yet without exhausting it. Our participation is always partial, and reality is more than just the
sum total of its parts.”26 Panikkar continues:
22
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As long as I do not open my heart and do not see that the other is not an other but
a part of myself who enlarges and completes me, I will not arrive at dialogue. If I
embrace you, then I understand you. All these is a way of saying that real
intrareligious dialogue begins in myself, and that it is more an exchange of
religious experiences than of doctrines. If one does not start out from this
foundation, no religious dialogue is possible; it is just chatter.27
5.3. Logos-Pneumatology: Grounds for Dialogical Dialogue
Approaching Panikkar’s theological references to the terms “Logos,” “Spirit,” and
“Christ” demands an in-depth understanding of these terms within Panikkar’s cosmotheandric
Trinitarian framework. Many times, mainstream theologians rush in to interpret and correlate
Panikkar’s theology with Christian orthodoxy. To understand Panikkar’s theological use of these
terms, it is imperative to discover the concept of divinity within the cosmotheandric vision of
reality. Outside this purview, these terms are difficult to grasp, especially for the Western mind.
This characteristic of Panikkar’s work, as pointed out by Komulainen, “turns his thinking into an
impenetrable jungle of various influences,”28 fraught with subtleties and nuances. One such area
that is problematic is Panikkar’s critique of the conceptual framework of logos-thinking: his
distinction between the incarnated Logos, Christ, and Spirit.
In general, the understanding of Logos, Spirit, and Christ does not form a single pattern
of thought in Panikkar’s philosophy (ontology) and theology (trinitarian). In his philosophy of
being, “Logos” and “Spirit” are used interchangeably in relation to being (on) and thinking
(logos). In some cases, Panikkar applies logos (with the small letter) to describe the Western
philosophical approach, which tends “to reduce Logos to an exclusively immaterial or
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intellectual phenomenon.” 29 On the contrary, he emphasizes that Logos is not reason alone.
“Logos means language, but also word, reason, intellect and love as well.” 30 Thus Panikkar
rightly hopes to repudiate the Western intellectual tradition that forms the basis of the thinking
that subjugates the Logos to the scrutiny of logos. This temptation to reduce Logos to only the
intellectual domain remains one of the greatest conundrums facing the conceptualization of
Western Christology as it remains independent from the mythical and pneumatic domain.31
Yet another problem of Western philosophy during the medieval era was the disconnection between logos and being, on the one hand, and logos and pneuma, on the other. For
this reason, Panikkar affirms that the compartmentalization of logos and its reduction to the
realm of intelligibility have led to a scientific understanding of reality that is devoid of the
mythos and pneuma.32 He argues for unity between being, logos, and pneuma. He says, “the on
[being] is bigger than the logos. The logos may be coextensive with the on [being], but still there
‘is’ the pneuma ‘between,’ and where Spirit, freedom. And where there is freedom, thought
cannot dictate, foresee or even necessarily follow the ‘expansion,’ ‘explosion’ life of Being.”33
Another stark and complicated usage of Logos, Being, and Spirit is found in Panikkar’s
articulation of his pneumatology: “If the Logos is the transparency of Being, the Spirit, is
paradoxically, its opaqueness. The Spirit is freedom, the freedom of Being to be what it is. And
this is, a priori as it were, unforeseeable by the Logos.”34
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In general, Panikkar’s use of the terms “Logos,” “Spirit,” and “Christ” forms a bloc that
describes a transcendental cosmotheandric reality as opposed to the dualistic vision created by
the Western philosophical compartmentalization of logos as thinking. For Panikkar, Western
Christo-logos (Christology) as a product of logos lacks the necessary theological resources for
any critical analysis of religious pluralism. In this sense, logos needs liberation and
transformation that can occur only in a worldview of interconnectivity which unites and
separates the Cosmos, the Divine, and the Human in radical individuality, irreducibility, and
reciprocity.
Contrary to notable attempts in Christology to achieve a conceptual mastery of Jesus
Christ through logos, Panikkar situates his opposition to the hermeneutics of Christo-logos
within the apophatic tradition. To minimize the risk of a Gnostic understanding of logos
(knowledge), Panikkar introduces another dimension of logos as the word to break forth the
silence of the Father. In this sense, both silence and the word are authentic sources of revelation.
For out of Silence (eternal) comes the word (finite), and the word as language equally reveals
silence. Panikkar shows their interconnectedness this way: “When silence and word are kept
separate, the Silence is terrifying and word ceases to be word of God…, becoming only our
words about God; theology loses its sacredness and becomes our scrutiny of the inscrutable.”35
This means that although the word reveals the Father, it does so to some degree, since for
Panikkar, “Christ will never be totally known on earth, because that would amount to seeing the
Father whom nobody can see.”36
In this sense, Panikkar’s notion of Christ is intrinsically linked to the apophatism of the
Father who through kenosis gives Himself to the Son and the Spirit, which in turn returns to the
35
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Father in an endless perichoresis. 37 However, Panikkar cautions on this relationality by
differentiating between the logos and Spirit. “There is, however the spirit, and the Spirit is not
the Logos. It is infinitely different, according to classical Christian theology. There is nothing
finite in the Trinity. We cannot and should not separate the Spirit from the Logos, but we should
not confuse them either.” 38 In the most mystical sense, the Silence of the Father and the
infiniteness of the Spirit prevent any conceptual mastery. Departing from the classical tradition
of the West, Panikkar upholds that an independent logos as rationes and intellectus cannot
scrutinize the divine. Hence in Panikkar’s epistemology, it is absurd to dissect the Theos through
the instrumentality of logos. In the strictest sense, all forms of Christo-logos and pneumato-logos
inevitably lead to some form of subordinationism—Christ and the Spirit being subservient to
logos.39
To resolve this conundrum, Panikkar identifies three important epistemological models
for a mutual coexistence between religion and philosophy: (a) logos—the thought, (b) Pneuma—
the unthinkable and (c) Mythos—the unthought. Panikkar attaches a corresponding theological
virtue to each of the triads; logos—Faith, Mythos—Hope and Pneuma—Love.40 As succinctly
explained by Joseph Prabhu, “Mythos is the unthought because it is the background, the source
and origin of what is thought, and therefore, cannot be made the object of thought. In this sense,
logos cover the whole range of thought; from sensibility at the ‘lower’ end of the cognitive
spectrum to speculative ideas at its higher end….The pneuma is the new, the unpredictable, the
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wind that blows where it will.”41 Invariably, Panikkar questions the soundness of a logos without
its pneuma; for Faith (logos) without Love (Spirit) is dead.42
In accordance with the cosmotheandric vision, Panikkar recognizes the role of logos in
the cognitive process through rationes and intellectus, yet he maintains that a conceptual mastery
of the divine through logos alone amounts to an epistemological impossibility. For Panikkar, the
problem of Western philosophy is precisely that it has remained imprisoned under the confines
of logos, thereby ignoring the other dimension—the mythos and pneuma. 43 By its refusal to
reconcile logos with its sources—namely, mythos and pneuma—Panikkar argues that Western
philosophy runs the risk of being logocentric and imperialistic.44
Panikkar believes that the rise of logocentrism in the Middle Ages led to the replacement
of symbols with terms. This process widens the polarity between philosophy and religion, on the
one hand, and science and arts, on the other, thus establishing a system in which reason and
dialectics remain the only means of resolving polarity. In answer to the question, does the logos
repair the polarity between the problem of the “One and the Many” in Western philosophy?
Panikkar says no:
The challenge consists in doing justice to this polarity—that is, in overcoming
duality without falling prey to monism. That is the proper function of advaita, or
non-dualistic approach, which is the hermeneutic key to everything I am going to
say. Advaita overcomes the strictures of logos, integrating the spirit to our
approach to reality, or as a western classic says…“reflectens ardor” (rebounding
love) belongs to the ultimate nature of the whole. In fact, an attempt to master the
just mentioned polarity by reason alone is at the origin of the dialectical method:
sic etnunc. Advaita amounts to the overcoming of dualistic dialectics by means of
including love at the ultimate level of reality. In other words, the holistic attempt
tries to “reach” the Whole not by a dialectic synthesis, not by means of an
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immediate contact with the Whole, defying the dualistic object/subject
epistemology.45
Furthermore, Panikkar is convinced that logos, as the root of the “—ology” of the
humanities disciplines, cannot be applied to Christ without qualifications. Thus, Christ-ology as
a branch of the logic of logos in Western thought shrouds the mystery of Christ, reducing it to
the particularity of Eurocentric understanding. Evidently, logos is in need of liberation and
rejuvenation; for without pneuma-Love, the logos as Faith is dead. Consequently, Panikkar falls
back to the apophatic tradition, to explain that “logos is not everything,” and consequently, does
not “know the knowing of the knower or searches the depths of divine emptiness.”46 As thought,
logos cannot think emptiness and silence.
As such, logos need the complementarity of the pneuma as its guiding hermeneutical
tool. The growing acceptance of the hermeneutics of the logos in the West signals a
corresponding neglect for pneumatology. To acknowledge this fact, Panikkar writes, “The
unthinkable does not exist in itself as a fixed dimension; at any given moment it is the
provisional, the historical, that accomplishes itself in the future, in hope…Receiving the pneuma
is a permanent passage, pascha, a pilgrimage: the procession from mythos through logos to
pneuma is endless. Precisely this pneumatic dimension guarantees the constant openness into
which we may take a step forward.”47 In another sense, Panikkar kept the gradual procession
under his understanding of perichoresis in a fashion that departs from the theological
underpinnings of subordinationism.
What is at stake in Panikkar’s critique of the intellectual propositions of logos and the
symbols derived from mythos is that both trajectories aided the conceptual thinking that paves
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the way for monocultural (theistic) systems, together with their imperial institutions and global
designs. Through this critique, Panikkar intends to establish a priority for pneuma-Love, as the
epicenter for dialogical dialogue; for the spirit breathes where it wills in all religions. 48
As against the imagination of his critics, Panikkar’s dynamic vision of the pneuma is not
a total rejection of logos and mythos all together; but a perichoresis of the triad. As Panikkar
says, “even a ‘pneuma-tic’ theology has to use the logos, that is, words… Logos is not
everything, but we cannot dispense with it.” 49 The result of maintaining this criticism of the
“purity and priority” of logos is to demonstrate its inherent paucity as an autonomous source of
knowledge. Panikkar continues, “[W]e discover that reason alone is not the only instrument to
live meaningfully in the universe. In addition, experience introduces us to a dimension of reality
that is impervious to reason, and to the fact that thinking alone is not the ultimate judge of
reality.”50
Panikkar finds the polarizing effect that underlines the conceptual frameworks of logos
most problematic for intrareligious dialogue. In this account, a dualistic hermeneutics of logos is
gravely dangerous for Panikkar’s Trinitarian cosmotheandric, wherein the logos, mythos and
pneuma interdependently create the authentic fusion of horizons 51 necessary for dialogical
dialogue. As Knitter says, “for Panikkar, when it comes to God as to religion, the free-wheeling,
unpredictable Spirit will always be one step ahead of Reason or Logos. We’re never going to be
able to wrap our minds around what the Spirit is up to.”52 Put in other words, Panikkar submits,
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“It is quite obvious that reason cannot have the last word in a matter where, as part of reality, its
own position is itself under question. Otherwise, reason would divinize itself.”53
The question remains, can a Christian dualistic theology of Christ as Logos be the ground
for a pluralistic theology of religions? Panikkar agrees on this point: namely, that there can be no
solution to the problem of religious pluralism with a dualistic concept of logos as the defining
characteristic of Christ-ology. Panikkar proposes an advaitic trinitarian pneumatology that is
based on love and openness to infinite transcendental possibilities. The symbol of Christ as
Logos becomes the nucleus of this advaitic pneumatology, which generates the vitality and
dynamism needed for dialogue among religions. As such, Christ-logos cannot be the starting
point for this universal pluralistic theology, since logos relies heavily on conceptual frameworks
and hermeneutics that are not open to all.
The matter becomes still more complicated in Panikkar’s dichotomy between Logos and
logos, wherein the former symbolizes the universality of Christ and the latter the particularity of
Jesus of Nazareth. The goal for Panikkar is to find an “authentically universal” Christ as “a
living symbol for the totality of reality: human, divine, cosmic.”54 The quest for such a universal
Christ is a sine qua non for intrareligious dialogue. In this regard, Panikkar argues that the
identity of Christ is not to be mistaken through identifying it with the historical consciousness of
Jesus of Nazareth. To quote Panikkar: “the identity of Christ is not his identification…we can
know the objective identification of Jesus, he was born and died at specific times and in specific
places…but his identity can still escape us…To know his identity we need love, we need faith …
we have to encounter his person.”55
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Panikkar’s description of “Christ” differs considerably from an orthodox rendition. In his
own words, “When I call this link between the finite and the infinite by the name Christ, I am not
presupposing its identification with Jesus of Nazareth.”56 To put it differently, for Panikkar the
reality of Christ as the transcendent and un-incarnated Logos, does not contradict the immanence
of the incarnated logos, Jesus of Nazareth. For theologians on the side of Orthodoxy, Panikkar’s
dichotomy between Logos and logos is problematic. For instance, Jacques Dupuis opines that,
“Panikkar’s thought does not appear to preserve the indissoluble link between the Christ of Faith
and the Jesus of History. It betrays this link, weakening it and threatening…to reduce the Christ
message to a kind of gnosis.” To make this point better, Dupuis referenced Robert Smet, who
states: “The Christian can perfectly well admit a presence of the logos outside the Christian and
Jewish traditions, but is not disposed to believe that the logos act elsewhere in identical
fashions.”57
The distinction between identity and identification becomes particularly important
in the theology of Panikkar when dealing with topics of such obvious importance
to Christology as the relation between Christ and Jesus. His most polemic
affirmation is “Jesus is Christ, but Christ cannot be identified completely with
Jesus.” This has to do with the Panikkarian conception of pars pro toto, which in
this case applies to symbolic knowledge: “Jesus is the symbol of Christ,” “the icon
seen in the Taboric light of revelation.” To understand what Panikkar means by
this, it is necessary to understand his conception of “symbol.” Thus, for Panikkar
saying that “Jesus is the symbol of Christ” is not contradictory to the dogmatic
assertion that Jesus “is the Christ,” but the inverse affirmation, “Christ is Jesus”
cannot be made, since Christ cannot be restricted to the historical figure of Jesus
of Nazareth, although he is made manifest through him.58
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In order to do justice to Panikkar’s Logos/logos dichotomy, it should be remembered that
Panikkar operates from an epistemological presupposition that suspects the entire history of
Western Christianity of supersessionism. It critiques further the Western Christianity diachronic
presentation of Christ that is somewhat alienated from the experiences of other cultures. The
question arises: are the methods inherited from the Greek and Roman traditions the only option
for theological reflection? In opposition to this hermeneutical trend, Panikkar calls for the
dekerygmatization and dehistoricization of classical Christ-ology in favor of the Christic
principle that is rooted in the human experience as elucidated in the cosmotheandric vision.59
This highlights Panikkar central claim: that the comprehensibility of the logos itself is
measured only by its degree of relativity to the mythos and the pneuma. Essentially, a concept of
the logos as existing by itself remains insufficient as the underlying principle of reality. With this
understanding as the starting point, Panikkar begins his critique of development of the logos in
Judaism and in Greek philosophy as it relates to the imperialistic monotheism that ensued after
the edit of Milan under Constantine.60 The result of this historical excursus leads Panikkar to the
conclusion that the classical Christology developed thus far in this sense fails the
“diatopic and pluritopic”61 hermeneutical test of crossing over to other cultures who do not share
similar patterns of understanding and intelligibility.62
Christo-logos as a Western perspective have become the universal absolutizing theory
about the story and history of Christ. 63 Panikkar observes further that “any alleged universal
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theory is one particular theory, besides many others, that claims universal validity, thus
trespassing the limits of its own legitimacy.”64 Therefore Panikkar advocates for Christophany.
which situates dialogue in the realm of the mythos and the pnuema (human consciousness and
cosmotheandric reality). This proposal means that genuine dialogue is no longer achievable
within the limits of the Christo-logos.
Hence Christology within the confines of the logos leads to dialectics and soliloquy
(monologue) within a closed system. Such an enterprise ends in substituting apologetics for
theology. In this regard, Panikkar warns that “we must eliminate any apologetics if we really
want to meet a person from another religious tradition.” 65 Within the cosmotheandric vision,
genuine dialogical dialogue is such that it “must begin with my questioning myself and the
relativity of my beliefs (which does not mean their relativism), accepting the challenge of a
change, a conversion, and a risk of upsetting my traditional patterns.”66
Panikkar is not alone in his post-colonial critique of the shape and content of classical
Christology and its supersessionist tendencies.67 This critique has witnessed a new resurgence in
pneumatological studies, first as a kind of reaction to logos Christology and second, as its
replacement. A common thread binds these researchers: namely, the search for a genuine nonsupersessionist Christology that will address religious pluralism—de facto and de jure.
Undoubtedly, many aspects of Panikkar’s subtle pneumatology demands further scrutiny. Yet,
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his bold step in announcing a movement from logos Christology to pneumatology as the ground
for pluralism must be acknowledged.
5.4. Towards a Pneumatology of Charity and Hospitality
In The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man,68 Panikkar identifies the humandivine polarity created by the Western philosophical traditions as the underlying factor
responsible for the human predicament. This division and apparent lack of interconnectivity
between transcendence and immanence is also noticeable in theology (Trinity, Christology, and
Pneumatology). 69 Panikkar takes aim at classical Christology as deeply responsible for a
Trinitarian theology built on a cosmology that creates a chasm between God, the Human, and the
Cosmos.70
In The Cosmotheandric Experience,

71

as well, Panikkar proposes a stark and

uncomplicated opposition to dualism and modernism. 72 As the title of the book indicates,
Panikkar is clear that the logic inherent in logos (rationes and intellectus) has devaluated lived
experience and religious encountering of the other. For Panikkar, the cosmology inherent in the
God-world dualism of classical Christology has theological consequences for an interpretation of
the incarnation within the realm of strict anthropocentrism. The “ology” in anthrop-ology and
Christ-ology73 merges to design a world that enthrones human knowledge as the measure of
reality. Panikkar’s advaitic Trinitarian cosmology, on the other hand, rejects such an
68
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anthropocentric view of reality. Indeed, as he argues, “The whole universe is called to share in
the Trinitarian perichoresis,”74 which hinges on the individuality, irreducibility, and reciprocity
between God, the cosmos, and humans.
At the heart of Panikkar’s advaitic Trinitarian theology is his reference to St. Paul’s letter
to the Ephesians 4:6—God above all, God through all, and God in all.75 Here, “God in all” for
Panikkar depicts the activity of the Spirit operating in the entire cosmos. The universal
dimension of the Spirit transgresses the particularity and historical consciousness of Jesus Christ
and, consequently, of Christianity as a religion among others. Thus in Panikkar’s estimation,
Christo-logos as the discourse about Jesus Christ within the comfort zone of Euro-centrism, at
best responds to the monolithic needs and lived experiences of Christians within that hemisphere.
The challenge is that Christo-logos fall short in addressing the lived experiences of
countless Christians of other cultures. In Panikkar’s words, “Today’s Christology is not catholic
or universal, nor does it need to be. Independent of its content, the very parameters of
intelligibility belongs to a phylum of human culture, but a single phylum after all.” 76 It is here
that the term “Christophany” differs essentially from “Christology.” Openness to the
transcendental possibilities found in the lived religious perspectives of humanity and of the
cosmos constitutes the mystical dimension of Christ.
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Panikkar goes on to add that

“Christophany takes nothing away from Christology but is open to the reality of the Spirit, which
separates logos from the pneuma, does not subordinate the former to the latter.”78

74

Panikkar, Christophany: The Fullness of Man (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2004), 147.
Panikkar, The Trinity and the Religious Experience of Man, 68.
76
Panikkar, “A Christophany of our Time,” 4.
77
Panikkar, Christophany, xx.
78
Ibid., 10.
75

280

Panikkar thus indicates his decision to move toward a pneumatology of Love, that is the
antithesis of logos Christology and its accentuation on doctrines. The Spirit, as it were, comes to
the rescue of the logos. Panikkar believes that it is in the Spirit that “our prayers meet, intentions
coalesce and persons enter into communion.”79 Still at the fundamental level, Panikkar defends
the importance of the knowledge of Faith gained through logos philosophy, yet he admits that
experiencing the Spirit in Love remains the only possibility for mutual interactions between
cultures and religions. For Panikkar, “the meeting of Spiritualities can only take place in the
Spirit. No new ‘system’ has primarily to come out of the encounter, but a new and yet old spirit
must emerge.”80 It is within the context of the Spirit that Panikkar raises the question of the
Father. Since the Father is not in the apophatic sense, the experience of the Father “is an
encounter in the Presence of the One who is already present in the hearts of those who in good
faith belong to one or the other of the two religions.”81
5.5. Hospitality as Ground for De Jure Pluralism and Soteriology
Panikkar’s concept of hospitality is intrinsically linked with the radical relationality and
the notion of communion that is inherently cosmotheandric. As a divine attribute, hospitality is
the way of relationship that stems from the Trinitarian perichoresis, otherwise referred to as the
coherence of intra and inter abundance. Panikkar’s example of hospitality clearly indicates that
radical relativity within the Trinitarian perichoresis is a matter of principle and not a union of
convenience or generosity. Thus as a hermeneutical tool, the concept of hospitality has attained a
new vista in both philosophical and theological hermeneutics.82 Put simply, hospitality is about
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difference (alterity) and the receptivity of truths claims from the guest (invited) and the stranger
(uninvited) alike.
A political philosophical understanding of hospitality wrestles with the ethical issue of
the law, obligation and freewill. Scholars like Levinas and Derrida reject such a juridical concept
of hospitality. 83 Derrida proffers a solution that distinguishes between “absolute hospitality,”
which is freely given, and “conditional hospitality,” which is based on cultural preconditions and
legal preference. He writes:
The law of hospitality, the express law that governs the general concept of
hospitality, appears as a paradoxical law, pervertible and perverting. It seems to
dictate that absolute hospitality should break with the law of hospitality as right or
duty…84
Darrida’s interruption of the juridical concept of hospitality aligns with Panikkar’s
cosmotheandric Trinitarian formulae characterized by the individuality, reciprocity, and
mutuality of the host and the guest. The concept of hospitality as a vital hermeneutical tool for
dialogue raises the question of identity. It does mean that interreligious dialogue calls for a
deeper mystical encountering of the other that is beyond mere generous acknowledgement of
plurality de facto. It searches further for de jure grounds for establishing the elements of truths
that are abandoned in the religious narrative of the other. An intrinsic link exists between
Panikkar’s radical pluralism and the kind of hospitality that is needed for the practice of
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dialogical dialogue. For Panikkar hospitality involves opening oneself to “accepting the
challenge of a change, a conversion, a risk of upsetting my traditional pattern.”85
Panikkar agrees with Derrida’s critique of the legalistic interpretation of hospitality and
goes on to stress the human and mystical dimension of hospitality. Panikkar affirms that
hospitality is neither a doctrine of a particular religious group nor a tool for inter-religious
proselytism; rather, it is an attitude “essential to anyone who harbors the feelings that are fully
human…”86 It is written in the human heart where the Spirit dwells. In other words, hospitality
springs forth from the depth of Panikkar’s intrareligious disposition. That is why for Panikkar,
“intrareligious dialogue and hospitality always go together.”87 The mystical connotation for this
connection between hospitality and interreligious dialogue becomes evident as Panikkar explains
how this connection is experienced in real life. Hospitality within the context of dialogue
“implies that the way in which we experience our religions opens us up to a mystery over which
we do not have exclusive property rights. Even if we are convinced that we are touching upon
the truth, we are incapable of plumping its depths.”88
To know what Panikkar means here, it is important to reiterate his position as explained
under the previous sub-heading (“Towards a Pneumatology of Charity and Hospitality”), which
demonstrates that interreligious encounters with the other is made possible only through Love in
the pneuma and not by the conceptual mastery of logos through Faith/Knowledge. Remarkably,
Panikkar returns the issue of interreligious dialogue to its pneumatic locus of lived experience
gained through the dynamics of similarity and difference.89 What is at stake for Panikkar is that,
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“hospitality cannot be reduced to mere theory. It invariably demands practice, action, and,
unequivocally love—love that is a precondition to knowledge: thus the importance of hospitality
is not only for dialogue but for there to be peace for all humans.”90
Speaking about the indispensability of hospitality within the context of human
experience, Panikkar writes of hospitality as “the meaning of life for each of us when we live out
our religion,”91 not in isolation but in sharing in the religious lives and truth of the other. The
other as a stranger is always unknown and as such the source of mystery. 92 Hospitality is strange
and mysterious.93 On the deeper mystical sense, Panikkar observes that “we do not need to know,
to love.”94 In genuine hospitality, receptivity towards the truth narrative of the stranger is given
priority over the conceptual mastery of narratives. Indeed, it is precisely because love (pneuma)
transcends knowledge (logos) that the notion of “generosity and tolerance” towards the stranger
is finally deemed inadequate.
Panikkar employs the concept of strangeness, arbitrariness, and mystery to qualify the
activity of the Spirit. Thus, the Spirit blows wherever it wills in all religions and cultures,
creating what Panikkar refers to as hospitable truth.95 Truth in this context is a posteriori and is
always relational. According to Panikkar, interreligious hospitality as the prerequisite to
dialogical dialogue departs considerably from the structures of knowledge and moves beyond the
90

Panikkar, “Introduction,” in Pierre-François Beithune, Interreligious Hospitality: The Fulfillment of

Dialogue.
Panikkar, “The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness,” in Beithune PierreFrançois de, Interreligious Hospitality: The Fulfillment of Dialogue (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2010).
92
Panikkar maintains, “all reality [including the Human] is mysterious…” and cannot be the subject-matter
of the logos devoid of the mythos and pneuma. Panikkar, “The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious
Consciousness,” in Beithune Pierre-François de, Interreligious Hospitality: The Fulfillment of Dialogue
(Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2010).
93
Panikkar, “Introduction,” in Beithune Pierre-François de, Interreligious Hospitality: The Fulfillment of
Dialogue.
94
See Beverly J. Lanzetta, “Mystical Basis of Panikkar’s Thought,” in Joseph Prabhu, ed., The Intercultural
Challenge of Raimon Panikkar, 97.
95
Panikkar, “Introduction,” in Beithune Pierre-François de, Interreligious Hospitality: The Fulfillment of
Dialogue.
91

284

parameters of cultural generosity and tolerance—the at-home experience. But as Derrida would
argue, “hospitality is the deconstruction of the at-home,”96 attitude that constitutes the encounter
between the “host and the guest.”
In interreligious circles, numerous scholars see too much risk in hospitality than its
prospects for dialogue and peace-making. 97 The idea that there can be preconditions to
hospitality in the dialogic process has led to the problem of anxiety and phobia. In a sense,
offering hospitality to a stranger—that is, sharing a meal—could be dangerous. As Panikkar
observes,
To invite a stranger to partake in a meal is the essence of hospitality.
Traditionally, the stranger was a pilgrim; he could well have been an angel, but in
any case he was to be treated with due respect. Today, unhappily, there is reason
to fear that the stranger may turn out to be a thief or a terrorist. Such a regrettable
trend is probably attributed to the individualism that characterizes the modern
world and is accompanied by a desacralization of the human person.98
In light of this quotation, it can be argued that Panikkar is not naïve about the impending
the risk and vulnerability involved in hospitality and its consequences for interreligious
dialogue.99 At first sight, “hospitality” and “hostility” both share the Indo-European root word
“host” which among other things translates into “ghost”—the unknown phenomenon. 100 The
guest or the strange-one, like the “ghost,” defies epistemological categorization. Because of its
indeterminate characteristic, the concept of the strange-one spawns fear and is always met with
suspicion, hostility, and hatred. 101 For Panikkar, “enemy” and “scapegoat” imagery thrives
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within dialectic hermeneutics and its use of reason to conceptualize the other. Thus, the
“unreasonable” strange-one becomes the source of fear and anxiety.102
Hospitality is not characteristically a Christian virtue. According to Panikkar it is
“essential to anyone who harbor the feelings that are fully human; feelings, I might go so far as
to say, that are indicative of a good state of health.”103 However, in the history of the Christian
tradition, hospitality has been dangerously reduced in meaning to mere generosity, and more
especially in the act of giving, especially of material wealth or possession from a benefactor—in
most cases, one that belongs to higher class—to a beneficiary who is often considered of lower
status.104 Along similar lines, “Christendom Christianity” became the benefactor religion of the
world, giving generously from the bounty of its fullness and yet unwilling to accept in return the
spiritual wealth of other religions.105 The Christian concept of generosity has historically been
conditioned as a one-way exercise: from the haves to the have-nots. The result is the
supersessionist attitude of Christianity towards other religions.
On the contrary, in Panikkar’s cosmotheandrism, hospitality depicts a transcendental
reality drawn from the Trinitarian perichoresis, wherein priority is given to mutuality and
reciprocity. In this activity, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are conjoined in an endless
dance of “giving” and “receiving.” Trinitarian perichoresis as the hermeneutical lens for
hospitality deconstructs “the have and the have-nots” polarity ingrained in Christian generosity.
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The principal target of this criticism seems to indicate that for Panikkar, the Trinitarian
perichoresis does not rest on the concept of generosity but on the hospitality that is guaranteed by
the “individuality, irreducibility and reciprocity” of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
Drawing from the Trinitarian mutuality, Panikkar argues that the human is attuned to the
rhythm of being, that is conditioned by receiving as well as in the giving. In this sense, being
human is being hospitable, being caught up in the rhythm of being that truly depicts the
Trinitarian life. In the strict theological sense, Panikkar argues that humans as part of the
cosmotheandric rhythm cannot claim to be the source of hospitality. Herein likes the major
difference between hospitality and generosity. Hospitality belongs to the ontological order of
reality, and the human person has an intrinsic connection to reality as a pole in the
cosmovision.106
Panikkar’s comparison between cosmotheandrism and Trinitarian perichoresis leaves
little doubt that he regards relationality as the bedrock for hospitality. The consequences brought
about by this perichoretic union are that the identity of each Trinitarian person is neither
subsumed by all nor isolated by the other. Hence, the dynamism of Trinitarian union is
constituted of and held by the relationality of each member to the other. Panikkar’s
cosmotheandric vision of realty proposes a similar principle between God, humans, and the
cosmos. It suggests also that the principle of “give and take” within the Trinitarian life can be a
veritable model for interreligious dialogue and mutual coexistence among religions. Panikkar
believes in the idea of the mutual fecundity of religions as the effervescent point of hospitality,
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wherein the guest and the host engage each other. For Panikkar, the fruitfulness of intercultural
dialogue rests upon this cosmotheandric process.107
As the fundamental virtue for Christian and Muslim dialogue, “hospitality and truth” are
corollaries. Genuine hospitality creates the room for reciprocal respect. As Panikkar argues, “in
order to know a religion (and therefore be in a position to talk about it) it is necessarily to share
in the lives of those who believe in it.”108 Thus, in advocating the concept of sharing, Panikkar
points to the Eucharistic character of hospitality—that is, its locale within the meal setting,
coupled with the idea of the brokenness of the bread; for it is only a bread broken that can be
shared. 109 It follows then that in Panikkar’s view, while the Eucharistic model emphasizes
otherness and irreducibility, yet it must guard against the prevalent hermeneutics of normativity
and its tendency to dominate and impose.110 Hospitality is about difference and the différance111
of otherness. This, after all, differentiates hospitality from all attempts toward similarity.112
Yet, a question arises at this juncture: what is the ultimate purpose of hospitality? What is
the point of reference between Panikkar’s hermeneutical theology of hospitality and the proposal
of a de jure pluralism and soteriology? What lessons can be drawn from the classical Trinitarian
perichoresis and Panikkar’s cosmotheandrism? At the immanent Trinitarian level, the answer is
contained in the question, meaning that God has no reason to account for God’s own being, or
God’s non-being, as the case may be. God is not a God for Godself, but rather a God in relation
107
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to the Cosmos and Humans.113 Divine hospitality therefore means simple participation of the
Father, Son, and Spirit in the Trinitarian Godhead. That is to say, Trinitarian relationality
(perichoresis) is not only a matter of fact (de facto), but also of principle (de jure).
Therefore, the task at hand is to approach the mystery of the Trinity at the cosmic and
economic level, where Trinitarian hospitality becomes prototypical for human hospitality.
Hospitality in this sense becomes part of the rhythm of being—both a de facto and de jure
condition of possibility of human encountering within the cosmovision. It is not difficult to see
how for Panikkar hospitality remains part and parcel of the cosmotheandric reciprocity—mutual
fecundity. 114 Panikkar recognizes that the future and fruition of inter-cultural, interreligious
dialogue rest upon this cosmotheandric process. Based on these convictions, he cautions, “it is
not possible to know another religion without practicing hospitality, not the way its believers live
it out. If we fail to experience hospitality we only have our own impression of that religion to go
by, not what it really is.”115
The intriguing implication of Panikkar’s hermeneutic theology is that it raises a further
question about the nature of identity and truth.116 Panikkar accounts for truth in relationality and
difference. This allows him to affirm the possibility of religious pluralism de jure from the
perspective of the guest and also from the purview of the stranger. In the theology of hospitality,
Panikkar resolves the de jure conundrum by positing a hermeneutical theology patterned by the
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Trinitarian perichoresis in the face of other theological opposition and the deadlock of
nomenclature—exclusivist, inclusivist, and pluralist.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION
The Middle-belt and Northern Nigeria is notoriously known as the epicenter for ethnic
and religious warfare. The hostility between the two dominant religions—Islam and
Christianity—has a beginning that pre-dates the British colonial occupation in 1903. This study
examines Panikkar’s pluralistic theology and its application as correctives to supersessionist
claims. Dialogical dialogue is a key concept in Panikkar’s pluralistic theology, and it forms the
backbone of the Cosmotheandric vision. By means of a short summary, this dissertation has
presented Panikkar’s Trinitarian theology of dialogue, which corresponds in particular to the
Indian tradition, and has proposed it as relevant for presenting a pneumatology of difference and
hospitality for interreligious dialogue in Jos, Plateau. From the scrutiny of contextualization, it is
valid to ask why one would instantiate Panikkar (Asian) in the Jos (African) terrain, knowing
well that Panikkar’s background consists of an encounter between Christianity, Hinduism,
Buddhism and Secularism? The answer is not farfetched. In their postcolonial critique, African
(American and Caribbean) and Asian scholars share a deep commitment to rejecting colonial
thinking and global design, along with the ripple effect it has on cross-cultural hermeneutics.
Post-colonialism attacks the central claim of the Western philosophical tradition: namely,
its totalizing and isolationist trends that deny otherness and difference. For good or ill, Nigeria
and India share a similar colonization experience. Contextual theologies resounding from the
frontiers of these nations register a strong opposition to the colonial mission’s attempt to deify
Jesus Christ as an imperial God, saddled with the responsibility of conquering other gods. 1
Panikkar’s entire theological enterprise involves a distillation of the historical contaminations
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associated with Western Christian identity as it evolves from “Christianity, Christendom, and
Christianness.” He states:
In simple terms, a growing number of our contemporaries want to be religious,
believing, and even Christian, but without the contaminations they feel have been
added to these words. They aspire to rediscover their roots in order to grow in a
soil that has not been spoiled by either the fertilizer of ancient times, the shrubs of
the middle ages, modern pesticides, or the radiations of postmodernity. Such a
struggle for renewal is innate in the human person; it has always been so, but in
our time it is acquiring historic, even cosmic proportions. Christianness…means,
first, liberation from a fixed and determined political order, which until recently
was regarded as indispensible for the practice of “Christian values”
(Christendom). It is also a liberation from identifying being Christian with the
acceptance
of
a
determined
series
of
Christian
doctrines
(Christianity)…Christianness is neither a new political form nor a new intellectual
creed; it is a commitment which, although it needs specific expressions and a
concrete political order to manifest itself, does not identify itself with any of these
things.2
For Panikkar, colonization, globalization, and universalization are products of monoculturalism, that is, Eurocentric perspectives. Thus, doing theology for Panikkar entails a fullfledged rejection of a belief in Western cultural superiority and its “hermeneutics of suppression”
and claim of intellectual sovereignty and dominance through the dialectical dualism. 3 Precisely,
Panikkar’s rejection of Western dualism leads to his proposal of a non-dualistic approach to the
Divine.
Through this conviction, Panikkar finds in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Secularism the
appropriate linguistic categories to convey the core message of the Christian faith in addition to
Hebrew, Greek, and Latin Christianity. In this cosmotheandric reality, embracing the cosmos, the
secular, and the mundane translates the matter and form for divinzation. It is the vocation of
human to make sacred the secular realm. Panikkar points out:
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To put forward my thesis straightaway: only worship can prevent secularization
from becoming inhuman, and only secularization can save worship from being
meaningless…the liturgical nature of man, thus considering worship to be an
essential human dimension, while, at the same time, recognizing secularization to
be a major phenomenon of our age, a phenomenon which, from now on, is
assuredly destined to assist the growth of man’s consciousness. Today, anyone
who is not exposed to secularization cannot hope to realize his humanity to the
full, at least not in terms o the twentieth century. On the other hand, man without
worship cannot even subsist.4
The background chapter provides an overview of the context of the study that is deeply
rooted in the colonial struggles that depict the people’s reaction to the institutionalization of the
hermeneutic of suppression orchestrated by the British colonial authority and later by the Fulani
hegemony. The introductory chapter also identifies the research questions, the sources consulted
in dealing with the questions, and the methods applied. Because of the connection of the research
questions to the reality of colonialism, a post-colonial critical approach was adopted as the frame
of reference in studying Panikkar. The preference for post-colonial critique in this research
hinges on three fundamental issues: first, the factors that led to the establishment of cultural
superiority by the British colonial administration; secondly, the adoption of a similar cultural
superiority by the Fulani hegemony over the Middle Belt minority ethnicities; and thirdly, the
creation of a Christian response to the first and second issues identified above from ethnic
minorities in Jos, Plateau.
From an insider’s perspective, the problem of interreligious dialogue in Jos, Plateau, is
traceable to the problem of alterity (otherness) and identity. Put differently, the colonial
apparatus ferments a triangulation of identity, between the British, the Fulani (Muslims), and
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ethnic minorities (Christians). At various times and out of sheer convenience, coupled with
political and economic gain, the British had taken sides with both ethnicities through a policy of
“divide and rule.” The results of this policy gave rise to the notion that the British tolerated the
flourishing of Islam in the North while simultaneously welcoming Christian missionaries in the
South. As a result, Jos, Plateau (Middle-Belt), became the melting point of Muslims and
Christians, constituting a religiously volatile situation. Thus, given the British colonial role in
shaping the socio-political, economic, and religious landscape in Northern Nigeria as a whole, it
became necessary to include the British colonial rule as an integral part of the study.
As already observed, the pre- and post-colonial response of Islam in the Sokoto Caliphate
to the British colonial rule does not form a single pattern. Support for or against the British was
registered along sectarian lines. With the fall of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1903, the split between
the Islamic sects turned into an open arena of confrontations. Not all Muslims accepted the fall
of the caliphate as the Divine will. While the Qadiriyya and Tijanniyya sects adapted easily to
the new reality of colonialism, the remnants of the Salafiyy/Wahhabi strongly opposed the
British rule on philosophical and theological grounds. For the Wahhabi, any form of
collaboration with the British is tantamount to support for Christianity, and it is deemed
heretical. Interestingly, however, both opposing sects agreed when the British jurisprudence
tended toward upholding the sharia—either partially or in its entirety.
The British, for lack of the required human resources to govern the vast geographical area
covered, maintained the socio-political structures of the defunct Sokoto Empire. As Umar
argues, the British had no choice other than to follow the colonial policies of “appropriation,
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containment, and surveillance” of Islam. 5 The British, through the indirect rule system,
appropriated the Qadiriyya and Tijanniyya sects to counter and thereafter contain the radicalized
tendencies of the Wahhabis. Consequently, these policies had an adverse effect on Islam; it
impeded its external growth and created internal disharmony. The most visible outcome was the
formation of an institutionalized version of political Islam, which would continue to be at
loggerheads with its revivalist counterpart. The cause of the sharia controversy and the
insurgence of newly Islamic fundamentalist sects in northern Nigeria are traceable to this
development.
In Jos, Plateau, the British continued to maintain its policy of indirect rule, although by
proxy—that is, the use of the Fulani hegemony over ethnic minorities. This arrangement did not
last, as the British thought it a matter of political expediency to return the traditional stool of
leadership to the BAA minority. This event in itself constitutes the root cause of ethnic and
religious violence in Jos, Plateau. The Fulani hegemony interpreted the British endorsement of
BAA as the subsequent dethronement of the Fulani as a “sub-imperialist” superior ethnic group.
The decision contradicted the “born to rule” narrative already in place by the Fulani ethnicity.
Jos saw its first wave of organized crisis in 1932 and 1945 when this axiom was challenged by
the growth in population of minority ethnicities, who became Christians.
Chapter 2 analyzed the hermeneutics of exclusion introduced by the British colonial
authority in their support for indirect rule of ethnic minorities by proxy. In the pre-colonial era,
the city of Jos and the entire Plateau had been annexed to the Bauchi emirate of the Sokoto
Caliphate; however, it never fell under the complete jurisdiction of the Bauchi. For lack of
geographical knowledge of the hilly terrain, the jihadists had lost most wars on the plateau,
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leaving the natives with a sense of esteem and pride in remaining unconquered until the arrival of
the British. Before then, the ethnic minorities had always maintained their autonomous right to
self-governing with the Bauchi emirate through diplomatic relations—that is, the amana contract
agreement.
Upon takeover of the Sokoto Caliphate, the British abrogated the customary amana
agreement between the ethnic minorities of Jos, Plateau, and the Bauchi emirate, thereby
subjecting the entire Benue-Plateau region under the new Bauchi province of the then Northern
Nigeria. This decision had both political and religious implications. Politically, it was a final
victory for the Fulani hegemony—a feat unachievable by the jihad. Religiously, it opened an
entire avenue for the propagation of Islam among the natives who were predominantly adherents
of African traditional religion.
The switch of loyalty from the Fulani hegemony to ethnic minorities by the British
sparked the “settlers and indigenes” controversy. Changes in demographics led the Christian
majority, which consisted of the ethnicities of BAA, to the claim of being the rightful owners and
authentic indigenes of Jos. Thus, the descendants of Hausa/Fulani ethnicities raise the question
of their own indigene-ship as well as rejecting the appellation as “settlers.”
What was at stake in the disputations between the “indigenes and settlers” was the issue
of land, politics, religion, and the question of ethnic belonging. For the BAA ethnicities, the time
had come for both political and religious emancipation and autonomy from the Fulani political
class. Hence the need for the Fulani hegemony to curb the political enthusiasm of the indigenes,
and their arrogant claims to lands and cultural identity led to the Jos crises of 1932, 1945, and
1994. Similarly, the 2001 crisis and its reprisals in 2004, 2008, 2010, and 2012 all had their
genesis in ethnic-religious incitement to hatred and wanton destruction of lives and property.
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The discovery of tin and iron ore in Jos led to an influx of immigrants into the city. The
new railway project brought workers from South Nigeria while the need for subsistence
agriculture saw the mass exodus of Hausa/Fulani nomads from the North into the plains of the
Plateau. In addition to the flow was the presence of huge number of expatriate and non-expatriate
(West Africans, Igbo, Yoruba, etc.) professional mine workers in the city. The presence of a
large population of migrant workers in Jos, mostly Christians, triggered a pastoral need that
would warrant the British’s justification to grant full permission to Christian missionaries to
operate within restricted areas of the North. This news was indeed good news for ethnic
minorities, who viewed Christianity as a tool for liberation from Islamic domination.
Despite the difficulties experienced by initial attempts to establish Christianity within the
core northern territories, the High Commissioner, Frederick Lugard, continued to nurture the
idea of advancing the gospel among the Middle-Belt ethnic minorities. This plan led to the
formation of the Sudan United Missions (SUM), an interdenominational missionary group whose
primary goal was to curb the advance of Islam through rigorous evangelism. SUM consists of the
Church of Scotland, the Wesleyan Methodist Church of England, the Methodist Church of
England, Congregational Church of England, and the Calvinistic Methodist Missions of Wales.
SUM evangelism, through a rhetoric of supremacy over Islam, led to the implantation of the
hermeneutics of exclusion and supersessionism, which later characterized the Christian response
to Muslims in Jos, Plateau. In addition, the nationalistic tendency of the SUM fueled existing
biases among the dominant Christian indigenes toward their perceived Muslim opponents.
Furthermore, Catholic response to Christian exclusivism through Nostra Aetate from
Vatican II claimed that the Church rejects nothing that is true from other religions. Through this
teaching, the Church gradually moved away from exclusive claims of religious superiority and
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embraced religious pluralism de facto. That would mean that for the Catholic Church, Islam
exists in its own right as another religion. However, the recognition of Islam de facto did not
erase the deep seated biases created over the years by the exclusivist hermeneutic established by
the SUM and employed mostly by evangelical and Pentecostal Christians today. The crisis faced
by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) remains a testimony to this con-fusion of
perspectives.
The ambivalent nature of the relationship between Christianity and Islam raises the
question anew: is Islam one of the religions of the book (Judaism and Christianity) and thus a
part of God’s saving plan (de jure)? In essence, castigating the other religions as a reflection of a
ray of the truth, the Catholic Church constitutes itself to be the ultimate religion with an absolute
monopoly of truth, which the Church alone possesses in fullness. More problematic is the fact
that the Protestant hermeneutics drawn from Christian nationalism hinder collaborative dialogue.
At this level of discourse, both Catholics and Protestants share a similar hermeneutics of
superiority (of Jesus Christ and of Christianity) over Islam and the African traditional religion.
The result has been an unbridgeable gap, which exists between the exclusivist claims of
supersessionist classical Christology and the challenge of the reality of de facto and de jure
religious pluralism.
Chapter 3 provided a detailed analysis of Panikkar’s reaction to the central claim of
supersessionist thinking. Panikkar sees his theology as deeply rooted in the confluence of
religious experience whereby an acceptance of difference becomes the hermeneutical key to
dialogue, away from the presuppositions of suppression, superiority, and supersessionism. This
critique leads Panikkar to a critical stance towards the exclusivist and inclusivist tendencies
inherent in traditional Christology, which he considers not too respectful to otherness and
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difference. Panikkar tactically traces the history of traditional Christology and finds it grossly
inadequate on two grounds for cross-cultural hermeneutics; first, it thrives well only in
monotheistic backgrounds, and second, it is rooted in dualistic perspectives. Hence, the search
for an authentic theology of Christ that draws from the Christian traditions and yet transcends the
tripology—exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism—lead Panikkar to an exploration of the
mystical approach to Christian theology—Christophany: that is, “to move from a tribal
Christology into a Christophany less bound to a single cultural current.”6
Panikkar intends to create a methodology of interreligious dialogue that adequately
addresses the signs of the times as well as the state of the religions. A radically pluralistic world
demands a radical pluralism that takes the relationship between the Cosmos, God, and Humans
seriously and sheds a new light. The search for an authentic pluralism of difference that is rooted
in Christophany ushers in a notion of Christ that transcends the mono-cultural formulations that
characterize Eurocentric hermeneutics.
A good starting point, according to Panikkar, signals a return of the Christological debate
to its Trinitarian locus where Christophany reveals the perichoretic reality that Christ not only
shares with the Father and the Spirit, but with the entire cosmos and humans. This will mean
creating a new theological anthropology that situates humans within the cosmotheandric vision,
and not as atomic individual units devoid of spiritual connections. In the light of this analysis,
Panikkar argues that an authentic theology of Christ within the framework of Christophany must
transcend the particularities of culture while still responding to the needs of the universe (as
cosmos).

6
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In a way that is consistent with the language of postmodernism—that is, a critique of
meta-narratives and post-colonialism—Panikkar exposes the danger inherent in strict adherence
to mono-logical claims about ultimate mystery. He says, “We must accept that some religious
traditions are mutually incommensurable,”7 consequently, religions like Christianity must “give
up any pretense to monopoly of what religion stands for.” 8 It is here, within the critique of
monotheism, that Panikkar sees pluralism as the attitude that recognizes perspectives in ways
that promote “irreducibility, individuality, and reciprocity.” Another name for pluralism as an
integral principle of the cosmotheandrism is perichoresis—interrelatedness.
Although the claim that Panikkar qualifies as a pluralist sui generis is defensible, yet the
need to qualify the limits of his pluralism against the trends and critiques of his contemporaries is
paramount. Panikkar’s theology, on the one hand, shares a perspective with Kant, Hick, and
Knitter that gives credibility to experience and historical narratives. The emphasis on narratives
means that no religion, regardless of its claim of uniqueness, can escape the scrutiny of history.
On the other hand, Panikkar agrees with Heim about the need for religions to maintain their
individuality and difference. Notwithstanding their shared areas of similarity, Panikkar’s
emphasis on non-dualism sets his pluralism apart from the Western perspectives represented in
the works of Hick, Knitter, and Heim. To acknowledge that Panikkar and the other scholars offer
similar accounts of interreligious dialogue that stresses the importance of alterity is not to say
they handle the problem of the “One and the Many” in the same way. A further comparison will
show that Panikkar tried to solve this dilemma at the mythical or mystical level beyond the
Western conceptual dualism of epistemology/ontology, subject/object, and mind/body.

7
8

Panikkar, “God of Life, Idols of Death,” Monastic Studies 7 (1986): 109.
Panikkar, “Have ‘Religions’ the Monopoly on Religion?” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 11 (1974): 517.
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From the Asian perspective, a subtle resemblance exists between Panikkar, Dupuis, and
Phan. In some cases this resemblance depicts areas of their studies that are either overlapping or
complementary, showing contraries and contradictions as well. All the same, these theologians,
each in his peculiar style, reject the notion of Christian supersessionism and the perceptible
doctrinal positions that construe other religious traditions as preparation for Christianity.
In Phan’s case, claims to the universal validity of one’s religion derive from the
particularity of religious experience and, as such, do not preclude adherents of other religions
from similar acts of religious faith. There is indeed something to learn from the Christian
perspective of Christ as the universal savior that also acknowledges Judaism as still another valid
track of salvation. In offering a theological response to the problem of Christian identity and
religious pluralism, Dupuis contends that deep within Christian theology, there are resources to
construct a genuine theology of religious pluralism that create room for other salvific figures
within the divine plan of salvation. In doing so, Dupuis affirms the traditional theology of the de
jure salvific role of Jesus Christ: his universality and uniqueness. However, he further maintains
that the particularity of the Christ-event in Nazareth does not empty the Divine will to save
through figures and traditions found outside of Christianity. This opportunity of salvation is not
outside the economy of the Holy Spirit. This means that the other religious traditions do not exist
“only in a secondary and provisional sense.”9 They have rights both de facto and de jure to exist
within the realm of history and human consciousness.
Chapter 4 vividly describes the philosophical background and the spiritual perspective of
Panikkar’s theology of dialogue. Dialogical dialogue belongs rightly to the realm of reality
Dupuis, though indebted to Rahner in many ways, rejects Rahner’s adoption of fulfillment theology. See
Karl Rahner, “Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions,” in Theological Investigations 5 (London: Darton,
Longman & Todd, 1966), 115-134. Dupuis fingered, Jean Danielou, Henri de Lubac and Hans Urs von Balthasaar as
equally product of the “fulfillment theory.” Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, 130-57.
9
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which Panikkar describes as the mythical. The incommensurability of the mythical phenomenon
extends beyond the confines of the dialectic of logos. Drawing attention to the concept of the
“incommensurable” of myths as the soul and nature of all religions, Panikkar argues that the
attempt by particular religions to monopolize claims relating to Ultimate Mystery has been the
fundamental barrier to interreligious dialogue. Panikkar describes this predicament as the
dethronement of myths and the enthronement of the hermeneutics of logos—that is, dialectics.
The knowledge of the incommensurability of both the phenomenon of religion and that of
the Ultimate Mystery is for Panikkar the prerequisite to entering the mythical realm. The
mythical experiencing of the divine surpasses particular doctrinal formulations of religions. It is
the presence of the other that reveals my myth. Thus, the humbling fact that one does not know
everything about one’s own myth is, for Panikkar, the epistemological grounds for accepting and
practicing pluralism.
Ultimately, for Panikkar, the cosmotheandric principle has implications for religious
pluralism. Most important, Panikkar’s advocacy of the perichoresis—interrelatedness—that
exists between the cosmotheandric triad structures reveals that the human spirit is open to the
realm of infinite possibilities. This inherent and universal tendency of the human to
transcendence can no longer be tamed under monotheistic absolutism. It is supposed that nontheistic traditions share a capacity similar to that of transcendence. Under the cosmotheandric
principle, dialogue is no longer at the dispensation and discretion of particular religions because
“the experience of God cannot be monopolized by any religion or system of thought.” 10
Consequently, it can be argued that “a plurality of religions is required since one single religion

10
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cannot provide enough space for the multiplicity of human experiences and divine
manifestations.”11
Panikkar’s concept of “dialogical dialogue” forms the central and connecting thread of
his Trinitarian spirituality and cosmotheandrism principles. It deplores traditional theological
ideas built on the mono-polar structures of absolute egocentric categories. Panikkar’s
cosmotheandrism is deeply rooted in the Advaitic Vedanta—non dualism. Through this reality,
Panikkar advances an epistemic, linguistic, and theological alternative to the Western problems
of the “One and Many,” and “Being and beings.” In many instances, Panikkar reaches the
conclusion that an advaitic approach to Christianity is not only a possibility but also part of
divine plan.
Panikkar’s theology of multiple religious belongings provides concepts for interreligious
conflict management and resolutions.12 He implants this framework into the dialogical literature
shared in part by Martin Buber’s encounter of the familiar and the stranger, the classical “I and
Thou”13 paradigm. Panikkar links them to interreligious peace, the central goal of cross-cultural
hermeneutics. He thus provides ways to interject the starting point of a peace movement. Those
are the rules of encounter and dialogue. Panikkar identifies nine rules for effective dialogue:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

It must be free from particular apologetics.
It must be free from general apologetics.
One must face the challenge of conversion.
The historical dimension is necessary but not sufficient.
It is not just a congress of philosophy.
It is not only a theological symposium.
It is not merely an ecclesiastical endeavour.
It is a religious encounter in faith, hope, and love.

11

Komulainen, 113f.
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9. Intra-religious dialogue has primacy.14
In part, these rules suggest predispositions for dialogue that is geared towards peacemaking and peace-keeping. An understanding of Panikkar’s “rules for religious encounter”
hinges first on the hermeneutical distinction between faith and belief. Panikkar describes faith as
the “constitutive human dimension” derived from the transcendental category of the divine
embedded in all peoples, cultures, and religions.15 It is not the prerogative of the few. Panikkar
acknowledges further that one does not possess faith like doctrines. Faith is a given, “the ever
inexhaustible mystery, beyond the reach of objective knowledge.”16 Panikkar situates Faith in the
inter-transcendental realm. Hence, “Faith cannot be equated with belief, but faith always needs a
belief to be faith. Belief is not faith, but it must convey faith. A disembodied faith is not faith.”17
The term “belief” for Panikkar refers to a set of doctrines, rituals, and ideologies by
which a religious tradition is identified by symbol, the “vehicle by which human consciousness
passes from myth to logos.”18 Belief accentuates that which is culturally valued, that which is
subject to change with the passing of time. Yet in the midst of change, the discourse of belief is
kept alive only through symbolic systems. It is here, at the level of symbolic discourse (not
doctrinal), that Panikkar locates interfaith encounter—dialogical dialogue.19
Panikkar distinguishes yet a second layer of his “rules of religious encounter,” by
differentiating between “dialectical dialogue” and “dialogical dialogue.” Panikkar summarizes
the difference thus:
The dialectical dialogue is a dialogue about objects, that interestingly enough, the
English language calls “subject matters.” The dialogical dialogue, on the other
14
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hand, is a dialogue among subjects aiming at being dialogue about subjects. They
want to dialogue not about something, but about themselves: they dialogue
themselves. In short, if all thinking is dialogue, not all dialogue is dialogical. The
dialogical dialogue is not so much about opinions, (the famous endoxa (ένδοξα)
of Aristotle about which dialectics deals) as about those who have such opinions
and eventually not about you but about me to you.20
In light of the analysis undertaken in this research, Panikkar’s criticism of dialectal
dialogue is guided by his rejection of the principles of logic and dialectics. The application of
these principles mutes the voice and reduces the presence of the “other” in the dialogic process.
At its best, dialectical dialogue hinders the mutual openness of self to the other. On the other
hand, dialogical dialogue ensures openness. As Madhuri M. Yadlapati argues, “the aim of such
openness is to place the other in a position not simply of equality but even of priority.”21
In this regard, priority and openness are the sine qua non for dialogical dialogue. The
idea of giving “priority” to the other religions amounts to being respectful and truthful to these
traditions. Finding truth in the other religions and acknowledging it as such is, indeed, an integral
part of witnessing. This form of inter-personal hermeneutics, according to Panikkar, leads to
mutual trust and reciprocity, given that “what the other bear is not a critique of my ideas but
witness to his own experience, which then enters our dialogue, flows with it and awaits a new
fecundation.”22
At first sight, Panikkar’s critique of dialectical approach can be perceived as entirely
negative. However, he draws attention to the positive values inherent in dialectics but
specifically warns against its unbridled brand:
Dialogue seeks truth by trusting the other, just as dialectics pursues truth by
trusting the order of things, the value of reason and weighty arguments. Dialectics
is the optimism of reason; dialogue is the optimism of the heart. Dialectics
20
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believes it can approach truth by relying on the objective consistency of ideas.
Dialogue believes it can advance along the way to truth by relying on the
subjective consistency of the dialogical partners. Dialogue does not seek primarily
to be duo-logue, a duet of two logoi, which would still be dialectical; but a dialogos, a piercing of the logos to attain a truth that transcends it.23
Furthermore, Panikkar’s concept of “dialogical dialogue” has implications for religious
pluralism. By application, this research draws attention to the two major factors of “monotheistic
absolutism” and “dialectical totalitarianism” that has prevented mutual conversation among
religions. Based on his radical pluralism, which is deep and multi-dimensional, Panikkar strongly
criticizes the absolute posturing of monotheism. Accordingly, he contends that pluralism is more
than mere plurality. He states: “Pluralism, therefore, does not mean that we recognize many
ways (plurality) but that we detect many forms which we cannot recognize as ways leading to the
goal. Pluralism does not mean just tolerance of the many ways. It is rather that human attitude
which faces intolerance without being broken.”24
Thus, Panikkar distances himself from any system—be it scientific, philosophical, or
theological—that leans towards absolutism. Consequently, “this means that even the
monotheistic concept of God has come under very critical scrutiny. Due to this change,
traditional theological concepts such as ‘Absolute’ and ‘God’ are not to be found easily in
Panikkar’s later work.”25 In the Rhythm of Being, Panikkar defends the notion of the divine that
is founded on the cosmotheandric vision of reality. By so doing, he intends, “to ‘liberate’ the
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Divine from the burden of being ‘God.’”26 This way of viewing the divine amounts to a total
rejection of the absoluteness of monotheism.
A deeper analysis of Panikkar’s concept of cosmotheandrism sums up this holistic
perspective. Panikkar’s entire theological endeavor culminates in his discovery of
cosmotheandrism, which opens the debate on religious dialogue on many fronts.
First, cosmotheandrism binds the human, the cosmos, and the divine in an indissoluble
union while at the same time maintaining the individuality of all. On this level, the apparent
division between transcendence and immanence is bridged through the pneumatic activities of
the Spirit. Through the lenses of the Spirit, reality is neither “one nor many.” In short, reality as a
whole depicts the Trinitarian mystery, in which the Father, Son, and the Spirit dwell in an eternal
perichoresis.
Second, Panikkar’s cosmotheandrism creates a “new anthropology” for man as an
integral member of the cosmic reality. Involved in this cosmic rhythm, man ceases to be the
measure of all things but is perceived as co-creator. This new cosmology ingrains in man the
spirituality of otherness. Because of this intrinsic ontological connection between man and
otherness, the practice of religion is conditioned by relationality: namely, by giving respect to
the relative value of all religions while eschewing relativism.
Third, Panikkar intends to avoid the mistake he tags as the “Western syndrome”: namely,
its superficial interpretation of the Trinity within the philosophical problem of the “one and
many.” Through the cosmotheandric approach to the divine, Panikkar’s Trinitarian discourse
situated the revelation of God—self-disclosure within the context of the entire oikonomia—
beyond the confines of particular theological systems, or orthodoxy. Such a theological outlook
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has tremendous implications for Christology and pneumatology. Systematically, for Panikkar,
the apophatism of the Father defines the salvific role of the Son and the Spirit in a new,
unorthodox light. Consequently, it is no surprise that Panikkar surmised that classical
Christology with its historical baggage of exclusivsm and mitigated inclusivism cannot be the
hermeneutical grounds that grant alterity to religions in the pluralistic setting.
Thus, only Christophany can provide this tran-historical epistemology necessary for
pluralism to thrive. Similarly, Panikkar’s advocacy for a “new Christology”—which he calls
“Christophany”—indicates awareness that the apophatic theology of the Father provides the
hermeneutical key for understanding the “Christic principle” that grounds his “symbol
Christology.” Besides the fact that Christophany opens the horizon for universal ontology, some
other ramifications are manifold, especially with respect to the question of the universal validity
of Christ in whom the fullness of the revelation of the Father dwells. Christophany salvages
Christology, rebranding it anew within the pluralistic context where a movement away from the
exclusivist claims of classical Christology becomes the sine qua non for the practices of religious
pluralism de jure.
Fourth, the cosmotheandric vision brings a profound re-definition of identity, which is
contextualized by relationality. Nothing stands alone, everything that exist stand in relation to
something else. Thus, in line with Panikkar’s cosmotheandrism, it is an absurdity to
conceptualize God without humans and the cosmos. When carefully analyzed, Panikkar’s
symbolism of the perichoretic relationality of God—Human—Cosmos is not only constitutive of
reality but also serves as the principle for being and existence. In other words, “to be” means
being “wrapped in radical relationality,” for nothing exists in “total ab-solutus, solutes ab.”27
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With this cosmotheandrism, Panikkar goes on to argue that Christianity as a religion is not
outside of this communion, nor can it be exonerated from this commitment to otherness.
As our theological investigation draws to a close, it will be profitable to retrace our steps
in order to consider the implications of Panikkar’s theological pluralism on Christological
supersessionism and its repercussions for the Christian and Muslim dialogue in Jos, Nigeria. To
this end, the application of Panikkar’s dialogical dialogue to the framing of Christian subjectivity
and the reconfiguration of Christian identity in Jos in the face of the irreducible other, the
Muslims, without constituting supersessionism remains the litmus test for the practice of
religious pluralism. As demonstrated above, the history of Muslim and Christian dialogue in Jos
Plateau has been marred by instances of dialectical dialogue, characterized by the monopoly of
perspectives. By and large, Christian response to the crisis has not departed from the inherited
Christological hermeneutics borrowed from colonial Christianity.28
In the context of progressive revelation, therefore, the presence of Islam becomes for
Christianity an authentic source of revelation, not to be conquered or overthrown but to be
revealed, reverenced, and respected. Dialectical dialogue in this sense threatens progressive
revelation. The continuous practice of the semblance of dialectical dialogue prevents Christianity
in Jos, Plateau, from viewing Islam as an authentic source of revelation. As a result, the
evangelical and triumphalistic tendency of Christians to monopolize and “lord it over” Muslims
has been identified as a dangerous recipe for religious violence and war.
Therefore, the search for mutual fecundation between Christians and Muslims in Jos,
Plateau, has led to a consideration of Panikkar’s cosmotheandrism, wherein his non-dualistic
Trinitarian perspectives provide some theological variations that can help overthrow
28
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Christological exclusivism. At the very center of Panikkar’s hermeneutics is the disposal of all
exclusive Christological claims of superiority, thus leading to a situation where Christians will
accept Muslims as equal dialogical partners and as an other with the de jure right to
salvation/redemption.
Theologically, Panikkar’s concept of relativity between the Father (apophatic sense), the
Son (Christic principle) and the Spirit provides the principle for this communication: namely,
that both Christianity and Islam can maintain their “individuality, irreducibility, and reciprocity”
within the dialogic process. We re-state Panikkar’s motto: “There is no ‘One’ that can be
imposed on the Many…and there are no Many that will be reduced to the One.”29 Just as in their
“individuality” and “irreducibility” an identity is maintained, so too in “reciprocity,” religious
identity is transformed in the process of give and take. Panikkar’s definition of Pluralism is
located at this point of the “give-and-take” wherein the unpalatable and unbridgeable characters
of individuality and difference are acknowledged and accepted as such.
Given the ambiguity in Panikkar’s theology, this research offers a way to understand and
contextualize his Trinitarian cosmotheandrism by arguing for a pneumatology of charity and
hospitality. Such hospitality requires commitment (from both the host and guest alike) to respect
and acknowledge the truth value inherent in each other’s religions. Within this overarching
framework of hospitality, the religious tradition of the guest is not to be considered a preparatio
evangelica, but an unconquerable and irreducible myth. Amidst other social, political, and ethnic
factors, the lack of recognition of the truth value inherent in each other’s religion remains the
greatest obstacle to Muslim and Christian dialogue in Jos, Plateau.
29
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Indeed on the part of the Christians, exclusivist Christological claims have blocked
genuine empathy towards achieving difference and alterity. Therefore, there are good reasons to
submit that, when carefully analyzed, Panikkar’s dialogical dialogue, which emanates from his
Trinitarian cosmotheandrism, discloses a veritable alternative to supersessionist Christology.
Adopting a dynamic pneumatology of charity and hospitality enables us not only to overcome
the flaws of supersessionist thinking, but also to create the necessary environment for the
flourishing of religious pluralism de jure.
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